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Heritage crime is a marginalised, misunderstood, and under-researched area of crime. The 
existing body of literature has largely failed to examine the experiences, attitudes towards, 
and understandings of heritage crime from the perspective of victims, the police, and 
heritage practitioners in England and Wales. Employing a qualitatively led mixed methods 
methodology, this is the first empirical piece of research which examines the lived realities 
of the victims of heritage crime and those policing the phenomenon. It advances our 
understanding of how police respond to and navigate the challenges of policing heritage 
crime, and examines the victims of heritage crime, exploring who they are and how 
heritage crime impacts upon them. 
 
These issues are confronted within the wider context of police responses to heritage crime 
and are situated amongst contemporary socio-economic and political issues. The findings 
reveal that heritage crime is rarely understood by police officers, is often perceived as a 
policing burden, and is not considered to be an important or serious enough crime to 
devote police time to. Officers are reluctant to engage in policing an area they do not fully 
understand, for numerous reasons, including a fear of engaging in an unknown area of 
crime and a lack of support and training. These issues contribute to a largely poor police 
response to victims of heritage crime, which contrasts with the acute impact this crime has 
upon victims. 
 
The research found that there are numerous obstacles which hinder the confident and 
joined-up policing of heritage crime and the just treatment of its victims. Potential 
solutions are presented, centring around police officer education and practical methods of 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“They see it as a crime, and a bit of lead’s a bit of lead, whereas to me, 
a bit of lead has intrinsic history in it…its personal to the site” 
 
Heritage is a difficult concept to unpick. It is fluid, and open to continuous interpretation 
and reinterpretation across time (Graham, 2002). Paradoxically, crime is solidified into 
law, as that which is ‘sufficiently injurious to the public to warrant the application of 
criminal procedure to deal with them’ (Ormerod and Laird, 2018: 6). ‘Heritage crime’ is a 
term used to describe crimes against heritage sites and assets (Historic England, 2019a). 
There is thus something of an inherent tension between the underpinning concepts. Indeed, 
there is currently no overarching law specifically pertaining to heritage crime (although 
there are specific laws for specific types of heritage crime) and heritage crime is not 
currently required to be recorded by the Home Office (Shelbourn, 2014a, NPCC, 2017). 
Legally, ‘heritage crime’ is not a self-standing criminal offence. However, we know from 
the limited empirical research available, that despite not being classified as a crime, 
heritage crime has a tangible and profound impact upon its victims (Oxford Archaeology, 
2009a, 2009b; Shelbourn, 2014b; Poyser and Poyser, 2017). 
 
Contrastingly, heritage crime remains a marginalised area of crime within policing, which 
the majority of police officers have limited knowledge of (NPCC, 2017), whilst others are 
unaware that the crime exists (Oxford Archaeology, 2009b; Shelbourn 2014a). To 
compound these issues, the impacts of heritage crime are often intangible, such as the loss 
of historical value and the emotional impact upon victims of the crime (Poyser and Poyser, 
2017). These impacts are, of course, recognised by the victims of heritage crime, but they 
are rarely recognised by police officers, who are looking for a tangible impact of a crime 
(Oxford Archaeology, 2009b). With a lack of knowledge and understanding of its impact 
therefore, officers may not feel confident in responding to heritage crime. However, 
victims may assume that officers will, nevertheless, recognise that crimes against heritage 
sites and assets should be recognised as crimes, and responded to as such by the State. 
Research has shown that in multiple and varying heritage crime cases, police officers 
respond to heritage crime very poorly, resulting in victims feeling frustrated and distressed 
(Shelbourn, 2014a, Poyser and Poyser, 2017). Victims have often been challenged by 
officers as to the validity of heritage crime (Shelbourn, 2014a; Oxford Archaeology, 
2009b). Officers have denied and downplayed the importance and intangible impacts of 
heritage crime, even after being told what these are by the victim (Shelbourn, 2014b). 
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Victims have also reported officers failing to attend heritage crime cases after they had 
been reported, and officers stating that heritage crime is not a police matter (Poyser and 
Poyser, 2017). Research has established that certain crimes are neglected, downgraded, 
and marginalised by the police organisation (Loftus, 2009) despite their validity as crimes. 
Historically, police officers have neglected a plethora of crimes which they deem 
unworthy of police time, many of which have a direct human victim (Hoyle, 1996). It is 
perhaps unsurprising then that heritage crime, which lacks an immediate human victim in 
police terms, is not always thought of as particularly important nor taken seriously by 
police officers. 
 
Overall, the existing research indicates that heritage crime is not perceived as ‘real’ police 
work and its associated impacts and victims are not taken seriously by police officers, 
leaving victims marooned by the criminal justice system (CJS) (Reiner, 2010). Indeed, 
questions may be raised as to why heritage crime should be policed at all, from both police 
officers and the public. In an era of inescapable austerity which continues to impact upon 
police forces (Grierson, 2017), alongside a changing landscape of criminality, such as a 
steep rise in particularly challenging crimes including online crime (Jewkes and Yar, 
2011), hate crime (Chakraborti, 2009), and human trafficking (Gentleman, 2020); heritage 
crime will never be a political, nor policing, priority. 
 
Indeed, heritage is already ‘dead’ and the possible extinction of heritage (Brodie, 2002) 
through acts of heritage crime, could be viewed as a loss which is unimportant in 
comparison to the loss associated with other crimes that involve human harm. From a 
policing perspective, there is no direct human victim of heritage crime, no individual 
whose life is in danger, no risk of harm or injury to a person. Whilst we can safely assume 
that heritage crime will never be a policing priority, its impacts, nevertheless, remain 
severe and wide-reaching. Heritage sites and assets possess a plethora of tangible and 
intangible values (Smith, 2006). Historical value, for example, is an intangible value 
which police officers may not recognise. Yet, if historical value is lost as a result of 
heritage crime, this loss impacts upon society’s understanding of the heritage site or asset 
which has been damaged, and our overall understanding of history (Thomas and Grove, 
2014). Therefore, heritage crime can be seen to be affecting communities and society as a 
whole (Baxter and Bullen, 2011). Indeed, heritage crime may not only unsettle but also 
devastate local communities, who are likely to have personally ascribed intangible values 
to the site or asset over time (Drake, 2008). More tangibly, heritage sites and assets are 
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often important sources of economic income (Walker, 2014), which can dramatically 
reduce in the wake of heritage crime. 
 
The track record of the police in dealing with other marginalised crimes such as rural and 
wildlife crime and arts and antiques crime (the cousin of heritage crime) have not been 
particularly positive. Research has revealed that the reluctance to police these crimes has 
been a combination of facets of police culture, a lack of police interest in and motivation 
to police them, and limited resources (Fyfe and Reeves, 2011; Lennon, 2003; Oxford 
Archaeology, 2009a). Heritage crime however, unlike the similarly marginalised areas of 
rural and wildlife crime, and arts and antiques crime, is a relatively new area of crime for 
police forces in England and Wales. The name was only officially attached to the crime by 
Historic England and Cadw (the English and Welsh heritage bodies respectively) in 2011 
(NPCC, 2013). 
 
Ultimately, there is a permeance to heritage crime which does not occur with many other 
crimes of this nature. Criminal damage against a bus shelter may be an inconvenience but 
can be fixed or replaced. Criminal damage against a heritage site or asset is far more 
serious, as such damage destroys historical fabric, which cannot be replaced in kind. 
Indeed, some of the most severe heritage crime cases might lead to sites and assets being 
permanently destroyed; and once heritage is gone, it cannot come back. Whether heritage 
crime is perceived by police forces as a crime worthy of policing is crucial for the future 
of our heritage. 
 
1.1 : Background to the study 
 
The foundations for this project began when the researcher was conducting empirical 
research for a much smaller study on heritage crime. This research involved sending 
questionnaires to neighbourhood policing teams in Nottinghamshire and conducting semi- 
structured interviews with victims of heritage crime (Poyser and Poyser, 2017). With 
limited time to conduct empirical research during this period, the research pool was small 
(9 semi-structured interviews with victims and 50 questionnaires to police officers) and 
restricted to Nottinghamshire. However, it became apparent that there was both a clear 
problem in the policing of heritage crime, and that victims were eager to talk about a 
problem which they felt was being ignored. The findings prompted further interest from 
the researcher and motivated the researcher to conduct research on a broader scale. Whilst 
conducting the research and drawing upon the limited research on heritage crime, it was 
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noted that Wales had failed to be acknowledged or empirically examined in this existing 
body of research. Therefore, it was decided that a broader study should include Wales 
within its remit. This could also be accomplished as both England and Wales share the 
same legal system, though separate systems of heritage governance (Belford, 2018). Cadw 
is the Welsh heritage body which oversees the protection, conservation and preservation 
of heritage sites and assets in Wales, and Historic England is its English counterpart. 
 
1.2 : Original contribution to knowledge 
 
Existing academic research on heritage crime is limited. Much of the existing research has 
been literature based (see Grove and Thomas, 2014; Shelbourn, 2008; Shelbourn, 2014a), 
and the empirical gap in relation to heritage crime is extensive. Currently, only four 
empirical studies have explored heritage crime in England and Wales (two qualitative and 
two quantitative). Of the two qualitative studies, one of these is Oxford Archaeology’s 
Nighthawking Report, which focussed upon illegal metal detecting (otherwise known as 
nighthawking) and produced a report and a second recommendation document (2009a, 
2009b). The other is Poyser and Poyser’s (2017) study, mentioned above. 
 
Quantitative approaches can be located in Shelbourn’s (2014a) study, which involved 
sending a survey to archaeologists, leading to a focus upon crimes such as archaeological 
theft, and Bradley et al’s (2012) study, which examined the scale of anti-social behaviour 
and crime on heritage sites and assets in England. Therefore, with only four empirical 
studies, three of which are arguably outdated, we know very little about heritage crime in 
practice. The existing research indicates that heritage crime is widespread, and although 
current crime statistics do not include a heritage crime category, there has been an attempt 
to quantify the phenomenon, with Bradley et al (2012) estimating that over 70,000 
heritage crime cases occurred in 2011. Research also indicates that police officers fail to 
understand heritage crime and have a very poor perception of it (Oxford Archaeology, 
2009a; Poyser and Poyser, 2017), downgrading it and viewing it as ‘rubbish’ (Reiner, 
2010). Research has revealed that the police treatment of heritage crime victims also 
appears to be poor (Shelbourn, 2014a). 
 
None of the aforementioned studies have comprehensively examined victimisation and 
heritage crime, nor police officers’ understandings, perceptions and awareness of heritage 
crime. Wales has also been side-lined by the existing research. This thesis plugs a 
significant gap in our understanding of heritage crime and provides a springboard for 
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further study in the area. By researching the experiences of officers at the front-line of 
policing heritage crime, it provides empirically-informed and practical suggestions for 
improving police officers’ understandings, perceptions and awareness of heritage crime, as 
well as their treatment of victims. 
 
On a practical level, these solutions account for the realities of front-line policing, and 
help inform both academic and policing understandings of the practical issues of policing 
heritage crime, from the perspectives of the officers themselves. Lastly, the thesis 
highlights the issues associated with the practical implementation of policing policy, into 
policing practice, and calls for police leaders to recognise the flaws of not liaising with 
front-line officers. On a conceptual level, this thesis draws on existing theory with a 
heritage specific focus, chiefly Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) Broken Windows Theory, 
illustrating how many criminological assumptions regarding disorder and crime do not 
apply to heritage sites and assets. Furthermore, this research challenges current theoretical 
assumptions regarding heritage crime (chiefly the empirically unsupported literature that 
crime prevention will help prevent and tackle heritage crime (Grove and Pease, 2014)). 
Progressing theoretical knowledge in the area of heritage crime will not only help future 
researchers in the field, but theories with a practical element, such as Broken Windows 
theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) and crime prevention are anticipated to produce further 
research which helps inform and improve police responses to heritage crime. 
 
1.3 : Research questions 
 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to examine and compare police officers’, heritage 
practitioners’ and victims’ understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime in 
England and Wales. A secondary aim was to identify and address some of the challenges 
associated with policing heritage crime more broadly in order to reflect the lived 
experiences of victims of heritage crime. In doing so, this research will broaden the 
existing empirical landscape of heritage crime, thereby providing a foundation for future 
research in the field: 
 
In order to fulfil these aims, the following questions were developed: 
 
 
1. How has the heritage sector in England and Wales influenced attitudes towards heritage 
and heritage crime in each country? 
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2. How do police officers understand, become aware of and perceive heritage crime, and 
how does this affect their response to victims? 
 
3. What obstacles exist to impede the effective policing of heritage crime in England and 
Wales? 
 
4. Who are the victims of heritage crime, and how do they understand, perceive and 
respond to it? 
 
5. Can victim-focussed mechanisms be developed to overcome the obstacles to the 
effective policing of heritage crime? 
 
1.4 : Chapter outline 
 
Following this introduction, the thesis comprises six substantive chapters, and a 
concluding chapter. Chapter 2, the literature review, begins by examining the contested 
concept of heritage and introducing the concept of heritage crime. It illustrates how 
heritage is socially, economically and politically constructed, and explains how heritage 
crime came to be unofficially recognised as a crime in England and Wales. It establishes 
the current position of police understandings and awareness of heritage crime amongst 
officers in England and Wales, explores how police culture may influence understandings 
and awareness, and details various policing approaches towards it. The similarly 
marginalised areas of policing, specifically rural and wildlife crime, are also drawn upon 
in order to inform this chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the different research methods employed for the purposes of this 
study, and how they were used to examine police, heritage practitioner, and victim 
perceptions, understandings and awareness of heritage crime in England and Wales. It also 
describes how the interview and FOI data were analysed and addresses ethical 
considerations. 
 
The findings of this research are outlined in three subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 analyses 
the results of semi-structured interviews with police officers and heritage practitioners. 
This chapter reveals that there are multiple issues relating to understandings, perceptions 
and awareness of heritage crime not just amongst police officers, but throughout the CJS. 
Firstly, the barriers to a positive perception and good level of understanding and 
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awareness of heritage crime are explored. The victims and impact of heritage crime are 
then discussed. Secondly, heritage crime is situated within the current policing 
environment. The issues with attaching heritage to rural crime are then extrapolated, and 
the problems with the reporting and recording of heritage crime are addressed. Finally, the 
chapter identifies the obstacles to improving police understandings, perceptions and 
awareness of heritage crime, alongside police officer and heritage practitioner suggestions 
to remedy these obstacles. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the findings of the FOI requests sent to 38 police forces. The collated 
responses were analysed and compared for similarities between them, and the emergent 
themes were then explored. A key theme concerned how individual forces had been given 
the freedom to decide what constitutes a heritage crime officer themselves, resulting in the 
heritage crime officer role being interpreted very differently between forces. 
 
Chapter 6 explores the results of semi-structured interviews with the victims of heritage 
crime across England and Wales. The chapter addresses the multiple issues with police 
understandings, perceptions and awareness of heritage crime from the perspective of the 
victims of heritage crime. The importance of the PCSO in relation to the policing of 
heritage crime is then considered. Thereafter, issues with reporting and reporting are 
revealed. It also examines the victims and impact of heritage crime. 
 
Findings are synthesised in Chapter 7. This chapter highlights the issues which police 
officers, heritage practitioners and victims raised throughout this research. It provides 
potential solutions to some of the obstacles which were found to hinder the policing of 
heritage crime or result in poor police understandings and awareness of the crime. The 
following is proposed by the researcher: i) a victim typology specific to the victims of 
heritage crime, ii) a model for police forces to follow when implementing heritage crime 
officers, and iii) a strand of Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) Broken Windows theory specific 
to heritage crime, coined ‘Ruined Windows theory’. 
 
In conclusion, Chapter 8 revisits the research findings and themes extrapolated over the 
course of the research. It also explores the ramifications of the researcher’s findings, 
providing recommendations as to how these findings may impact upon both theory and 
praxis relating to the policing of heritage crime, and treatment of victims in the 
phenomenon in England and Wales. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 : Introduction: What is heritage? 
 
Heritage has no official, unified definition (Smith, 2006). This is because heritage is 
socially constructed (Graham, 2002). It may be assumed that if heritage is socially 
constructed, due to the variety of individuals in society, there will be many different 
interpretations of what heritage is, and what it is not, and that these interpretations will 
change over time (Harvey, 2001). However, this is not the case. Power is central to the 
construction of heritage (Graham et al, 2005), and so it is the powerful who have the 
ability to construct heritage. As such, heritage reflects the powerful. In the UK, those with 
the power to construct heritage have, traditionally been the elite (Pendlebury et al, 2004). 
Constructions of heritage in the UK therefore, reflect the elite, meaning that elite heritage 
is the dominant form of heritage in the UK (Lowenthal, 2015). Other understandings of 
heritage are ignored and marginalised (Waterton, 2009), such as working-class heritage 
(Drake, 2017). Indeed, survey data demonstrates that it is the sites and assets of the elite, 
such as castles, cathedrals, country homes, and historic parks and gardens; which the 
general public most think of when asked what heritage is to them (Pendlebury et al, 2009: 
180). 
 
The Introduction to this thesis illustrated that there is an underlying tension surrounding 
the idea of heritage. This is because heritage is fluid and open to interpretation (despite the 
influence of the powerful and dominance of elite heritage), whereas crime is a more fixed 
concept. However heritage and crime, as separate concepts, do share one important 
similarity. Much in the same way that heritage is socially constructed by the powerful, 
crime is also socially constructed by the powerful (Quinney, 1970). The shared meanings 
of what social acts are considered normal, deviant, or criminal are socially constructed, 
constantly contested, and evolving (Surette and Otto, 2001: 147). Indeed, there is currently 
no heritage crime law (NPCC, 2017), although there is specific legislation for specific 
heritage crimes (explored further in 2.3). Legally, ‘heritage crime’ does not exist. Yet the 
powerful still see heritage sites and assets which reflect and represent them-elite heritage- 
receiving disproportionate attention and outrage when subject to criminal behaviour. A 
solid gold toilet, for example, was stolen from Blenheim Palace in 2019 (Gayle, 2019), 
and the police response and media interest was significant. On the other hand, when vast 
swathes of industrial heritage sites and assets are subject to heritage crime, they appear to 
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receive comparatively less attention, in not having uncontested importance automatically 
ascribed to them; as elite heritage does (Gould, 2015; Dicks, 2015). 
 
Whilst heritage remains undefinable, the social construction of heritage has made elite 
heritage the dominant form of heritage across the UK. The ramifications of this in relation 
to heritage crime are unknown, although the social construction of heritage could impact 
upon the way the CJS responds to it. Indeed, despite the broad definition of heritage 
crime, the social construction of heritage may supersede how broad this definition is. In 
theory all types of heritage crime should receive equal attention from the CJS. Yet in 
practice, the social construction of heritage (and indeed crime) may prevent this. 
 
2.2 : Defining heritage crime 
 
Heritage crime is defined by the respective heritage bodies in England and Wales. Historic 
England is the chief heritage body in England, and Cadw is the chief heritage body in 
Wales. Historic England is responsible for protecting, conserving and preserving the 
historic environment (Historic England, 2019b), and is the English government’s principal 
advisor on heritage in England (Trow, 2018: 83). In Wales, the authority responsible for 
protecting, conserving and preserving heritage, and defining heritage crime, is Cadw 
(Kalman, 2014). Quite differently from Historic England, Cadw has been integrated into 
the Welsh government’s historic environment division from 2005 onwards (Mynors, 
2006). Although both bodies are equally as concerned with the protection and 
maintenance of heritage sites and assets, their working practices towards and perceptions 
regarding heritage may differ, not least because of differing cultural attitudes towards 
heritage in England and Wales. For example, because Cadw is part of the Welsh 
Government, Lennox (2016: 164) argues that this limits its independence, its ability to ally 
with this heritage sector (through advocacy for the historic environment), and its 
opportunity to be innovative in terms of policy and ethos, as being closely aligned to the 
will of government hinders this. 
 
Indeed, Howell (2016: 172) argues that the influence of the Welsh government is both 
being felt, and demonstrated, in the current Welsh heritage provision, as heritage sites and 
assets are ‘rolled out,’ as a means of promoting tourism and investment; a strategy which 
reflects the Welsh Government’s influence of, and desire to, control the wider Welsh 
heritage sector. Moreover, resourcing is also likely to impact upon the way both bodies 
operate. Cadw is ‘…not a large organisation and its resources are relatively small in 
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comparison to other national bodies’ (Humphries, 2013: 82). Both Historic England and 
Cadw have been subject to continued budget cuts in recent years, but Cadw has 
continuously received far fewer resources than Historic England (Belford, 2018). 
 
It could be suggested that these differences might impact upon attitudes towards heritage 
crime in both bodies. However, despite such differences, Cadw is known for taking its 
lead from Historic England in relation to matters of heritage (Lennox, 2016: 322). This 
would suggest that basic working practices relating to heritage, and heritage related 
definitions may be similar, such as the definition of heritage crime. 
 
The definition of heritage crime provided by Historic England is as follows: 
 
 
‘Heritage crime is any offence which harms the value of heritage assets 
and their settings…However, other crimes such as theft, criminal 
damage, arson and anti-social behaviour offences can also damage 
and harm heritage assets [authors emphasis] and interfere with the 
public's enjoyment and knowledge of their heritage’ (Historic England, 
2019b). 
 
The heritage assets and sites Historic England refers to are: 
 
 
‘Listed buildings, scheduled monuments, World Heritage Sites, 
protected marine wreck sites, conservation areas, registered parks and 
gardens, registered battlefields, protected military remains of aircraft 
and vessels of historic interest, undesignated but acknowledged 
heritage buildings and sites’ (Historic England, 2019b). 
 
Much of the online literature and guidance concerning heritage crime produced by 
Historic England is endorsed by Cadw. Despite Cadw following Historic England’s lead 
on heritage matters, as mentioned above, the definition of heritage crime adopted by Cadw 
differs slightly from Historic England. It is defined as: 
 
‘Heritage crime is any unlawful activity which harms historic assets 
including buildings, monuments, parks, gardens and landscapes…Some 
of these assets are protected by specific criminal offences but heritage 
crime often takes the form of ‘general’ offences such as theft, 
criminal damage, anti-social behaviour which are equally damaging 
to historic assets [authors emphasis] and interfere with the public’s 
understanding and enjoyment of them.’ (Cadw, 2019). 
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2.2.1 : Cross collaboration? 
 
 
At first glance, the definitions provided by Historic England and Cadw are almost 
identical. This could indicate that there is an opportunity for English and Welsh police 
forces to collaborate on the policing of heritage crime, as both forces operate under the 
same policing related legislation and a similar definition of heritage crime. However, the 
different phraseology of the sentences highlighted in bold above suggests different 
emphases. Cadw conceptualises heritage crime as being as an individual type of crime, but 
a crime that can also take the shape of other low-level forms of criminal behaviours, such 
as theft or criminal damage. Meanwhile, Historic England conceptualises heritage crime 
as an individual type of crime, but views crimes such as theft, arson, and anti-social 
behaviour (amongst others), as separate forms of crime that exist alongside heritage crime. 
 
Whilst this difference is minor, it has the potential to be exceptionally confusing to those 
outside of the heritage sector who may encounter heritage crime: the public, local 
authorities, CPS and police officers. Previous research conducted on heritage crime by the 
author (Poyser and Poyser, 2017) has identified that police officers in England struggle to 
accurately define heritage crime. In particular, police officers find difficulty in 
understanding whether a crime against a heritage site or asset was strictly classified as a 
heritage crime, or whether the crime was categorised as a criminal damage against a 
heritage site or asset (Ibid, 2017). The difficulties these respondents had in defining 
heritage crime on the frontline of policing also appear to be reflected in the slightly 
different definitions of heritage crime between England and Wales. Each body has 
produced two different definitions of heritage crime to describe the same phenomenon, 
both of which are equally valid as there is no universal definition of heritage crime. 
 
This subtle definitional difference could have repercussions for the policing of heritage 
crime. If there is no universal definition of heritage crime between England and Wales, 
this could hinder collaboration between English and Welsh forces. In Wales, the definition 
from Cadw suggests that heritage crime is a type of crime itself, which encompasses other 
crimes (such as criminal damage). However, Historic England’s definition suggests that 
crimes such as criminal damage exist alongside heritage crime. This indicates in Wales, 
criminal damage against a heritage site would just be referred to as a heritage crime, whilst 
in England the same scenario would be referred to as a criminal damage and a heritage 
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crime. This would naturally result in confusion in terms of categorising the crime between 
forces, and difficulty in applying a standardised response to the crime. 
In order to combat potential confusion due to a lack of an identical definition of heritage 
crime between England and Wales, the NPCC Heritage and Cultural Property Crime 
Working Group (2017: 10) has also produced, what they term, a ‘working definition’ of 
heritage crime, which is as a follows: ‘ [Heritage crime is]…Any offence involving 
damage or loss to the historic environment, including all offences involving cultural 
property.’ Although this definition is broad, it is important for the NPCC to have produced 
it, as a police led definition of heritage crime is arguably best for police officers to 
specifically refer to as needed. Indeed, the NPCC have referred to this definition as a 
‘working definition’, suggesting that this definition is best used by police officers in their 
working practice. The simplicity of this definition is also useful for officers, who may feel 
unfamiliar with the language used in the definitions supplied by Historic England and 
Cadw. Arguably, the more straightforward the definition, the easier heritage crime will be 
for officers across England and Wales to understand. 
 
Irrespective of which definition is used by police officers and other actors within the CJS 
in practice, there is no legal definition of heritage crime, as there is no overarching 
heritage crime law. Instead there are various existing offences, which may be applied to 
specific heritage offences. 
 
2.3 : The legal framework governing heritage crime in England and 
Wales 
 
The existing legal framework for heritage crime provides the basis for police knowledge 
of and response to heritage crime. There is limited understanding and awareness of the 
existing legislation amongst police officers in England and Wales (NPCC, 2017), for 
initial training for officers tends not to cover such niche areas of criminal law. Indeed, it is 
therefore anticipated that the police officers in this study will have limited awareness and 
experience of using this legislation. Even if officers are aware of this legislation and 
understand the legislation enough to apply it, they may prefer to rely on other forms of 
criminal law that they are more accustomed to. For example, Shelbourn (2008:3) suggests 
that officers are more likely to use legislation that they are familiar with when 
investigating heritage crime cases, more general criminal offences such as criminal 
damage or theft, as heritage specific legislation can be complex and contains difficult 
elements for the prosecution to prove. 
13  
As mentioned previously, there is no specific law for heritage crime, as heritage crime 
lacks a legal definition. Instead there are multiple pieces of legislation which apply to 
different kinds of heritage sites and assets. These include: 
 
● Protection of Wrecks Act (1973) 
● Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act (1979) 
● Protection of Military Remains Act (1986) 
● Planning (Listed Building and Conservation Areas) Act (1990) 
● Treasure Act (1996) 
● Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offenses) Act (2003) 
 
 
It is beyond the remit of this thesis to explore these statues in detail, but examples include 
the Treasure Act (1996) which is utilised to prosecute illegal metal detecting, whilst the 
Planning (Listing Building and Conservation Areas) Act (1990) is used to prosecute 
crimes against Grade listed buildings, such as owners of Grade listed buildings who make 
unauthorised alterations to the historical fabric of them (BBC, 2015). Although certain 
powers in Wales are devolved to the Welsh Government/Llywodraeth Cymru, the same 
legal framework applies. 
 
2.3.1 : Legislative stagnation? 
 
 
The legislation above has undergone very few changes. This is likely to be because 
heritage crime is a rather unknown area of crime amongst the public (Grove, 2013). There 
is therefore, little public pressure to influence the reviewing, tightening, or introduction of 
new legislation (Kindred, 2011). However, there have been some small, but significant, 
changes to heritage legislation in England and Wales from 2016 onwards. 
 
One of these pieces of legislation was passed in Wales in 2016 (and is specific to Wales), 
in order to help strengthen Wales’ approach to tackling heritage crime. The Historic 
Environment (Wales) Act 2016 is particularly crucial as it limits the defence of ignorance 
in relation to scheduled ancient monuments (under the 1979 Act). This change means that 
prosecution in Wales is now possible if a person has committed a heritage crime against a 
scheduled ancient monument, and knew or ought reasonably to have known, that the 
monument was protected (Belford, 2018:113). Limiting the use of the defence of 
ignorance in this way enables the more effective prosecution of heritage crime, as, in the 
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past, the use of this defence meant that cases would be unable to be taken any further 
(Cadw, 2014). 
 
More recently, a consultation regarding proposed changes to the Treasure Act (1996) was 
undertaken in 2019. The proposed changes are hoped to preserve more significant finds 
for public collections, make the Treasure process more efficient, and the Act itself easier 
to understand (Lewis, 2019: 18). Importantly, in the case of heritage crime, there is a 
specific proposal to extend the time limit for proceedings to be brought for an offence. It is 
proposed that the traditional six month time limit for summary offences be extended, 
allowing proceedings to be brought up to six months after the date on which a prosecutor 
is aware of sufficient evidence that a crime has been committed (DCMS, 2019). If the 
proposed changes go ahead, then this would help heritage crime officers significantly, as 
delays to reporting of metal detecting finds would have less impact upon the allocated six 
months investigative time for summary offences. 
 
Additionally, it is also important to mention that heritage crime legislation is unlikely to 
develop further, because the perception may be that the law as it stands currently contains 
sufficient provision to address, for example, vandalism, arson and theft, through the 
general criminal law framework (e.g: Theft Act 1968, Criminal Damage Act 1971). This, 
alongside the limited and unfamiliar legislation for specific types of heritage crime, 
naturally has consequences for when heritage crime moves through the CJS. Such 
legislation may be easier to use by police officers and prosecutors, but being more general 
forms of criminal law, they may not result in proportionate punishment for heritage crime. 
Indeed, there appear to be various issues which heritage crime experiences as it moves 
through the CJS, which are explored in greater detail below. 
 
2.3.2 : Prosecution, practice and substitution 
 
 
Whilst there is a dearth of literature on heritage crime more generally, there is even less 
legal literature on what happens when heritage crime reaches court. Frankly, this is 
because heritage crime rarely reaches a stage where the CPS becomes involved, let alone 
reaching court. There are two main reasons for this. As noted above, the legislation 
employed to target very specific heritage crimes, such as the Treasure Act 1996, may not 
be used in practice, since police officers and prosecutors prefer to rely on legislation they 
are accustomed to and which would produce similar sentencing outcomes (Holmes, 2013). 
Indeed, reports of cases where a heritage crime has occurred tend to show that the accused 
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has been prosecuted under a general criminal offence, such as theft, as opposed to a 
specific law pertaining to heritage crime (Bliss, 2013; Kent Police, 2016). For example, it 
has been found that cases which might utilise the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological 
Areas Act 1979, have been prosecuted under the Theft Act 1968 instead (Shelbourn, 2008: 
3). This, Shelbourn theorises, may not only be due to the familiarity the police and CPS 
have with general criminal offences, but also because there is difficultly in proving the 
substantive elements of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act. However, 
without cases being prosecuted under heritage-specific legislation, the legal literature 
remains scant. 
 
A second reason for heritage crime cases failing to reach court is that some heritage sites 
and assets are covered by insurance. For example, when theft of lead from a church roof 
occurs, these cases may involve only the reporting of the crime to the police for the 
purpose of receiving a crime number to submit an insurance claim (Dobinson and 
Dennison, 1995). Police involvement is often minimal, and the case will rarely go to court. 
Out of court disposals might also be used with heritage crime (Shelbourn, 2014a). 
Furthermore, as there is no specific heritage crime law, cases will not be brought before 
court as ‘heritage crimes’, rather, they would be brought before the court as ‘normal’ 
criminal offences such as criminal damage, theft or arson (amongst others). Overall case 
law on heritage crime is therefore, minimal (Shelbourn, 2014b). 
 
As the legal literature on heritage crime is so limited, this discussion will also draw upon 
literature from the similarly marginalised areas of rural and wildlife crime, and the 
problems associated with taking rural and wildlife crime cases through court. These two 
areas of crime are operationally grouped together with heritage crime by the CPS (CPS, 
2019) and the police (NPCC, 2018), suggesting that the issues facing rural and wildlife 
crime cases are likely to be reflected in heritage crime cases. Both rural and wildlife crime 
have also been embedded within policing for longer than heritage crime (Nurse, 2008), 
and so there is a greater quantity of literature to draw upon, to help inform our 
understanding of the similar problems which heritage crime may face in court. 
 
2.3.2 A: Heritage crime in court: getting it to court, and legislative issues 
 
 
Heritage crime is not classified as a crime by the Home Office, meaning that there is no 
requirement for the police to record it and there are no official heritage crime statistics 
(Kerr, 2013). Therefore we cannot ascertain how many heritage crime cases reach the 
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prosecution stage. However, as a marginalised area of crime which few police officers 
have a good understanding and awareness of (Poyser and Poyser, 2017), we can safely 
assume that if few officers can identify the crime, then few cases reach CPS. Heritage 
crime is likely to be difficult to bring to court not least because of lack of police officer 
understanding and awareness, but for reasons directly relating to CPS procedures. 
 
For any heritage crime case to successfully reach court, it must first pass both the 
evidential stage and the public interest stage, of the two-step test required for all 
prosecutions. The evidential stage considers if there is evidential sufficiency that would 
ensure a realistic prospect of conviction, whilst the public interest stage considers if the 
prosecution is in the public interest. With regards to the evidential stage, evidence in 
heritage crime cases can be hard to acquire. Literature shows that police officers do not 
perceive heritage crime as a crime and are unlikely to understand or recognise the crime 
when it occurs (Poyser and Poyser, 2017; Shelbourn 2014b). As such, officers have been 
dismissive and defeatist when faced with evidence of a heritage crime, such as telling 
victims that ‘digging holes’ could not be interpreted as criminal damage and that they 
‘Didn’t see that they could find anything,’ in illicit metal detecting cases (Oxford 
Archaeology, 2009a: 98). Furthermore, if the police fail to treat heritage crime scenes as 
‘real’ crime scenes, then this may mean that there is little evidence which could be used to 
identify and convict a suspect (Shelbourn, 2014a: 193). These attitudes towards and 
perceptions of heritage crime, explored in greater detail in section 2.5, are clearly an 
obstacle to heritage crime meeting the evidential stage. 
 
Compounding these issues is the difficulty associated with gathering evidence from 
heritage sites and assets after heritage crime has occurred. Heritage crime may not be 
discovered until sometime after the offence has been committed, for example, when 
heritage crime occurs on remote sites or assets which are rarely visited, or when lead is 
taken from parts of a church roof which cannot easily been seen from the ground. 
Moreover, heritage crime which occurs on remote sites or assets are likely to lack 
witnesses. Lastly, many sites and assets lack CCTV, either because CCTV cannot be 
affixed to their historical fabric or because they are impossible install, such as a public 
field containing historical artefacts (Grove and Pease, 2014). 
 
For all these reasons, police officers may choose to use out of court disposals such as adult 
cautions instead of starting the prosecution process (Shelbourn, 2014a: 191). Indeed, a 
series of FOI requests submitted to five forces in England and Wales in 2018, concerning 
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illegal metal detecting and theft from heritage assets, revealed that between 2015-2017, 
the most common police responses to this crime included: NFA (no further action), 
investigation complete no suspect identified, suspect identified evidential difficulties, 
adult community resolution, and caution (Norfolk Constabulary and Suffolk Constabulary, 
2018; Dyfed Powys Police, 2018; West Midlands Police, 2018; Devon and Cornwall 
Police, 2018). Not only do these responses illustrate how heritage crime can, very easily, 
fail to make it to court through a lack of evidence, but they also demonstrate at a front-line 
level, how police discretion results in a charge not being brought; by utilising out of court 
disposals. Out of all five forces, only two charges had been brought in this three-year 
period (Norfolk and Suffolk Constabulary, 2018). 
 
The next stage concerns the public interest. The concept of ‘public interest’ is loosely 
defined and vague (Doak, 2008: 120), meaning that it is subject to different 
interpretations. The impact which heritage crime has upon the wider nation’s heritage may 
indicate that the public interest stage is reasonably easy to pass in heritage crime cases 
(Holmes, 2013). However, it is not quite this simple. The first prosecution under the 
Treasure Act 1996 in 2010, despite passing both stages, was met with a negative response 
by both magistrates and the public: CPS were privately told that the magistrates felt that 
the prosecution should not have been brought, and public support for the prosecution was 
greatly limited (Shelbourn, 2014a). In other cases, the public interest stage has failed to 
consider the wider impacts of heritage crime, namely the impact on the nation’s heritage 
(as mentioned above). In 2004 for example, the CPS decided not to proceed with an illegal 
metal detecting case, arguing that it was not in the public interest due to the low monetary 
value of the objects, which totalled £50 (Brodie, 2004: 3). In this instance the intangible 
historical value and significance of these objects was ignored despite the fact that, in being 
‘everybody’s’ heritage, these types of cases should perhaps always fulfil the public 
interest test. 
 
Lastly, it is worth noting that upon taking a closer look at the slight differences in the 
heritage sector between England and Wales; it could be suggested that prosecuting 
heritage crime might be more difficult in Wales than in England. In Wales, the Inspectors 
of Ancient Monuments (at all levels) are not PACE (Police and Criminal Evidence Act) 
trained (Pers comms, 2018), whereas in England, all the Inspectors of Ancient Monuments 
(at all levels) are PACE trained (Historic England, 2013). This training means that 
Inspectors in England can issue a caution, which enables them to gather evidence via an 
interview (if there is a suspect); thereby beginning the process of investigating the crime 
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(Pers comm, 2018). Through these actions, Historic England’s Inspectors are likely to able 
to decide more easily if the case is worth putting to the police for further investigation, and 
possibly prosecution. This greater sense of autonomy is, arguably, an advantage over 
Cadw’s Inspectors, who are entirely reliant upon police officers to conduct all processes 
relating to a heritage crime case (or a potential heritage crime case). 
 
Whilst there are clearly numerous issues with taking heritage crime cases to the 
prosecution, and problems within the court setting itself (such as the reluctance to use 
legislation which perhaps the police and CPS are not accustomed to using), CPS have 
taken steps to try and alleviate these issues. Chiefly, this has been through the creation of 
the Wildlife, Rural and Heritage Crime Co-ordinator role. 
 
2.3.3 : The Wildlife, Rural and Heritage Crime Co-ordinators 
 
 
From 2013 onwards, at least one Wildlife, Rural and Heritage Crime Co-ordinator has 
been placed in each CPS Area across England and Wales (Austin, 2013). These co- 
ordinators are specialist crown prosecutors, and their role specifically concerns rural, 
wildlife and heritage crime (CPS, 2019). The creation of this role is undoubtedly a great 
step forward in tackling heritage crime within the CPS, however, the position is not 
without its faults. For example, Flynn’s (2017) research on Wildlife, Rural and Heritage 
Crime Co-ordinators, found that whilst the co-ordinators all have experience and working 
knowledge of rural, wildlife and heritage crime (much of which they have learnt on the 
job), this experience and knowledge varied vastly between co-ordinators. Those with more 
‘on the job’ experience had greater knowledge and confidence in prosecuting the three 
crimes than their less knowledgeable and less confident counterparts. Opportunities to 
increase existing knowledge and skills were also found to be limited as training 
conferences and courses were no longer running due to budget constraints (Flynn, 2017). 
 
Arguably, the most crucial finding related to personal characteristics of the co-ordinators, 
namely that a personal interest and enthusiasm for all three types of crime, were crucial to 
undertaking the position, as it involved an additional workload on top of already full case- 
loads (Ibid, 2017). Lastly, there were two significant problems facing the co-ordinators. 
Firstly, the high cases loads they had, and inconsistent communication of existing cases, 
sometimes resulted in inexperienced, non-specialist prosecutors taking wildlife, rural and 
heritage crime cases to court (potentially resulting in inadequate charges) (Ibid: 89). 
Secondly, CPS Direct often failed to direct cases to these specialist prosecutors, as the call 
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handlers did not have the knowledge of wildlife, rural and heritage crime to know to 
whom to send such cases (Ibid: 90). 
 
The implementation of Rural, Wildlife and Heritage Crime Coordinators has been a 
significant step in attempts to improve the overall CJS response to heritage crime. 
However, their role is impeded by a wider lack of knowledge, understanding and 
awareness within the CPS overall, as section 2.3 has illustrated. Indeed, one of the main 
barriers to the successful prosecution of heritage crime is, arguably, the focus by the CJS 
upon financial (monetary) value. Unfortunately, in heritage crime cases the financial value 
of the object or asset is often very low in comparison to the loss of historical value 
(Shelbourn, 2014b). Indeed, heritage practitioners have argued, from personal experience, 
that the court system seems more focussed upon the monetary value of heritage objects 
when heritage crime occurs (Oxford Archaeology, 2009b), as opposed to intangible 
values, such as intrinsic historical value. 
 
Alongside the introduction of Wildlife, Rural and Heritage Crime Co-ordinators, there are 
indications that the sentencing of all heritage crime cases will improve in years to come. In 
July 2019 new sentencing guidelines were introduced addressing many of the intangible 
impacts this section has discussed (Gould, 2019). Aside from highlighting the unique 
nature of damage to heritage sites and assets (in that they destroy history), considerations 
will be given by the courts to social impacts (such as the impact upon local communities), 
psychological impacts, and the impact upon emergency services, in terms of diverting 
resources (Historic England, 2019c). This is a positive development which will hopefully 
prompt further recognition of the impact and severity of heritage crime across the criminal 
justice system. 
 
2.3.4 : Summary 
 
 
This section has shown that there is a lack of overall knowledge, clarity and awareness of 
heritage crime in the court systems in England and Wales, which is reflected in the 
sentences which heritage crime cases receive. The creation of the Wildlife, Rural and 
Heritage Crime Co-ordinator Role and the recent sentencing changes are all significant 
developments, and may go some way to remedying the difficulties which have plagued 
heritage crime cases that enter the court system. Whilst these improvements are likely to 
impact upon future heritage crime cases in court, it is argued that it is crucial for more 
heritage crime cases to reach magistrates court. This is in order to prevent the vicious 
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circle which has been observed in attempts to bring marginalised crimes to court, wherein 
marginalised crimes are not prosecuted, resulting in magistrates and judges gaining little 
experience of prosecuting these cases, leading to lenient sentencing which discourages 
further prosecutions (Watson, 2005: 199). As heritage crime is a marginalised area of 
crime, the vicious circle scenario is certainly applicable to heritage crime cases. The only 
way for these cases to enter the court system however, is through police officers. Indeed, 
examining heritage crime through the lens of the CPS only accounts for a very small 
portion of the CJS, and is of course the last stage a heritage crime case reaches. Therefore, 
it is now important to examine the role of policing and police officers, in relation to 
heritage crime. 
 
2.4 : Policing and heritage crime 
 
2.4.1 : Introduction 
 
 
Existing research indicates that police officers generally struggle to understand heritage 
crime and possess a lack knowledge and awareness of the area (Oxford Archaeology 
2009a; Poyser and Poyser, 2017; Shelbourn, 2010). There are some forces which display a 
good level of understanding, knowledge and awareness of heritage crime (Oxford 
Archaeology 2009b), whilst others struggle with the concept and dedicate limited 
resources to the area (Ibid). This patchy coverage by forces is likely to impact upon the 
victims of heritage crime. With this in mind, this thesis will seek to expand upon the 
existing research and illustrate in greater detail the possible reasons for the limited police 
knowledge, understanding and awareness of heritage crime. It will also address the 
potential consequences and problems with the unequal attention paid to heritage crime, by 
forces across England and Wales, as well as plugging the gap in the empirical research 
concerning the policing of heritage crime in Wales. 
 
2.4.2 : Police culture 
 
 
Police culture (the occupational culture of the police, otherwise known as ‘cop culture’) is 
the term used to describe the practice, attitudes, values and norms which all construct how 
to be a police officer and how to do policing (Paoline, 2003: 200). When an officer puts on 
the police uniform s/he enters this culture, which is governed by norms and values 
designed to mitigate the strains created by their unique role in the community (Van 
Maanen, 1973: 85). It is important for this thesis to explore police culture in order to help 
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answer RQ2 and RQ3. It is anticipated that certain facets of police culture may influence 
police understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime, and how they treat 
victims of the phenomenon (RQ2). It is also predicted that certain characteristics of police 
culture (explored below) may be an obstacle to the effective policing of heritage crime 
(RQ3). 
 
Police culture has been subject to continued academic examination since the mid-20th 
century (Reiner, 1992a) but still remains difficult to define (Westmarland, 2008). 
Although we cannot surely define what police culture is (Cockcroft, 2013), we can utilise 
existing frameworks in place to explore police culture in greater detail. Perhaps the most 
well-known is Robert Reiner’s characteristics of police culture (2000). The characteristics 
are as follows: Mission, action, cynicism, pessimism (all four of which are interlinked), 
suspicion, isolation/solidarity, conservatism and machismo (Reiner, 2000: 89-101). 
 
Firstly, the characteristic mission, or sense of mission, derives from an officer’s desire to 
‘get the bad guys’ and to do society’s dirty work; work which nobody else is willing to do 
(Foster, 2003). This is a defining aspect of their role, the feeling that policing is a way of 
life, as opposed to just a job (Reiner, 1978: 247). Officers come to conceptualise 
themselves as the thin blue line between order and disorder and without them, chaos 
would ensue (Brogden et al, 1988). The mission of police work is a source of great pride 
for police officers and is also cited as a reason for joining the job, particularly in terms of 
the ability within the role to make a difference to society (Loftus, 2009: 91). Intertwined 
with a sense of mission is the characteristic of action. Police work cannot be considered 
police work unless it is fun, challenging, and involves hedonistic action (Reiner, 2010: 
12). As Holdaway (1983:131) illustrates, when officers describe car chases ending in the 
use of force against an offender, excitement, action and fun are fundamental to the story. 
 
However, when officers realise that policing and police work is not the action packed ideal 
they believed it would be (explored further in this chapter), and instead consists primarily 
of peacekeeping and order maintenance activities, this realisation undermines the officer’s 
sense of mission (Charman, 2017). This realisation, alongside the nature of the population 
officers usually encounter (challenging individuals) leads to officers feeling cynical and 
pessimistic (Cockcroft, 2013, Charman, 2017). Cynicism is directed towards the public, 
the CJS and higher-ranking members of the police organisation (Loftus, 2009). Whilst 
cynicism may impact upon morale (Niederhoffer, 1967), it is unlikely to impact upon 
professionalism (Chan, 1996). 
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Suspicion emerges within policing as officers are constantly managing unpredictability 
and anticipating danger. As part of their role, officers are required to make the distinction 
between the normal and abnormal (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). In encountering the 
ambiguity and uncertainty which the public present daily however, officers respond to this 
by creating workable typifications of the people around them, to prevent the looming 
chaos and maintain order (Holdaway, 1983:65). However, the latter can lead to the 
manifestation of hostile stereotypes (Manning, 1974: 29). These stereotypes have led to 
officers stopping people who are not engaging in criminal activity, but whose location, 
behaviour or appearance suggests they might be (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). This creates 
an ‘us vs them’ mentality and affects relationships between police officers and the public. 
 
The nature of policing, which involves lengthy shift work, unsociable hours, and difficulty 
switching off from the job, isolates officers from civilian life (Reiner, 2010). Inevitably, 
this causes officers to withdraw from the civilian world, and invest more in relationships 
with colleagues (Cockcroft, 2013: 58). The isolation officers experience leads to solidarity 
with each other, as the police family replaces family and friends outside of policing: “I see 
more of the lads than I do of my own family…you all become like family don't you?” 
(Loftus, 2009: 119). Solidarity is therefore, used as a means of counteracting the pressures 
officers experience from those outside of policing looking in, such as public perceptions of 
policing, media criticism, and internally, unsupportive senior officers (Charman, 2017). 
 
The penultimate characteristic, conservatism, refers to the fact that police officers are said 
to be conservative ‘both politically and morally’ (Reiner, 2010: 126). Police officers are 
morally conservative as they must enforce the law, and therefore become implicated in 
affirming these laws (Skolnick, 1966). In England and Wales specifically, police political 
conservatism has been bolstered historically through a symbiotic relationship between the 
Conservative Party and the police (Reiner and Cross, 1991). However, Cockcroft (2013) 
suggests that the political conservatism within policing may be lessening in England and 
Wales. Since the early 1990s, the symbiotic relationship between the police and 
Conservative Party has lessened, as the latter no longer perceive the police as the pet 
public service they once did in the 70s and 80s (Reiner, 1992b: 764). 
 
Lastly, machismo emerges in police culture because the police are ‘expected to be 
physically and emotionally tough, aggressive and engage in traditionally masculine 
activities’ (Waddington, 1999: 99). Policing is an arena for exaggerated masculine 
exploits such as only pursuing adrenaline inducing crimes (Reiner, 1978), excessive 
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drinking, and exaggerated tales of violence and sexual conquest (Fielding, 1994: 50). 
These attitudes and norms have created a ‘cult of masculinity’ within policing (Smith and 
Gray, 1985), which impacts distribution of labour within the police force, where some 
crimes are perceived as masculine and others as feminine (Appier, 1998). Furthermore, the 
crimes which are perceived to be masculine are perceived as ‘real’ police work (exciting, 
high-octane jobs) whereas the crimes which male officers believe female officers should 
tackle, are considered as not ‘real’ police work, such as administrative tasks 
(Westmarland, 2017). ‘Real’ police work demands further discussion, as it can result in 
differing responses, attitudes and actions towards certain types of crime; indeed, officers 
have even been found to avoid police work that is not ‘real’ by framing particular jobs as 
jobs that only female officers can attend (Ibid). 
 
2.4.3 : ‘Real’ and not ‘real’ police work 
 
 
‘Real’ police work involves crimes where officers ‘feel their adrenaline surge in 
anticipation of chase, danger, confrontation’ (Crank, 2015: 167). However, officers swiftly 
realise that the day-to-day reality of policing does not consist of the latter. In fact, policing 
is mostly dry, monotonous, and service orientated, where officers are more likely to find 
themselves becoming the proverbial clerk in a patrol car (Van Maanen, 1973: 404) than 
engaging in high speed car chases. Whilst officers recognise that crime fighting is an 
infinitesimal part of their work (Charman, 2015), work which does not ascribe to the crime 
fighting action packed ideal, such as ‘…low status, inconclusive order maintenance 
work…’ (Waddington, 1999:57) is dismissed as not being ‘real’ police work by officers. 
Activities which fall under not ‘real’ police work include administrative tasks such as 
paperwork. Paperwork is the ultimate antithesis to ‘real’ police work, and in contrast 
appears monotonous, and is spoken about disparagingly (Chatterton, 1989). 
 
Paradoxically, despite being rejected as irrelevant by frontline officers, paperwork is the 
defining characteristic of formal operations (Manning, 1980: 221), recording and 
legitimising police action, and well completed paperwork is essential for taking cases 
through the CJS (Chatterton, 1989). However, it is not just activities such as paperwork 
which are dismissed as not ‘real’ police work. There are in fact, certain crimes which are 
thought of as not ‘real’ police work, colloquially termed ‘rubbish’ (Holdaway, 1983) by 
officers. ‘Rubbish’ work includes non-criminal disputes and social work tasks (Chan, 
1997), jobs where officers feel as if they are social workers or counsellors more than 
police officers (Charman, 2017). These types of crimes are given an inferior status within 
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an officer’s sense of a crime hierarchy (Loftus, 2009: 92) and are thought of as ‘bullshit 
calls’ (Rubinstein, 1973: 110). Victims of ‘rubbish’ crimes, and crimes which are not 
perceived to be ‘real’ police work, are often seen as undeserving of a police response 
(Charman, 2019). The latter is explored in greater detail further in this chapter. 
 
2.4.4 : Police culture and heritage crime 
 
 
The above discussion raises the question as to how this occupational culture impacts upon 
the operational policing of heritage crime. Whilst we know little of what officers’ 
understandings, perceptions and awareness of heritage crime are in-depth, we can gather 
limited information from the following two studies, namely Oxford Archaeology’s 
Nighthawking Report (Oxford Archaeology, 2009a) and Shelbourn’s (2014b) survey to 
archaeologists on their experiences of engaging with the police regarding heritage crime. 
The Nighthawking Report (2009a), a qualitative piece which specifically focussed upon 
nighthawking (the informal term for illegal metal detecting), found that awareness and 
understanding of heritage crime and relevant laws were poor amongst officers. This 
resulted in Finds Liaison Officers (from heritage bodies) receiving an increased workload, 
as they were asked to handhold officers through the investigative process, informing 
officers of the relevant laws and action they should take (Ibid, 99). Policing attitudes 
towards the crime were negative, with victims detailing excuses for a lack of police action 
which included reasons such as: heritage crime was impossible to police, it was fairly low 
down on the list of police priorities, and that it lacked an immediate human victim, 
specifically ‘They’re not mugging old ladies’ (Ibid: 98). 
 
Shelbourn’s (2014b) quantitative research which surveyed archaeologists reporting similar 
issues, mirrored these findings, with officers refusing to acknowledge that heritage crime 
was a crime, officers only recognising and showing interest in ‘everyday’ crimes as 
opposed to heritage crime ‘Interest from the police was solely due to a vandalised 
portacabin, not damage to archaeology plus theft of cultural artefacts (Ibid: 192), and 
officers believing heritage crime was a victimless crime and therefore not worthy of police 
time: ‘Police saw that the offence was more of a waste of time/victimless crime and they 
had no reason to follow-up’ (Ibid: 192). Taken together, the existing research strongly 
suggests that police understanding of heritage crime is poor, officer’s overall awareness of 
heritage crime is lacking, and their perceptions of heritage crime are not particularly 
positive. 
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Similarly, past attempts at policing arts and antiques crime, the cousin of heritage crime, 
have been unsuccessful, and suggest that culturally, heritage crime will suffer from the 
same shortfalls which ended the policing of arts and antiques crime across England and 
Wales in the early 2000s. Attempts were made by police forces to police arts and antiques 
crime in the early 2000s, through implementing due diligence officers, who specifically 
liaised with the art trade and policed art and antiques crime (Bennett, 2000). However, the 
role was short lived, as policing arts and antiques crime was not a Key Performance 
Indicator for police forces, leaving little motivation for forces to prioritise it, and few 
resources were dedicated to the role (18th April 2000, HC 371-II, 218). 
 
Indeed, when the Metropolitan Police’s Arts and Antiques Unit (AAU herein), the only 
specialist unit in the UK solely concerned with the policing of arts and antiques crime 
(Kerr, 2015), attempted to hold training sessions for due diligence officers, forces refused 
to spend the money on training and so the sessions dried up (Charney, 2016a). Culturally, 
forces perceived arts and antiques crime negatively, with retired officers from the AAU 
arguing that forces lacked interest and application in the policing of the two areas 
(Lennon, 2003). As heritage crime is not dissimilar from arts and antiques crime, it is safe 
to assume that the same cultural attitudes are likely to repeat themselves. 
 
More broadly, examining general policing literature on police culture can also provide us 
with clues as to how officers understand, become aware of, and perceive heritage crime. In 
general, we can safely assume that police officers are highly likely to perceive heritage 
crime as ‘rubbish’ work (Holdaway, 1983). Heritage crime is very unlikely to involve the 
exciting, hedonistic aspects of policing, such as high-speed car chases, or apprehending an 
offender, as those committing heritage crimes are rarely caught in the act (Poyser and 
Poyser, 2017). Instead, heritage crime cases are likely to take up a lot of time if the officer 
is to pursue the case (explored in greater detail below), are likely to lead to no discernible 
result, and with no human victims, heritage crime cases will rank low in official and 
informal reward systems (Punch, 1979:47). Indeed, heritage crime cases may involve a lot 
of extra work on the part of the officer. Heritage crime is often not straightforward, and 
can be without witnesses, CCTV, an indication of what has been stolen (for example, 
nighthawking), or an accurate timeframe of when the crime occurred (Poyser and Poyser, 
2017). Officers, therefore, are likely to be reluctant to pursue what they see as a futile case 
which will be difficult to investigate and prosecute. 
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Furthermore, heritage crime may be an unrewarding and unsatisfying crime to solve, 
particularly in cases which do not have an individual available to thank the officer for their 
work, such as heritage crime against isolated sites and assets which lack guardians. This is 
likely to dampen an officer’s enthusiasm for policing the crime, as it does not adhere to 
the image of protecting the weak, nor does it provide the satisfaction of engaging face-to- 
face with a victim and providing positive service to a victim, which is considered good 
police work (Chan et al, 2003). Indeed, the policing of heritage crime may not fulfil many 
of the occupational characteristics of policing as described by Reiner (2010), which make 
policing worthwhile for police officers. For example, there is no room for machismo in the 
policing of heritage crime: responding to crime against an Ancient Monument with no 
direct victim is unlikely to allow for the ‘…hard men on the streets image…’ 
(Heidensohn, 1992:77). As the core justification of policing is a victim centred perspective 
(Reiner, 2000:89) and there is no direct victim in heritage crime cases, the sense of 
mission also does not apply, and the image officers have of themselves as upholders of 
public safety (Holdaway, 1979: 110) is therefore, not upheld when they respond to 
heritage crime cases. 
 
Moreover, attending reports of heritage crime is likely to be seen as tedious work, giving 
the officer no chance to show courage or to be an aggressive crime fighter; further 
undermining the officer’s occupational image (Philips, 2015). Officers will also know 
that, whilst they may have all the skills in their existing policing toolbox to police heritage 
crime, heritage crime requires a level of knowledge and understanding of the area in order 
to police it efficiently and effectively. As an interviewee in Kerr’s (2013: 133) research on 
arts and antiques crime stressed: ‘The average bobby doesn’t know a Canaletto from a can 
of beans.’ Far from being a criticism, this simply highlights the reality that policing niche 
areas of crime are impossible without being equipped with essential knowledge, awareness 
and skills to police these crimes. 
 
Lastly, we return briefly to the notion of heritage crime being ‘rubbish’ work. To 
compound the perception of heritage crime being ‘rubbish’ work further, the policing of 
heritage crime, much like art and antiques crime, does not just involve the skills of the 
police officer. Instead, it necessitates officers participating in extra work, engaging with 
those outside of policing, such as community partnership and outreach, alongside 
engaging with academics and professionals in the heritage world (Charney, 2016b). Police 
officers have, historically, been suspicious and mistrusting of academics (Charman, 2017; 
27  
Cockcroft, 2013) and are sceptical of partnership working, which they feel lacks action, 
outcomes, clear command and fear that partners will intrude upon police functions 
(O’Neill and McCarthy, 2014). 
 
Therefore, to subvert cultural norms, to be confident in doing so, arguably requires an 
officer who is passionate and interested enough in heritage crime that they are able to 
resist cultural norms, and confidently perceive these marginalised and less exciting crimes 
as ‘real’ police work. Indeed, Detective Chief Superintendent Coles notes in the Select 
Committee for Culture, Media and Sport Report, that personal interest is crucial to 
policing art and antiques crime: ‘Where you have a personal interest [in a certain type of 
crime] you are more dedicated’ (23rd May 2000, HC 371-II, 477). These qualities are 
clearly important for all areas of crime, but are arguably crucial in crimes which are niche, 
and challenge the notion of ‘real’ police work. These qualities should, hopefully, be 
present in heritage crime officers, who are responsible for policing heritage crime across 
England and Wales (NPCC, 2017). 
 
2.4.4A: Police culture: implementing the policing of heritage crime 
 
 
The policing of heritage crime began with the launch of Historic England’s Heritage 
Crime Programme in 2011 (Historic England, 2019d), which introduced heritage crime 
into the overall policing remit of England and Wales for the first time. The first ACPO 
(Association of Chief Police Officers, now known as the NPCC) meeting regarding 
heritage crime produced the Heritage and Cultural Property National Policing Strategic 
Assessment (ACPO, 2013), which recommended that police forces develop ‘a network of 
dedicated Heritage and Cultural Property Crime Liaison Officers, to promote Heritage and 
Cultural Property Crime at a local police level’ (Ibid: 31). As such, the heritage crime 
officer role was introduced into forces across England and Wales to facilitate the policing 
of heritage crime. 
 
However, it was inevitable that this was a role which would not fulfil the sole remit of a 
single stand-alone officer. Such a role would have been impossible to justify 
operationally, particularly as the policing of heritage crime was implemented shortly after 
austerity measures had been announced for policing (HMIC, 2012). It seems that, largely 
due to cost reasons, the role of heritage crime officer was to be attached onto an existing 
officer (much like the aforementioned due diligence officers). 
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It appears that the trend amongst forces has been to operationally affix heritage crime to 
rural and wildlife crime, meaning that the role of heritage crime officer has, subsequently, 
been attached to Rural and Wildlife Crime Officers (RWCO). This trend was officialised 
in the NPCC’s Rural Affairs Strategy, which stated that heritage crime was an intrinsically 
linked theme in the policing of rural and wildlife crime (NPCC, 2018a). Responsibility for 
policing heritage crime therefore, will generally default to RWCOs, who will police 
heritage crime alongside rural and wildlife crime. They may consist of one officer with a 
team of RWCOs at their disposal (Hertfordshire Police, 2019), a team of RWCOs (Kent 
Police, 2016), or they may act entirely alone (Humberside Police, 2019; Essex Police, 
2019), depending on the force. However, despite the claims of the NPCC Rural Affairs 
strategy (that heritage crime is intrinsically linked to rural and wildlife crime) there is no 
clear justification for this link. No evidence suggests that heritage crime is more likely to 
occur in rural areas (Bradley et al, 2012), but the focus upon policing heritage crime 
alongside rural and wildlife crime by Kent Police (one of the earliest forces to begin 
unofficially policing heritage crime), may have acted as a catalyst for further forces to 
adopt the approach of affixing heritage crime to rural and wildlife crime (Oxford 
Archaeology, 2009b). 
 
Whilst it is important to allocate the policing of heritage crime to some area within 
policing, allocating it to rural and wildlife crime comes with a host of issues stemming 
from police culture. Rural and wildlife crime have historically, and continue to be, 
marginalised within police (Gilling, 2011; Wellsmith, 2011). Similarly to heritage crime, 
rural and wildlife crime both suffer from negative police cultural attitudes towards them 
(Yarwood and Cozens, 2004; Nurse, 2013a), creating numerous challenges for the officers 
responsible for policing rural and wildlife crime. Culturally, rural and wildlife crime, in 
not ascribing to the policing ideal of action packed and exciting ventures, are denounced 
as ‘rubbish’ crimes and perceived to be not ‘real’ police work (Nurse, 2013b). In the past, 
wildlife crime officers have been openly ridiculed and treated with contempt by their 
colleagues and superiors (Kirkwood, 1994: 75). More recently, Fyfe and Reeves’s (2011) 
research found that wildlife crime officer’s superiors perceived wildlife crime as ‘bunny- 
hugging type stuff’ (Ibid, 175) and made it very clear that wildlife crime was low priority 
and unworthy of police attention. 
 
Moreover, previous research has revealed that there is a perception amongst NGOs that 
wildlife crime officers often struggle to access the proper equipment for their job, due to 
the low status of their work, alongside the fact that they do not have internal force backing 
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for the work they do (Nurse, 2008: 150). It is questionable therefore, as to how RWCOs 
will find the time, resources, and internal support to police heritage crime, if the areas of 
rural and wildlife crime already struggle to achieve the latter. Moreover, the attachment of 
heritage crime to rural and wildlife crime, two areas which have been and still are 
perceived as not ‘real’ police work (Smith, 2010; Wellsmith, 2012), means that the 
internal perception of heritage crime has already been decided by the police organisation: 
if heritage crime is attached to two areas which are already perceived as not ‘real’ police 
work, then by default, heritage crime also must not be ‘real’ police work. 
 
Ultimately, the allocation of heritage crime to RWCOs appears to be ill-thought-out. It 
may have been assumed that the skills in policing rural and wildlife crime could be 
transferable, and applied to heritage crime, as all three crimes are marginalised within 
policing. However, heritage crime shares few similarities with rural and wildlife crime. It 
does not share the same legislation, nor the same types of victims, and is unlikely to 
require the same operational response. Furthermore, in policing two areas of niche crimes 
already, RWCOs are likely to lack the time to undertake the heritage crime side of their 
role. 
 
Existing documentation also suggests that the policing of heritage crime was thrust upon 
RWCOs, and that they did not have a choice in policing heritage crime (NPCC, 2017; 
NPCC 2018a); unless of course another officer has an existing interest in heritage crime 
and volunteers to take on the role. The allocation of jobs to officers without consultation is 
not uncommon within policing, which has a hierarchal structure where front-line officers 
are told what to do by their superiors (Van Maanen, 1973: 14). Nevertheless, with heritage 
crime being imposed upon RWCOs, there is no guarantee that these officers will have the 
enthusiasm and interest required to police heritage crime (see 2.4.3). Indeed, Kirkwood’s 
(1994) analysis of wildlife crime officers revealed that policing such niche areas requires 
genuinely interested officers who have a commitment to policing environmental issues 
(Ibid:69). However, wildlife crime officers were being forced into the role by their 
superiors, taking it on regardless of expertise or interest (Ibid: 65); and this method of 
allocation was considered the most unsatisfactory structure for effective wildlife policing 
(Ibid:71). 
 
Lastly, the affixation of heritage crime to rural and wildlife crime is likely to have incurred 
significant issues for wider understanding, awareness, and perception of heritage crime 
amongst frontline officers. The move may have created misconceptions amongst officers 
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more generally that heritage crime is not a crime which can be investigated by a ‘normal’ 
officer; and requires specialist skills to investigate. In fact, all officers possess the skills to 
police heritage crime, they simply must be cognisant of the heritage aspect to the case. In 
assuming that they do not possess the necessary skills, an officer may be referred a 
heritage crime case and simply pass it onto an RWCO. Consequently, this would increase 
the RWCOs workload, affect their response time to the heritage crime case, and 
potentially impact upon treatment of victims of heritage crime. 
 
2.5 : Leadership and heritage crime 
 
The policing of heritage crime in England and Wales is led by the NPCC’s (previously 
ACPO) Heritage and Cultural Property Crime Working Group (ACPO, 2013). The Chief 
Constable responsible for leading this group is referred to as the NPCC Lead for Heritage 
and Cultural Property Crime. Since 2013, there have been four officers who have assumed 
this role for varying periods. This lack of continuous group leadership may have led to 
operational inconsistencies. Two of these officers have been said to share a passion for 
heritage, and therefore policing heritage crime, in being ‘keen archaeologists’ (Kerr, 2013: 
232). It is arguable that possessing an interest, knowledge of, and enthusiasm for policing 
heritage crime are all crucial for this NPCC position. A leader with these qualities would 
be well placed to express why it is important for English and Welsh forces to dedicate 
already stretched resources to preventing and policing the phenomenon. Moreover, every 
force in England and Wales has force specific local priorities, despite receiving direction 
from the Home Office, and the NPCC, regarding national priorities (Loveday, 2005; Doig 
and Levi, 2013). The well documented disjuncture between frontline officers and senior 
leaders (Rowe, 2006) is likely to be heightened further if the senior leader is unable to 
successfully convey the latter. 
 
Indeed, it is likely that there is already disjuncture between frontline officers and senior 
leaders regarding heritage crime, as neither consultation with nor involvement of front-line 
officers appears to be apparent within the Heritage and Cultural Property Crime Working 
Group documentation, from 2013 and 2017 respectively. This suggests that the 
perspective of frontline officers regarding the inclusion of heritage crime within RWCOs 
operational remit has not been considered. On paper, heritage crime is within the police 
remit of all forces in England and Wales (NPCC, 2017). On the ground however, it is 
likely to be far harder to police heritage crime than the NPCC documentation suggests. 
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2.5.1 : Policing approaches to heritage crime 
 
 
As mentioned previously, heritage crime is currently an unrecordable crime. Data on 
heritage crime is not required to be collected by the Home Office, and many instances are 
instead recorded under other heads (Shelbourn, 2008). Without data, methods of policing 
heritage crime may be limited. Data is the foundation of many modern policing methods 
to tackling crime, and an absence of data renders two of these methods, Problem Oriented 
Policing (POP) and Intelligence Led Policing (ILP), unusable; as both rely upon data 
(Tilley, 2011). The third method, Neighbourhood Policing (NP), seems to be the most 
feasible means of policing and preventing heritage crime, as this method involves 
embedding officers in local communities, with officers carrying out regular foot patrol and 
using proactive engagement methods (Quinton and Morris, 2008). Regular patrol may 
make these officers more conscious of the heritage sites and assets around them, as was 
the case with local PCSOs in The Nighthawking Report findings (2009a); whilst liaising 
with and educating the local community about heritage crime may result in the community 
proactively looking out for and reporting heritage crime. 
 
With a lack of data limiting the policing approaches police forces can use, it appears that 
forces have settled upon crime prevention (CP) as the best means of tackling heritage 
crime, suggesting that academic literature on heritage crime has filtered through to the 
police organisation. However, the limited academic literature on using CP to combat 
heritage crime is not empirically based, and also recognises that using CP on heritage sites 
and assets is greatly flawed (Grove, 2013; Grove and Pease, 2014). CCTV, for example, 
cannot be affixed to heritage sites and assets, as it would damage their historical fabric 
(Grove and Pease, 2014). CP can also clash with important cultural and historical facets of 
certain heritage sites and assets. Churches, for example, have historically and culturally 
remained open for the public (Baker, 1999). Some of the most basic CP techniques 
therefore, such as locking doors (Schneider, 2015), are likely to be rejected. Despite these 
issues, CP is heavily focussed upon as a key means of tackling heritage crime in both of 
the NPCC Heritage and Cultural Property Crime Strategic Assessments (ACPO, 2013; 
NPCC, 2017), whilst policing literature from Historic England suggests the same approach 
to preventing heritage crime (Historic England, 2018). 
 
The focus upon CP by police forces, whilst flawed, is understandable. More active 
policing approaches towards heritage crime face huge obstacles, such as the difficulty in 
members of the public recognising heritage crime: fresh crimes against dilapidated sites or 
32  
assets, or those in a ruinous state for example, mean that crime may be hard to identify. 
Heritage crime can also easily go unnoticed and is rarely ‘caught in the act.’ Witnesses to 
heritage crime are often unaware that a heritage crime is occurring, with many assuming 
that the perpetrators are conducting official repair work (Weir, 2014), such as perpetrators 
wearing hi-vis jackets to appear as workmen when stealing lead or stone from churches 
(Burgess, 2018). Without this facet of the investigative process, which is one of the 
traditional starting points for investigations (Voillot, 2006), then officers may be confused 
by heritage crime, or give up without attempting to investigate further. Indeed, the latter is 
suspected to commonly occur with heritage crime, as, as mentioned previously, all police 
officers also recognise ‘…that to make something into a crime requires work’ (Sumner, 
1994: 218). Heritage crime not only incurs work, but incurs work outside of the traditional 
remit which officers feel comfortable with, such as examining heritage specific law, or 
spending time finding heritage experts who can provide a heritage crime impact statement 
(HCIS). Therefore, officers may not want to actively pursue heritage crime cases, and 
instead may prefer to ‘learn complacency’ (Van Maanen, 1973) by avoiding these cases 
entirely, or perhaps closing the cases prematurely. 
 
2.6 : Victims and victimology 
 
2.6.1 : Introduction 
 
Having considered the factors which influence the policing of heritage crime, it is also 
important to explore victims and victimology, in order to contextualise who the victims of 
heritage crime actually are (RQ4). Victimology is clearly a broad, varied and youthful 
discipline (Fattah, 2010), arguably meaning that it is ripe for the development and 
introduction of new strands of victimology, such as a victimology of heritage crime. 
Indeed, victimologists in the 21st century have recognised that great swathes of victims 
have been dismissed by the CJS, ignored in victim’s policy, and neglected by existing 
strands of victimology (Hall, 2013). 
 
Unconventional and contested conceptions of victimisation are being explored by a 
growing number of victimologists. Green victimologists for example, are looking beyond 
the legalistic definitions of crime and victims and expanding the victimological field by 
examining non-human victims of crime (Lynch and Stretesky, 2014). Broader conceptions 
of what makes a victim and how far victimisation extends are being further through the 
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victimologies of white collar and corporate crime, which have been addressed by scholars 
(Croall, 2007). Despite these advancements and challenges to the victimological norm 
however, the number of victimologists exploring these greatly marginalised victims and 
areas of victimology remain small, and the academic attention paid to these areas is 
limited (Whyte, 2007; Pemberton, 2014). Victimologists continue to focus upon many of 
the restrictive approaches towards and perceptions of victims and victimisation which 
form the foundation of the discipline (Hall, 2017). Despite our knowledge of the 
complexities of victims and victimhood, the former continue to impact upon the societal 
construction of victims. With this in mind, it is important to explore what victimology 
considers a victim, as well as exploring the contesting conceptions of what a victim is, 
alongside this. 
 
2.6.2 : Who is a victim? 
 
 
A starting point in addressing RQ4 is the notion of Christie’s ‘ideal victim’, who is ‘…a 
person or category of individuals who, when hit by crime, most readily are given the 
complete and legitimate status of being a victim’ (Christie, 1986:18). Christie’s ideal 
victim (notably a woman) is conceptualised as: 
 
(1) The victim is weak. Sick, old or very young people are particularly 
well suited as ideal victims. (2) The victim was carrying out a 
respectable project-caring for her sister. (3) She was where she could 
not possibly be blamed for being-in the street during the daytime. (4) 
The offender was big and bag. (5) The offender was unknown and in no 
personal relationship to her (Christie, 1986:19) 
 
 
Clearly, the characteristics of the victim play a great role in their ability to achieve victim 
status. The probability of victims achieving victim status through their personal 
characteristics is referred to as the ‘hierarchy of victimisation’ (Carrabine et al, 2004). At 
the top of this hierarchy are victims who exhibit the characteristics of the ideal victim. The 
elderly female victim of violent crime for example, is readily assigned victim status. On 
the other hand, individuals at the bottom of the hierarchy include street prostitutes, 
homeless people, and drug addicts, who are often denied victim status as their lifestyles 
(which are seen as their choice) mean they are prone to experiencing victimisation 
(Walklate, 2011: 183). These individuals are referred to as non-ideal victims, for they are 
perceived as contributing to and therefore can be blamed for their victimisation (Winter, 
2002). The non-ideal victim is explored in greater detail below. 
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Whilst an individual may be labelled as a victim by others, thereby gaining victim status, 
not all victims choose to accept this status. Victimisation is a ‘…personal subjective and 
relative experience’ (Fattah, 2000: 63). Even if a victim is recognised as such, it does not 
simply mean that victims will accept their victim status. In fact, the connotations 
associated with victim status may make victims reluctant to accept it, because victims are 
traditionally portrayed as helpless and vulnerable by society (Newburn and Stanko, 1994). 
However, it could be suggested that rejecting this status is futile, as the victim status is 
determined by a social process ‘…which may conform or conflict with self-identification’ 
(Zeigenhagen, 1978: 17). Victims are neither in total control of the victim label, nor their 
victim status. This is because the victim is a product of social construction (Strobl, 2004: 
297). This construction determines ‘…what forms of victimisation and what kinds of 
people are helped’ (Spalek, 2006: 31). Victims are socially constructed in the same way 
that laws, which determine what is a crime and therefore what actions result in a victim, 
are also socially constructed; specifically by the powerful (Miers, 1990). 
 
2.6.3 : Police officers and the ideal victim 
 
 
The ideal victim is socially constructed by the powerful, and the police have a significant 
role in this. Indeed, victims of heritage crime may not be perceived as ideal victims, or 
victims of crime at all, according to police conceptions of what constitutes a crime and 
what constitutes a victim. Police culture plays a significant role in officer’s conceptions of 
who a victim is, particularly that of ‘real’ and not ‘real’ police work (Reiner, 2010). 
Research has shown that there is a link between officers attending a ‘good job’ (‘real’ 
police work) and these good jobs resulting in what officers termed ‘genuine’ victims (ideal 
victims), as the following officer in Charman’s (2019: 89) study illustrates: ‘The good 
work is the people that are genuine.’ Another officer in the same study reported craving 
jobs with a genuine victim, as this was seen as proper policing (Ibid, 89). Clearly 
therefore, if the job is perceived as ‘real’ police work, this also means that the victim will 
fit the concept of the ideal victim and will be viewed as a genuine individual who merits a 
police response. Moreover, in being ‘real’ police work which serves a genuine victim, an 
officer’s sense of mission is fulfilled (Reiner, 2000). 
 
Alternately, when an officer attends to ‘rubbish’ work, the victim is usually immediately 
perceived by officers as non-ideal (or ingenuine). This is because the victims of ‘rubbish’ 
work are often perceived as contributing to their victimisation, such as when officers 
attend crimes where there is an overlap between victim and offender (Lauritsen et al, 
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1991). The victim and offender overlap refers to the victimological finding that offenders 
and victims are often the same individuals (Farrall and Maltby, 2003). This overlap 
impacts upon how police officers assess whether a victim can acquire the victim label or 
not, as the overlap means that officers struggle to ascertain where the victim and offender 
starts and ends (Duggan, 2018), resulting in non-ideal victims of crime. Officers are often 
reluctant to engage with non-ideal victims (Charman, 2019), and may take minimal action 
or ignore them, as officers feel that non-ideal victims are culpable in their own harm 
(Brown, 1988:216). The latter is of course problematic, as an officer’s assessment of who 
is worthy of victim status or not affects how they treat victims, with non-ideal victims 
being perceived as less deserving of an officer’s efforts (Charman, 2019). 
 
The victim-offender overlap is particularly relevant for discussions surrounding the 
victim/s of heritage crime as the identities of the ideal victim and the ideal offender are 
likely to be enmeshed more than other crimes. It has been argued that much heritage crime 
occurs out of ignorance (Vollgraaf, 2014). Thus, the offender is simultaneously and 
unknowingly also a victim of heritage crime, as the damage they cause to heritage sites 
and assets is part of their own history and heritage (Smith, 2006). This also means that 
there is no ideal victim, or ideal offender when heritage crime occurs as it may be 
impossible to separate victim from offender in certain scenarios. Examples of this include 
young people who may be unaware of the importance of heritage sites and assets, playing 
on them and subsequently damaging them (Moody, 2020), or farmers who may 
unknowingly damage ancient monuments or burial mounds on their land, which often look 
like innocuous mounds of earth (Bagnall, 2014). 
 
This area is important to explore further, as recognition that heritage crime occurs out of 
ignorance may lead to victims of heritage crime being reluctant to call the police and 
inform officers of heritage crime, as they may perceive the reporting of crimes where 
victim and offender crossover, as a waste of police time. Indeed, petty crimes occurring on 
heritage sites and assets committed by teenagers may be perceived very differently from 
thieves consciously and maliciously stealing artefacts from an asset, by the custodian of 
the site or asset. 
 
2.6.4 : Summary 
 
 
This section has outlined the development of victimology and explored who the victim is 
and how the victim is socially constructed. The concept of the ideal victim and non-ideal 
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victim were then examined, as well as how being labelled a victim gives the victim access 
to a sympathetic response from the CJS and its actors. Section 7.7 below will explore all 
of the concepts introduced in section 7.6, but through the lens of heritage crime and non- 
human victims of crime, referring back to previous discussions on green victimology and 
rural and wildlife crime. 
 
2.7 : Finding the victim of heritage crime: problematizing non-human 
victims of crime 
 
Victimology ‘…continues to be centred on notions of victimisation espoused by official 
sources, often through the criminal law’ (Hall, 2013:9). There is no specific law on 
heritage crime, and therefore, there is, legally, no direct victim of heritage crime. Heritage 
crime therefore, falls into an legal gap. As mentioned in the Introduction to this thesis, 
heritage crime also falls into an academic gap. The existing literature on heritage crime 
has failed to address and examine the victims of the phenomenon. Therefore, it is 
important in this section to look to other areas of victimology and victimological scholars 
who challenge the existing norms within the field, particularly those which examine non- 
human victims of green crime, and rural and wildlife crime; in order to inform our 
discussion of the victims of heritage crime. 
 
2.7.1 : A case for the direct victim of heritage crime 
 
 
It may be assumed that direct victims of heritage crime do not, and cannot, exist. The 
concept of the victim in victimological literature centres around the human. Even for green 
victimologists, whose concept of victims and victimhood extends to flora, fauna, animals 
and the environment more generally, the direct victim is at the very least a living 
organism, if not human (South et al, 2013). Examples of direct victimisation in green 
victimology that do not involve humans include: the illegal trafficking of animals (Maher 
and Sollund, 2016), direct damage to ecosystems (White, 2013) such as the illegal trade in 
endangered flora and fauna, or illegal deforestation (Skinnider, 2013), and man-made 
pollution directly affecting the natural functioning of a waterway (Lynch and Stretesky, 
2014: 7). 
 
However, at ‘face value’ it is difficult to argue that there are direct victims of heritage 
crime in the same way that there can be direct victims of green crime. A heritage site or 
asset is not human. It cannot feel emotions or pain. The damage or destruction of a 
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heritage site or asset is very unlikely to produce the same consequences to human, animal 
and environmental life that the damage and destruction of the environment does. After all, 
heritage is not essential to human life, despite holding much meaning and value to people 
(Smith, 2006). However, if the concept of victimhood can be fluid in the area of green 
victimology, then it could also be argued that the concept of victimhood can be equally as 
fluid in relation to heritage crime. Therefore, it is argued that the equivalent of the direct 
victim in heritage crime cases, (as it cannot be the heritage site or asset itself), is the 
individual who is responsible for taking care of the damaged site or asset.1 
 
The direct victim of heritage crime shares many similarities with ‘conventional’ victims 
and appears to experience many of the ill-effects of direct victimisation that Hall and 
Shapland (2007: 178) list, including: shock, financial loss (direct and indirect), 
psychological effects (fear, anger, depression), guilt, and consequential effects (such as 
fear of further victimisation). Churchwardens have been reported as being ‘in tears’ 
(Davies, 2018) after heritage crime has occurred. Friends groups (individuals who 
volunteer to take care of heritage sites or assets in their locally community) have described 
feeling as though their ‘morale [is] being kicked in the teeth’ (Wood, 2017: n.p) and 
‘devastated’ (Breen, 2019: n.p) following heritage crime; whilst vandalism at a church in 
Kent not only resulted in psychological effects (anger) but also financial loss, as the 
church was forced to close due to the repeated criminal behaviour (Williams, 2017). The 
direct victims of heritage crime also appear to experience secondary victimisation in the 
same way that victims of more ‘traditional’ crimes do. 
 
Secondary victimisation is victimisation which occurs as result of involvement by victims 
in the CJS (Walklate, 2007: 130), and manifests itself when agencies of the CJS mistreat 
victims (Jou and Hebenton, 2017). In particular, victims of heritage crime experience 
secondary victimisation through unsympathetic reactions from the police (Wemmers, 
1996:20) and poor police communication (Condry, 2010). Indeed, the existing research 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter undertaken by Oxford Archaeology (2009a; 
2009b), Shelbourn (2014b) and Poyser and Poyser (2017) all offer examples of secondary 
victimisation by agencies of the CJS, primarily by the police, in response to victims of 
heritage crime. A victim in Poyser and Poyser’s study (2017), for example, recalled how 
the police had attended a heritage crime which had been reported (by a local individual) 
but had failed to contact the victim and inform her that the crime had occurred; a clear 
 
 
1 The notion of the direct victim of heritage crime is explored in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 8. 
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example of poor police communication which left the victim very confused. In the same 
study, victims also recalled calling the police, and the police not attending the crime as a 
result of a lack of police interest (Poyser and Poyser, 2017). 
 
Oxford Archaeology’s (2009b) research similarly showed that officers were 
unsympathetic, with victims explaining how officers had made it very clear that illegal 
metal detecting was less important than other crimes (Ibid: 98), and that officers were 
uninterested in investigating the crime ‘[the officers said that they] Don’t see that they 
could have found anything’ (Ibid). In Shelbourn’s (2014b: 192) research meanwhile, 
police officers expressed dismissive attitudes towards victims, and rejected the idea that 
the victim might know more about relevant law than the police officer. Indeed, one 
archaeologist gave an example of him trying to get police officers to understand that 
illegal metal detecting on a scheduled ancient monument was indeed a crime, but the 
police officers simply would not believe the archaeologist in question: ‘I was told the 
offences, if any, were of civil trespass and so the police would take no action.’ 
 
These are all examples of secondary victimisation against the direct victim in heritage 
crime cases. However, it could be suggested that certain heritage crimes may result in 
unintentional secondary victimisation. Oxford Archaeology’s (2009a; 2009b) research 
centred upon illegal metal detecting, which is a type of heritage crime that many officers 
are likely to lack knowledge around and struggle to understand the severity of. This is 
because, for example, a hole in the ground caused by illegal metal detecting may simply 
appear as innocuous as a ‘normal’ hole in the ground to many officers. Additionally, there 
is usually limited evidence of who has committed the crime (it is difficult to catch 
nighthawks in action) and particularly what has been taken in these cases (Addyman and 
Brodie, 2002). Nobody knows what undiscovered artefacts lie beneath these protected 
areas (such as battlefields), as digging in these places is of course illegal. Both of these 
factors limit how the police can respond to the crime, as was the case with the following 
respondent from the Oxford Archaeology report (2009b: 99): ‘…as we could not tell them 
what had been stolen and its value they felt they could go no further with this.’ The same 
victim also explained how the officers could not interpret ‘digging holes’ as criminal 
damage, because the officer reviewing the case would not have considered the crime 
worthy of further police time and resources (Ibid). 
 
Secondary victimisation may not be a deliberate act of police unwillingness to be engaged, 
but, rather, may genuinely stem from ignorance regarding heritage crime (the ‘digging 
39  
holes’ comment above, highlights this), for heritage crime is relatively unknown area of 
crime amongst police officers (Poyser and Poyser, 2017; Shelbourn, 2014b). Furthermore, 
a lack of awareness and knowledge of what police officers can do with their existing skills 
in response to a crime, which few are aware of, may also influence their overall treatment 
of victims. 
 
2.7.2 : The indirect victim 
 
 
Indirect victimisation refers to the ‘impact that crime has upon those not directly involved 
in the particular event [crime] concerned’ (Davies, 2011: 193). When individuals 
experience feelings of victimisation after a crime has occurred, but they are not the main 
or intended target of the crime, these individuals are referred to as indirect victims. The 
remit of the indirect victim can be quite broad, indeed, according to Furedi (1997: 97) 
anybody who has witnessed something unpleasant or has heard of such an unpleasant 
experience, is a suitable candidate for the status of indirect victim. Indirect victimisation is 
therefore, often collective in nature (Van Dijk, 2011: 122). In addition, indirect 
victimisation can extend beyond communities; wider society can be victimised by criminal 
events for example (Moffett, 2014). A key facet of indirect victimisation is that its 
consequences are no less real and can be no less damaging, than the consequences which 
result from a more direct encounter where someone intends criminal harm (Fattah, 1991: 
18). 
 
Like green crime, rural and wildlife crime, and arts and antiques crime, heritage crime also 
has a plethora of indirect victims. Green victimological scholars have recognised that there 
are multiple indirect victims of green crime, some of which are difficult to conceptualise 
and identify (Williams, 1996; White, 2013). In the field of arts and antiques crime, it has 
also been recognised that the victims of arts and antiques crime are vast and varied, and 
are in fact, not just limited to the small pool of individuals within the art and antiques 
sector (Charney, 2009; Kila and Belcells, 2014). Similarly, heritage crime may also have 
numerous and varied victims. 
 
The local community 
 
 
Heritage sites and assets often form essential parts of local communities. Some heritage 
sites or assets, such as churches, may act as a community hub, and can help build social 
capital (Graham et al, 2009). Even if heritage sites or assets are not used by a community, 
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heritage has been recognised for its intangible and tangible benefits, such as providing a 
sense of place (Samuel, 1994: 247; Uzzell, 1995) and being an important cornerstone of 
identity (Graham and Howard, 2008). Aside from these benefits, the most important factor 
in relation to the local community experiencing indirect victimisation as a result of 
heritage crime, is that communities often feel a sense of ownership over their local 
heritage site/s or asset/s (Logan, 2008). The sense of owning a heritage site or asset can be 
best expressed through the concept of ‘cognitive ownership’ (Boyd et al, 1996), a concept 
which can also help us to address why communities experience indirect victimisation, in 
the aftermath of heritage crime. 
 
Cognitive ownership refers to the link between people and place, a link which is defined 
by some form of intellectual, spiritual, or conceptual meaning which a person or group 
attaches to a site or asset (Ibid: 125). It does not include legal or economic ownership, 
rather, it centres upon personal identification and emotional association with a heritage 
site or asset (Boyd, 2012: 5). Cognitive ownership is also an inherent cognitive quality, as 
opposed to being an inherent quality of the heritage site and asset, and comes from 
‘knowing’ the heritage site or asset by those who associate with and construct meaning 
about it (Boyd et al, 1996: 125). Communities are key to the model of cognitive 
ownership, because ‘community access to heritage is legitimized through the recognition 
of interest’ (Boyd, 2012: 180). If local communities feel a strong sense of cognitive 
ownership over their local heritage sites and assets, then it appears with some inevitability 
that the community will suffer from indirect victimisation after heritage crime has 
occurred. 
 
Local communities are therefore indirect victims of heritage crime. Whether the site or 
asset is still utilised by or considered the centre of the community, or perhaps cannot be 
used by the community but evidently remains important to them; the feelings of distress 
are the same. Whilst the local community appear to be the most ‘direct’ of the indirect 
victims, there also seem to be a variety of other potential indirect victims of heritage 
crime. Heritage crime, like green crime, might also be considered as a form of crime 
which affects society at large (Lindgren, 2002). This suggests that wider society and 





Heritage can be perceived as belonging to everybody (Breglia, 2006; Smith and Waterton, 
2012). In this sense, we are all custodians of heritage now for the benefit of future 
generations. However, if heritage belongs to everybody, then heritage crime can result in a 
loss of heritage, which is a loss to everybody: that is, wider society. Many people may not 
recognise or consider themselves as victims of heritage crime, not least because the 
concept of ‘victim’ for many people is associated with a direct event which harms or 
impacts upon the individual personally, but also because heritage may not feel important 
to them. Indeed, wider public feelings of moral indignation that a heritage site or asset 
(whether local or national) has been damaged (or even destroyed) are unknown, but are 
most likely to be short-lived in day-to-day conversation, unless there is a direct connection 
to the site or asset (Robinson, 2018: 200). 
 
Nevertheless, even if victims within wider society do not recognise themselves as victims, 
they can still be regarded as such. Society as a whole loses the benefit of gaining 
knowledge from, visiting, and enjoying heritage sites and assets when heritage crime 
occurs, particularly if heritage crime is severe enough to damage the site or asset beyond 
repair or to permanently close it. For example, an English Heritage owned castle in 
Leicestershire was forced to close due to repeated vandalism (Mack, 2018), whilst ruins 
which were opened daily in Maldon were similarly forced to close, due to continued 
vandalism on the site (Gueye, 2017). 
 
At a basic level, closing these sites and assets mars wider society’s enjoyment of them, but 
their closure could also encourage further crime, without informal guardians regularly 
using these sites (Wilkinson, 2019). On a wider level, the loss of whole sites and assets 
due to criminal behaviour, such as churches being targets of arson across England and 
Wales which completely destroys them (Dalling, 2019); is a loss to every member of 
society. The assets and sites which are destroyed can obviously not be replaced in kind, 
and the potential to engage with them in any capacity is lost. Heritage enriches the lives of 





We can turn to the similarly marginalised area of green victimology to gain an 
understanding of just how far-reaching the victims of heritage crime can be. Williams 
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(1996: 21), for example, argues that the victims of green crime can be as broad as future 
generations, defining victims of green crime as ‘…those of past, present, or future 
generations…’ The impacts of green crimes are often not isolated in the way that an 
‘ordinary’ crime, such as criminal damage against a bus shelter might be (the bus shelter is 
simply replaced), and ripple outwards, affecting swathes of individuals after the initial 
crime has been committed (Lynch and Stretesky, 2014); including future generations. The 
same can be said of heritage crime. Indirect victims of heritage crime may constitute 
future generations, particularly in the terms of loss of knowledge and provenance, if a 
heritage site or asset is damaged or destroyed beyond repair or moved from its original 
setting illegally (Brodie, 2002; Gruber, 2014). 
 
Heritage crime also destroys the opportunity for future generations to understand and 
appreciate heritage. The impacts of criminal behaviour may diffuse over time and over a 
wide group of individuals, but in the case of heritage crimes, they may not distil in the 
same fashion. Future generations may be equally as distressed as current generations that 
experience heritage crime, and may be more distressed by the fact that our current 
generation failed to conserve, preserve and protect heritage. A recent example of the latter 
is the deliberate destruction of heritage sites and assets and cultural property in Syria by 
ISIS. The nature of this destruction has led to it being considered a war crime, as it is now 
considered to be undertaken with the purpose of depriving Syrian people of their identity, 
knowledge and history (UNESCO, 2015). Indeed, Amr al-Azm, former head of Syria’s 
conservation laboratories, succinctly summarised the depth and breadth of loss which 
occurs due to heritage and cultural property crime: ‘I always say that people without their 
heritage and history are not a people’ (Shaheen, 2015: n.p). 
 
2.8 : Conclusion 
 
This chapter discussed the definitions and concept of heritage crime, as well as the legal 
framework governing heritage crime in England and Wales. Heritage cannot truly be 
defined, no matter what is put forth by national and international heritage bodies, and can 
mean a variety of different things to different people (Smith, 2006). However, as this 
chapter has illustrated, heritage is also utilised for a variety of political, social and 
economic purposes (Graham, 2002). In the context of the UK, this has meant that 
regardless of how interpretations of heritage may differ from person to person, the heritage 
of the elite has emerged as the dominant heritage across the UK (Schofield et al, 2011). 
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Although there is no overarching legal framework that governs heritage crime, there are a 
range of laws relating to specific crimes that are applied in practice. Moreover, it was 
found that heritage crime struggles to move through the CJS without experiencing 
significant barriers (Shelbourn, 2014b). A lack of knowledge and understanding of 
heritage crime within the court system in England and Wales were revealed as reasons 
behind the overall poor treatment of heritage crime by the CPS. In addition, the values by 
which the police and the CPS evaluate ‘normal’ crimes clash with heritage values. This 
means that heritage crime cases often fail to progress beyond the two-stage test for public 
prosecutions. It is hoped that the creation of the Wildlife, Rural and Heritage Crime 
Coordinator role has gone some way to remedying these issues, although there is currently 
no evidence to support this. Tangentially, this thesis hopes to gain some level of insight on 
the treatment of heritage crime in the CPS, which it is hoped will be achieved by 
interviewing police officers on the issues relating to policing and prosecuting heritage 
crime more broadly. 
 
This chapter also explored the concept of police culture and its characteristics, as well as 
exploring prominent themes which consistently emerge in the literature, such as the notion 
of ‘real’ police work and the clash between senior and front-line officers. Thereafter, 
police perceptions, understandings and awareness of heritage crime were discussed. 
Although there is little empirical research on police perceptions, understandings and 
awareness of heritage crime, the areas of rural and wildlife crime and arts and antiques 
crime (both of which share a number of similarities with heritage crime) were drawn upon 
to inform this discussion. Current police approaches to heritage crime were also addressed. 
Overall, this chapter illustrated how police understandings, awareness and perceptions of 
heritage crime amongst the average police officer, are likely to be poor. 
 
Another key aim of this thesis is to fill a significant gap in the existing literature relating to 
victims of heritage crime. As such, this chapter reviewed the field of victimology, 
explored definitions of the victim, and examined the ways a victim may experience 
victimisation in relation to heritage crime. Wider victimological concepts such as the idea 
of the deserving victim, which often impacts upon police officer’s responses to victims of 
crime (Charman, 2017), were also discussed through the lens of the victim of heritage 
crime. Indeed, whilst officers may refute the idea that they respond differently to different 
kinds of victims (Cretney and Davies, 1995), it was found from the limited existing 
research available, that many police officers perceive heritage crime as ‘victimless.’ 
Additionally, it was clear that this perception influences the way that officers respond to 
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the victims of this crime; a response which is epitomised in the limited literature wherein 
officers explicitly state that heritage crime is victimless and not worth police time 
(Shelbourn 2014b; Poyser and Poyser 2017). 
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3.1 : Introduction 
 
The chapter outlines the research methods and approach utilised by this thesis. This thesis 
set out to examine and compare police officers’ and victims’ understandings and 
experiences of heritage crime. The research methods and approach utilised by this thesis 
were orientated towards the following aims, identified as those being best placed to 
answer the research questions identified in 1.3: 
 
Aim 1: to examine and compare police officers’, heritage practitioners’ and victims’ 
understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime in England and Wales. 
 
Aim 2: to identify and address some of the challenges associated with policing heritage 
crime more broadly in order to reflect the lived experiences of victims of heritage crime. 
 
In order to address these questions, a qualitatively driven mixed methods research design 
was adopted (Mason, 2006). A qualitative focussed approach was thought to be best for 
the purposes of this research, for the following reasons. Firstly, the researcher was 
interested in exploring the lived experiences of the interviewees, and such realities and 
narratives can be difficult to interrogate through quantitative methods (Marshall and 
Rossman, 2006). Secondly, because heritage crime is an area of crime which has not been 
subject to empirical research of this extent or depth prior to this study, in-depth research of 
this nature was deemed to be an essential foundation of this thesis. In order to complement 
the use of the main qualitative methods, supplementary qualitative methods were used, 
through sending FOI requests to all territorial police forces in England (FOIs were not sent 
to Wales, explained later in this chapter) enquiring if their force had a heritage crime 
officer/heritage crime liaison officer. 
 
The qualitatively driven mixed methods research design involves the core of the mixed 
methods approach being qualitative in nature, and then a supplementary qualitative 
component being undertaken alongside the core qualitative component. As the FOI 
requests were sent out whilst the interviews were being conducted, this type of approach is 
known as a: QUAL+qual approach, where the study is qualitatively driven with a 
simultaneous qualitative supplement (Morse, 2017). The supplementary qualitative 
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method elicits data which the core qualitative method cannot, resulting in a study which is 
strengthened and deepened more than a single method study could achieve (Morse and 
Cheek, 2014). Further benefits of adopting a qualitatively driven mixed methods 
approach, specifically QUAL+qual, include: the ability to develop a more rounded 
understanding of the phenomenon being investigated by comparing the datasets, and the 
ability to gain an understanding of the phenomenon from differing perspectives (Hesse- 
Biber et, 2015). Lastly, a key benefit of the mixed methods approach more generally, for 
this research in particular, is that it is said to be very useful for exploring areas which have 
received little attention thus far (ibid, 2015), such as heritage crime. 
 
3.1.1 : The research process 
 
 
This thesis began with an examination of police understandings, awareness and 
perceptions of heritage crime, through the review of existing literature and other resources 
which focussed upon the phenomenon. A selection of the resources used, is provided in 
Table One below: 
 
 
Table 1: Sources used for the literature review 
Historic England online literature on heritage crime (including documents such as 
‘Guidance for Sentencers and ‘Memorandum of Understanding Prevention, 
Investigation, Enforcement and Prosecution of Heritage Crime’) 
Historic England and Cadw webpages on heritage crime 
NPCC documentation concerning heritage crime (NPCC Heritage and Cultural 
Property Crime National Strategic Assessment 2013 and 2017) 
Legislative documentation on the specific laws pertaining to heritage crime (such as 
the Treasure Act 1996) 
Police practice documentation concerning rural crime and wildlife crime as heritage 
crime is operationally affixed onto both of these crimes (principally the rural crime 
strategies from forces, where these were available) 
10 pieces of online police practice documentation specifically concerning heritage 
crime from individual forces in England and Wales (only available from 10 forces) 
Academic resources on heritage crime (surveying the area of criminal justice, law, 
and criminology, alongside the limited academic literature on heritage crime) 
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50 newspaper reports concerning instances of heritage crime in England and Wales 




The researcher understood the importance of not taking documentary sources (particularly 
newspapers and webpages) at face value, as the credibility and validity of such sources is 
not guaranteed (Wincup, 2017). Therefore, the researcher utilised Scott’s (1990) typology 
which is designed to assess the quality of documentary sources. This typology comprises 
four criteria: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning, as detailed below: 
 
Authenticity: Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? 
 
 
Credibility: Is the evidence free from error and distortion? 
 
 
Representativeness: Is the evidence typical of its kind, and, if not, is the extent of its 
untypicality known? 
 
Meaning: Is the evidence clear and comprehensible? (Scott, 1990: 6). 
 
 
By following this framework, the researcher was able to assess documentary sources more 
efficiently, sorting ‘good’ documentary resources from ‘bad’, leading to high confidence 
that the chosen documentary resources were both highly authentic and credible. 
 
Research Process Phase 1 and 2: interviewing police officers, heritage practitioners, 
and victims of heritage crime 
 
Interviewing is an intricate process, a difficult technique which makes demands upon both 
the interviewer and interviewee (Frey & Oishi, 1995: 2). Interviews are time-consuming, 
with travel to participants being costly, meaning that sample size is generally small (Adler 
and Clark, 2014). Although interviewing victims of heritage crime was reasonably 
straightforward, interviewing police officers adds another layer of complexity to an 
already complex technique. Indeed, policing has long been wary of academic inquiry and 
police officers are often suspicious and distrustful of academics (Young, 1991).** 
However, despite the challenges associated with interviewing, the researcher felt that the 
aims of her research would be best met through interviews. This is because interviewing 
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‘...gives us access to the observations of others...we can learn about places we have not 
been and could not go’ (Weiss, 1994: 1). This makes interviewing an ideal research tool 
for understanding the personal experiences of victims, and groups such as police officers, 
which the researcher may struggle to access. Moreover, there was a limited pool of police 
participants to choose from, because the spread of officers who hold responsibility for the 
policing of heritage crime across England and Wales is inconsistent (see 3.4.2 for further 
information on this). Utilising interviews meant that in-depth inquiry into heritage crime 
which produced thorough and detailed data was still possible, even with a small number of 
participants available. Overall, qualitative interviewing was considered the best method of 
interrogating heritage crime, because any quantitative alternative would have merely 
scraped the surface of the views and experiences of the interviewees. Qualitative 
interviewing permits the data to speak for itself, whereas quantitative methods do not 
(Seidman, 2006). Specifically, semi-structured interviews were chosen for this research. 
The semi-structured interview is a method of interviewing which utilises pre-prepared 
questions, but the sequencing of questions is participant led, permitting for flexibility and 
probing based on interviewee’s answers (explored further below) (Roulston and Choi, 
2018:233). 
 
This method of interviewing is similar to an everyday conversation, but with a sense of 
purpose, involving a particular approach and techniques (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2015). 
Semi-structured interviews are advantageous over the rigidity of structured interviews 
(Berg, 2001). The rigidity of structured interviews offers little leeway for interviewer or 
interviewee to ad-lib (Tewksbury and Mustaine, 2015: 119), resulting in both interviewer 
and interviewee squeezing themselves into ‘...a number of predetermined boxes which 
may or may not be appropriate’ (Jupp, 1989: 63). The semi-structured interview 
meanwhile, is flexible and fluid (Mason, 2017), acting as a guide for the researcher. The 
researcher can alter the order and wording of questions as the interview progresses 
(Patton, 2002), instead of adhering to a strict pathway. 
 
This flexibility allowed the researcher to probe interviewees for greater depth of response, 
asking further questions of and exploring potential points of interest discussed by the 
interviewee (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Berg, 1989). The latter was an important reason for 
employing semi-structured interviews, as heritage crime had not been investigated 
qualitatively prior to this research, and therefore it was crucial to be able to probe 
interviewees for depth if the opportunity arose. Pilot interviews were not run, but draft 
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interview guides were commented upon by the researcher’s supervisors to check for error 
and omission, thus ensuring consistency and reliability. 
 
To ensure that the officers felt comfortable during the interview, every face-to-face 
interview was conducted in the interviewee’s place of work. Due to the shift-based work 
schedules of many of the interviewees, it was logistically necessary, at times, to conduct a 
telephone interview instead of a face-to-face interview. There are some negatives 
associated with telephone interviews, including a potential loss of contextual data and 
visual cues (Gillham, 2005), but Novick (2008) argues that the negative impacts 
associated with telephone interviewing are poorly evidenced and are in fact minimal. 
Before examining the phases of the research process in greater detail, it is important to 
discuss the different sampling methods used to gather participants for these phases. The 
section below will do this. 
 
3.2 : Sampling 
 
3.2.1 : Sampling method: heritage practitioners and victims 
 
 
This thesis employed two types of sampling: purposeful sampling and snowball sampling. 
Purposeful sampling involves the researcher selecting participants which fit the needs of 
the study (Morse, 2000: 129). The sampling approach for heritage practitioners and 
victims of heritage crime was purposeful, because it permitted the researcher to access 
information-rich cases, in which the researcher could “...learn a great deal about issues of 
central importance to the purpose of the research...” (Patton, 1990: 169). In an 
academically marginalised area like heritage crime, which has not been subject to any 
qualitative academic enquiry into the experiences of victims (and very little with regards 
to heritage practitioners), purposeful sampling was arguably integral to this study. Both 
victims and heritage practitioners were contacted through publicly available emails. 
 
The sampling approach for obtaining police participants was snowball sampling. Snowball 
sampling involves the researcher identifying accessible participants who possess 
characteristics that are of interest to the research study (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981). 
After the initial participants are contacted, these participants are used to identify others, 
and in turn, others; until data saturation has been reached (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 233). 
Both of these methods are discussed in greater detail below. 
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3.2.2 : Sampling method: police officers. 
 
 
Facilitating access to police officers has long been acknowledged as a significant barrier 
for academics engaging in police research (Holdaway, 1983). Having conducted research 
with the police previously, the researcher was aware of how to approach officers in order 
to invite them to take part in research (such as formality in emails and use of an officer’s 
title), but access options remained limited. Therefore, this study utilised snowball 
sampling to obtain interviewees. Snowball sampling is an effective method of accessing 
difficult to reach participants (Faugier and Sargeant, 1997), such as the police. The 
snowball sampling method necessitates the researcher locating potential participants 
which they can access (in this case through police emails that were available in the public 
domain), and then asking these participants to provide the information needed, so that the 
researcher can locate further participants themselves (Watters and Biernacki, 1989; 
Babbie, 2007). 
 
In Wales, snowball sampling worked very well, as Wales only has four territorial police 
forces. Upon conducting an interview with one officer from a police force in Wales, the 
officer in question then personally emailed the three officers who were in the same role as 
him, in the other three forces in Wales, explaining that the researcher was hoping to 
interview the recipients of his email. 
 
Before moving onto section 3.3, it is important to briefly address some of the main 
shortcomings of both snowball sampling and purposeful sampling. These shortcomings 
include the limited generalisability (Engel and Schutt, 2014) of the results from studies 
which utilise these sampling methods, because of the small sample size generated (Patton, 
2002), as well as a high probability of bias (Morse, 1991). However, the intention of this 
thesis was not to collate vast amounts of data which would be generalisable to larger 
populations; it was to collate rich detailed data which permitted a “mirror like” view into 
the phenomenon being investigated (Giacomini and Cook, 2000: 480). Moreover, despite 
the possibility of biased responses from participants recruited using these sampling 
methods, the researcher still achieved a range of views on heritage crime. 
 
Lastly, data analysis in this study was conducted through Grounded Theory, specifically 
Strauss and Corbin’s version of this popular method of data analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Grounded Theory is a method of data analysis which creates theory and theoretical 
concepts that are grounded in empirical data (Merriman, 2009), and, uniquely, allows for 
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research analysis and data collection to occur concurrently (Strauss and Corbin, 2015). 
Snowball and purposeful sampling are methods which are specifically utilised for studies 
with a Grounded Theory methodology (Grove et al, 2015). Moreover, with a Grounded 
Theory methodology, small sample size and limited generalisability are considered 
unproblematic because ‘…the size of the sample is not a concern, and the aim is not to 
provide a statistical result generally applicable across a population’ (Bryant, 2017: 251). 
 
3.3 : Research Phase 1A: interviewing police officers 
 
Phase 1A of the research aimed to investigate police officers’ understandings, awareness 
and perceptions of heritage crime, alongside the potential obstacles officers encountered 
which may impede their practice. Twelve officers were interviewed, eight in England, four 
in Wales. It can sometimes be difficult to access police officers to conduct research with, 
as police management is known to be at times reluctant to grant access to outside 
researchers, fearing a hidden agenda (Rowe, 2015: 176). However, the marginalised 
nature of heritage crime was thought to be advantageous. Heritage crime is not generally 
considered to be a controversial or highly political area of policing, so it was unlikely that 
these officer’s superiors would reject their request for permission to be interviewed. 
 
However, as highlighted above, there is a dysfunctional relationship between police 
officers and academics, conceptualised as a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (in which neither 
academic nor police officer are listening to each other), ultimately resulting in ‘...mutual 
misunderstanding that negatively impacts upon the police-academic relationship’ (Bradley 
and Nixon, 2009: 423). To negate this issue, existing literature suggests that researchers 
mix ‘positionalities.’ Researchers’ mixing of positionalities and identities is instrumental 
to conducting successful police research (Fuller, 1999). In one moment, the researcher 
may present themselves as a researcher, and in other moments they may present 
themselves ‘...as advocates, sometimes as challengers, sometimes as change agents’ 
(Marks et al, 2010: 117). 
 
To do so, the researcher employed a number of techniques. Firstly, the researcher worked 
hard to build rapport with the interviewees. Opie (2004) writes that humour is a key 
method of building rapport with interviewees, and this is something the researcher 
attempted to achieve with the officers. If the interview environment was relaxed enough to 
result in laughter, this was a signal that the barrier of formality associated with research 
and academics had been broken down, meaning that the police interviewee could be 
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probed further, and potentially more critical questions be asked of them. Healthy cynicism 
and dark humour were encouraged. The use of straightforward language is recommended 
as a facilitating factor of research with the police (Cockbain, 2015), so jargon was rejected 
in favour of informal language during the interviews, which the researcher would always 
introduce first. 
 
Stanko and Dawson (2016) write that another stumbling block for policing researchers is 
the inability to recognise the realities of front-line policing, and so the researcher aimed to 
show that she was indeed aware of these realities, by, for example, making reference to the 
current (austerity-led) policing environment. In certain cases, the interview itself became 
an arena for officers to air their grievances with policing more generally, to which the 
researcher always listened with sympathy and empathised with the officers’ worldviews - 
a crucial component of conducting police research (Marks et al, 2010). Informality also 
allowed the researcher to feel more comfortable interviewing the officers, thus producing 
an interview which flowed more naturally. 
 
3.3.1 : Research Phase 1B: interviewing heritage practitioners 
 
 
Phase 1B of this research aimed to examine the understanding and perception of heritage 
crime amongst heritage practitioners. It also aimed to establish the potential obstacles that 
practitioners may face in protecting heritage, from a legislative and policing engagement 
perspective. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with four practitioners: two from 
Wales and two from England. This interviewee number is, arguably, rather small. 
However, once the researcher had conducted the third interview, it became apparent that 
data saturation was already being reached, as participant answers were becoming 
repetitive and no additional data was being collected (Gratton and Jones, 2004). Interviews 
were conducted at the heritage practitioners’ places of work, in a private room, so that 
they felt comfortable enough to answer the questions openly and thoroughly (Green and 
Thorogood, 2009). 
 
3.3.2 : Research Phase 2: interviewing victims of heritage crime 
 
 
Phase 2 of this research aimed to examine the experiences and perceptions of heritage 
crime from the victims of the phenomenon themselves. It also aimed to examine the 
overall police understanding and response to heritage crime when victims reported it, and 
how this could be improved, if necessary. 16 victims were interviewed, eight in England, 
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eight in Wales. There were some challenges to sourcing the victims. From previous 
research experience on the same topic, the researcher was aware that ‘heritage crime’ is 
not used in mainstream public or media discourse, when the media reports an instance of 
heritage crime. Therefore, although a laborious process, the researcher searched for 
victims by compiling a ‘bank’ of search terms. This enabled her to search for victims of 
heritage crime, whilst avoiding the term ‘heritage crime.’ 
 
Four interviews were conducted via telephone, due to the work schedules of the victims. 
Telephone interviews may disadvantage the interviewer, as it can be harder to build 
rapport with participants (Gillham, 2005), but this type of interview can also be 
advantageous for interviewing vulnerable participants (like victims of crime). A ‘faceless 
researcher’ (Dinham, 1993: 25) may allow interviewees to be more open about sensitive 
topics (Kavanaugh and Ayers, 1998; Chapple, 1999). Ultimately, there is no noticeable 
difference in the data from telephone and face-to-face interviews when compared 
(Jendrek, 1994: 209), and thus telephone interviews were utilised where necessary. The 
other twelve interviews were conducted in the heritage asset, or on the heritage site, in 
which the crime had occurred. Conducting an interview at the place of a crime could have 
been upsetting for the victims, but all victims were asked in advance of the interview 
where they wanted to meet, and all were comfortable meeting at the site or asset where the 
crime had occurred. 
 
The researcher employed various strategies in order to gain the victims’ trust and to make 
them feel safe and comfortable talking to her. For example, regardless of how comfortable 
the victims already seemed, the researcher ensured she was sensitive to the emotional 
impact of the crime upon the interviewee (Noaks and Wincup, 2004). If an interviewee 
appeared visibly angry about what had happened, the researcher would show concern. The 
researcher would also engage in self-revelation, exposing what she felt about the incident, 
in turn. Self-revelation on the part of the researcher is suggested by Rubin and Rubin 
(2005) as an incredibly useful tool when interviewing victims, as it helps the interviewee 
feel protected, less exposed, and builds researcher empathy. Notably, in the case of this 
research, in which the police often fail to recognise the severity of heritage crime and its 
impact upon victims (Oxford Archaeology, 2009a); it permitted these victims to be 
confident that their feelings were justified. 
 
The researcher also ensured that enough time was spent talking to the victims, so that the 
interviewing process was not a, ‘smash and grab’, where the research interview comprises 
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of ‘…getting in, getting the data, and getting out’ (Wadsworth, 1984: 218). This would 
result in the victims feeling used and rushed. To mitigate the latter, the researcher 
expressed at the beginning of the interviews that she had plenty of time to speak with the 
victims, which often resulted in time spent with the victims greatly exceeding the one hour 
initially allocated for the interview. The victims were assured that the researcher did not 
simply want to rush through the interview, thus generating trust between them and the 
researcher. 
 
3.3.3 : Research Phase 3: sending Freedom of Information Requests (FOIs) to police 
forces in England and Wales 
 
Phase 3 of this research sought to ascertain if each force in England and Wales had a 
heritage crime officer. According to Historic England’s Policing and Crime Advisor, 
every police force in England has a heritage crime officer (Kerr, 2018). Yet, in the 
interviews the researcher was conducting with the officers in England, she was 
anecdotally informed that the latter was not the case. Therefore, the researcher wanted to 
establish if each force in England did indeed have a heritage crime officer. Without the 
time to interview every heritage crime officer in England, submitting FOIs would help the 
researcher assess the overall ‘coverage’ of heritage crime officers. As a force’s heritage 
crime officer is generally not public information, it was decided that submitting an FOI 
request, enquiring if a force had a heritage crime officer, was the best method of accessing 
this data. FOIs were not sent to the four police forces in Wales because the researcher had 
strong connections with the heritage crime officers in those forces and maintained these 
connections post interview. 
 
FOI requests have been underused by researchers concerned with criminology, legal 
studies, and criminal justice, but present many opportunities for researchers interested in 
these areas whose ‘...agencies of study are often rich in data but reluctant to publicise’ 
(Brown, 2009:88). Whilst FOIs can be an incredibly valuable research tool, as they permit 
the researcher to access data that would otherwise be unavailable to them (Savage and 
Hyde, 2012), there are potential difficulties associated with their use. The requesting 
process, for example, is somewhat fragile (Worthy et al, 2016). There are often an 
inadequate number of appropriately trained staff available to respond to FOIs (Roberts, 
2012), and there is also the possibility of resistance to FOI requests from the agencies 
responding to them (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014). Indeed, in 2012, ACPO, described how 
FOIs were time consuming for police forces, were constantly increasing, were used 
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improperly, and were a drain on diminishing financial resources (Ministry of Justice, 
2012). 
 
Despite these potential difficulties, FOI requests were still considered the most effective 
method of establishing whether a force had a heritage crime officer. FOI requests were 
sent to 38 territorial police forces in England (the 39th, the Metropolitan Police, were 
exempt, because of the AAU). Once the requests were sent to the respective police forces, 
they had 20 days to respond. However, researchers may experience a delay in response, 
and so FOI’s are not recommended for use when working to a tight deadline (Lee, 2005). 
To mitigate this, the researcher ensured that the research timeframe allowed for the 
possibility of responses taking longer than 20 days. The quickest response from sending 
the initial request to receiving an answer to the request, was 24 hours. The lengthiest was 
one year. A response rate of 36 was achieved. 
 
3.4 : Analysis 
 
3.4.1 : Analysing the interview data 
 
 
Interviews are not only time-consuming to conduct; they are time-consuming to transcribe 
and analyse (Dantzker and Hunter, 2012). This is particularly the case when (as in this 
research study) open-ended responses are encouraged, thus producing a vast amount of 
information for the researcher to code and analyse (Maxwell, 2005). Therefore, sufficient 
time was allocated for the researcher to transcribe, and then analyse the interviews in 
depth. After transcription was completed, the researcher used grounded theory (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998) to analyse the interviews. One of the purposes of this research was to 
generate theory directly from the data collected, and grounded theory is an analytical 
method designed for achieving the latter (Glaser and Strauss, 2017). 
 
Interview analysis began with coding. Coding was a 3-step process, such is the grounded 
theory method of coding data. Firstly, interview data was subject to open-coding where 
data is broken down, compared, conceptualised, and then grouped together to form 
categories and subcategories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 12). The next step was for the 
interview data to be subject to axial coding. Axial coding deepens the analysis already 
conducted, relating categories to subcategories, specifying the properties and dimensions 
of a category and bringing the data back together which has been fractured during open- 
coding (Charmaz, 2006). The last step in grounded theory analysis, and for the collected 
56  
interview data, was selective coding. Selective coding connects the categories formed 
from the axial coding model, centring the categories around a core category, building a 
story from the analysed data (Creswell, 1998) and creating data-led theoretical 
propositions (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
 
Coding was a similarly time-consuming process, heightened by the large amount of data 
gathered from the interviews. These all had to be coded and themed systematically. The 
researcher coded all the data manually which, although a laborious process, has some 
tangible advantages. Manual coding permitted the researcher to engage more closely with 
the gathered data than coding electronically allows (Blair, 2015). Nevertheless, after 
manual coding had been completed (and the researcher felt confident that she knew her 
data comprehensively) a software package was used to code the collected data (NVivo). 
By doing so, the researcher adhered to the recommendations that both manual and 
electronic coding are utilised in order to scrutinise and interrogate data more thoroughly 
(Welsh, 2002). Lastly, the researcher did not experience any challenges in employing the 
Grounded Theory approach to data analysis, as she had used the method in previous 
qualitative research. 
 
3.4.2 : Analysing the Freedom of Information requests (FOI) 
 
 
Literature available on how to analyse FOI requests which produce qualitative data is 
scarce (Lee, 2005; Walby and Larsen, 2012; Spiller and Whiting, 2020) and a particular 
method of data analysis is not specified nor recommended (Walby and Luscombe, 2020). 
It was up to the researcher to decide which method of qualitative analysis to use, and 
thematic analysis was settled upon. 
 
Thematic analysis offers a means of ‘…systematically identifying, organising, and 
offering insight into, patterns of meaning (themes) across a dataset’ (Braun and Clarke, 
2012: 57). It is a flexible method of analysis (meaning it can be used for numerous forms 
of qualitative research), and inductive (themes induced from the data are not 
predetermined), meaning that the researcher may encounter emergent issues which they 
had not anticipated (Ezzy, 2002). The latter applied to the thematic analysis of the FOI 
requests, and was perceived as a positive by the researcher. Although an arguably 
rudimentary method of analysis, it was believed to be the best option for analysing the 
FOI data, because there is overlap between thematic analysis and grounded theory 
(Pidgeon, 1996); meaning that the researcher already had the necessary skills to utilise this 
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method of analysis. 
 
 
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six phase approach to conducting thematic analysis was 
employed as guidance for undertaking the analysis. After counting and sorting the 
responses from the 36 forces which had responded, the researcher repeatedly familiarised 
herself with the data, looking for initial similarities in the responses. In this instance, 
similarities in phrasing were important to identify. Many of the responses were phrased 
almost identically, but despite this, one force would respond ‘Yes’ to having a heritage 
crime officer, whilst the other would respond ‘No’. Individual forces appeared to be 
making assumptions regarding the heritage crime officer role, such as assuming that all 
officers in rural and wildlife crime teams were also heritage crime officers. Although 
heritage crime has been affixed onto the rural and wildlife crime policing remit (NPCC, 
2018a), this does not automatically make all rural and wildlife crime officers heritage 
crime officers, as mentioned in section 2.4.3. Therefore, it was decided that if a force’s 
FOI response did not identify one designated heritage crime officer, or failed to state that 
all of the force’s rural and wildlife crime officers were also heritage crime officers, then 
this force could not be counted as having a heritage crime officer. This was an important 
distinction to make, in order to determine if the NPCC’s (2017) assertion that each force 
had a heritage crime officer was indeed accurate on the frontline. 
 
The existing data was then manually coded and themed, in order to find patterns in the 
dataset (Braun and Clarke, 2006: 82), much like grounded theory. Due to the small 
amount of data, both processes were completed swiftly after every response had been 
received. The existing themes were then briefly reviewed, in order to ensure that they 
captured the overall tone and the most relevant parts of the data; and the themes were then 
defined and named (Braun and Clarke, 2012). The last stage in this six-phase approach 
was writing up, a process which blurs into the analysis, and involves ‘…compiling, 
developing, and editing existing analytic writing’ (Braun et al, 2016: 204). 
 
3.5 : General ethical considerations 
 
Before a discussion of the ethical considerations in relation to this research study, it is 
important to note that this project was approved in accordance with Nottingham Trent 
University’s Research Ethics Policy and complies with the University’s Code of Practice 
for Research. 
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3.5.1 : Confidentiality 
 
 
Affording confidentiality to participants who engage in the research process is crucial 
(Davies et al, 2011). Permission was granted from all interviewees well in advance of the 
interview taking place. The interviews were recorded using a dictaphone. Recordings were 
then uploaded to a secure university computer and destroyed upon being transcribed by 
the researcher. Before the interviews took place, participants were ensured that their 
contributions would be confidential and anonymised, and their identities kept private. 
Identities of the participants were protected during data analysis through identifiers which 
only the researcher would recognise, such as HP4 (heritage practitioner) or Victim 8. Care 
was taken to ensure that any interview comments which might identify the interviewees, 
such as a mention of their force area, heritage asset/site, or specific heritage crime case 
which could be traced back to the interviewee (through a newspaper report for example); 
were removed. Additionally, as there are a small number of police officers responsible for 
the policing of heritage crime across England and Wales (see Chapter 5 for elaboration on 
this), the ranks of these officers have not been disclosed, because doing so may identify 
the interviewees. Instead, every police interviewee, regardless of rank, is referred to as 
Officer 1, for example. 
 
3.5.2 : Informed consent 
 
 
Participants in any research study must know that their participation in the study is 
voluntary, and that they understand the study they are partaking in (Ruane, 2016). 
Participants should also be made aware that they can withdraw their consent to participate 
at any stage during the study (Hammersley, 2018). To meet these requirements, voluntary 
consent was obtained from all participants (before the interview began) in writing, via 
email or paper consent form. After this, all participants were informed, in clear terms, 
about the purpose of the research, why it was being undertaken, and how the findings 
would be disseminated (Israel, 2015). The participants were also told during the interview 
that they did not have to answer every question put to them, and that they could withdraw 
from the interview at any point during it. 
 
3.5.3 : Pressure to participate 
 
 
When conducting research with police officers, there is a danger that officers will be 
pressured into partaking in the research by their superiors, owing to the hierarchal nature 
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of policing (Cockbain, 2015). However, it was predicted that there would be no issues 
with officers being pressurised to partake in this research. Officers were unlikely to be 
pressured to participate by their superiors, chiefly because very few officers have heard of 
heritage crime (Poyser and Poyser, 2017)! Moreover, as mentioned in section 2.3, 
heritage crime is a relatively uncontroversial area of policing. Brown (2015:39) writes that 
one of the key factors to success in conducting police research is ‘…the interest of the 
subject being researched by senior management.’ By all accounts, heritage crime is of 
very little interest to senior management; the area remains relatively unknown at all levels 
of policing due to its lack of proliferation throughout police forces (Kerr, 2013). As such, 
the lack of interest of senior management in heritage crime is likely to have worked in this 
research study’s favour: there would be no pressure for officers to participate from 
superiors because the area is unknown and also, a reasonably innocuous policing area. 
Indeed, frank discussion of heritage crime in an interview setting was unlikely to produce 




This chapter outlined the research aims and objectives of this thesis. It then described the 
various research processes undertaken for this study, including desk-based research, semi- 
structured interviews with police officers, heritage practitioners, and victims of heritage 
crime, and sending FOI requests to police forces across England. The methodological 
approaches utilised within this research have been detailed, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of each methodological approach, summarised. In particular, issues 
associated with interviewing police officers and victims of crime were discussed in-depth. 
The analytical techniques utilised in this study were then outlined, and lastly, three key 
ethical considerations were addressed. 
 
This thesis will now explore the findings of the research which was conducted. These 
findings are presented in three chapters, Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 4 explores the 
police understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime from the perspectives 
of police officers and heritage practitioners. Chapter 5 collates and analyses the FOI 
requests which were sent to all police forces in England. Lastly, Chapter 6 examines the 
understandings, perceptions and awareness of heritage crime from the perspectives of the 
victims of heritage crime. 
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CHAPTER 4: POLICE FINDINGS 
 
4.1 : Introduction 
 
This chapter explores police officers’ and heritage practitioners’ understandings, 
awareness and perceptions of heritage crime in England and Wales. The first section 
examines the reasons for poor police understanding and perception of heritage crime. It 
analyses the barriers to police engagement with heritage crime and considers whether 
certain elements of police culture can contribute to these barriers, highlighting three 
factors which contribute to an overall poor understanding, awareness and perception of 
heritage crime amongst officers in England and Wales. The chapter then considers who 
the victims of heritage crime are, and what the impacts of heritage crime may be, 
comparing the perspectives of the officers and heritage practitioners. It also situates two 
impacts of heritage crime within a wider criminological framework. Thereafter, this 
chapter establishes heritage crime within some of the wider issues facing modern day 
policing. Then, the practical difficulties associated with the reporting and recording of 
heritage crime, guiding heritage crime through the CJS, and engaging in partnership 
working concerning heritage crime; are all addressed. Lastly, this chapter considers the 
obstacles which may inhibit police understanding and perception of heritage crime, for 
which the officers suggested solutions. 
 
For these two phases of the research, twelve interviews were conducted with nine Rural 
and Wildlife Crime Officers (from herein referred to as RWCO/s) and three officers who 
were not RWCOs; but held the responsibility for heritage crime in their policing careers. 
The majority of RWCOs interviewed were also the heritage crime single point of contact 
(herein referred to as SPOC) within their force. A SPOC is not an additional job role, as 
when one becomes the point of contact for a specific area of policing, this is simply tacked 
onto their existing position. The other RWCOs who were not the heritage crime SPOC 
within their force had been made responsible for the policing of heritage crime by virtue 
of being an RWCO, as heritage crime has been operationally attached, within policing, to 
rural crime and wildlife crime (NPCC, 2017; NPCC, 2018b). The other four interviewees 
included practitioners from the heritage sector: two practitioners from Historic England 
and two from Cadw. 
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4.2 : Alliance to Reduce Crime Against Heritage (ARCH) 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the Historic England group the Alliance to Reduce Crime Against 
Heritage (ARCH), a voluntary cross collaborative group which aimed to engage a variety 
of public and private stakeholders in order to address the issue of heritage crime (Historic 
England, 2019e). Officers were asked if they had ever heard of ARCH, and, if they were 
aware of the group, whether the group had been useful in the policing of heritage crime. It 
was found that, out of the 12 officers interviewed, only four had heard of ARCH. Indeed, 
one officer had heard of ARCH upon reading a copy of the researcher’s MA dissertation: 
“Only when I read it in your dissertation, and that’s me being brutally honest. I searched 
ARCH, and then I ended up with some nice images of brickwork, stuff like that” (Officer 
4). Of these four officers, none felt that ARCH had been useful in tackling heritage crime 
or reducing heritage crime. Upon asking two of the RWCOs if ARCH had worked, both 
stressed that it had failed in their force areas: “Not here” (Officer 2), and that ultimately 
“It worked for about a year and then...it just died a death” (Officer 7). 
 
4.2.1 : Police understandings and perceptions of heritage crime 
 
 
Having established that many police officers within one police force struggled to 
understand heritage crime in previous research upon the topic (Poyser and Poyser, 2017), 
it was considered important to explore whether similar limited understandings and poor 
perceptions of heritage crime were replicated in forces across England and Wales. This, it 
was hoped, would provide a broader picture of police understandings and perceptions of 
heritage crime in England and Wales. The officers interviewed were asked if they thought 
that police officers more generally understood heritage crime and how these officers might 
perceive it. Officers were unanimous in their assertion that police officers outside of the 
RWCOs areas of policing were extremely unlikely to understand heritage crime: 
“...outside of our bubble, no, I’m not convinced there’s a good knowledge...” (Officer 3), 
unless an officer had an existing interest in the area. Furthermore, every officer also 
agreed that heritage crime would be perceived apathetically or negatively by officers who 
were not RWCOs. This was because heritage crime was not something that officers dealt 
with regularly, an area of crime which was not an officer’s: 
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“...bread and butter, [describing officers more generally] we don’t go 
to heritage crime everyday. We can mop up theft from stores, and a 
fight on a Saturday night in town, but when someone says “Hmm, 
there’s a heritage crime” they’re immediately “Well what even is that, 
what?” [Laughs]” (Officer 5). 
 
 
Lastly, one officer reasoned that all police forces across England and Wales shared the 
same limited understanding and poor perception of heritage crime, because:“...as a police 
service, I don’t think we know what it [heritage crime] is” (Officer 4). Likewise, the 
heritage practitioners all agreed that outside of RWCOs (or the rare officer they 
encountered that was interested in the area) police officers across England and Wales 
unquestionably had a poor understanding of heritage crime “...the average PC-not a 
clue”(HP2), and, suspected one heritage practitioner, perceived heritage crime as an 
undesirable area of policing which they probably wanted to pass onto other colleagues: 
“…and I suspect that it’s a bit of a hot potato and they’re busy trying to pass it on to one 
of their colleagues.” (HP1). 
 
Having acknowledged that overall police understandings and perceptions of heritage crime 
were poor, several reasons for this were identified by the interviewed officers. These are 
discussed thematically, under the following heads: i) Fear of the unknown; ii) 
Downgrading the severity of heritage crime; and iii) Lack of training and knowledge. 
 
i) Fear of the unknown 
Fear of the unknown was recognised by all officers as a considerable barrier to positive 
police understandings and perceptions of heritage crime. Firstly, two RWCOs explained 
how encountering heritage crime was likely to worry police officers, as a general officer’s 
perception of heritage crime was that it was unlike other crimes that were encountered 
routinely, where they would: “...be in their comfort zone...” (Officer 2). With heritage 
crime, officers did not “...have that familiarity...” (Officer 4) that they did with crimes 
which they dealt with on a regular basis. Indeed, one officer said with some certainty that 
if heritage crime was allocated to an officer who was not an RWCO, or part of a rural 
crime team, it would undoubtedly cause panic: 
 
“If that [theft of a heritage object] got allocated to a general police 
officer, if you didn’t have a force with a rural crime team and there’s 
about thirty odd that don’t have them...so if you actually said to a 
police officer “We’ve got a heritage crime” they would absolutely 
panic” (Officer 10). 
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Fear had the potential to overwhelm officers with no knowledge of heritage crime. 
Consequently, this could result in them perceiving heritage crime as far more complex 
than other crimes. In the following example for instance, it was only when Officer 12 had 
simplified a heritage crime that had occurred to his colleague, explaining how the heritage 
crime was simply a theft, that the colleague then understood the actions they had to take: 
 
“They get scared. I had one, someone had broken in and stolen a 
£750,000 Georgian table from a house. And they [the colleague] were 
in a state of “I don’t know what to do “ der der der [mimicking the 
officer panicking] What do I do bluhbluhbluh and I said “Well, if 
they’d broken into the house and stolen an Ikea table, what would you 
do?” “Well I’d do this” “Well do that” (Officer 12). 
 
 
It also transpired that the panic which many officers felt, could have significant 
implications upon taking heritage crime cases through the CJS. Simple heritage crime 
cases that could be taken through the CJS with relative ease, were impeded by this sense 
of panic. Such was the case with the following incident one RWCO described, in which an 
officer who was panicking over a heritage crime case almost allowed the standard time 
frame permitted to investigate any crime to expire: 
 
“And it did sit on this officer’s workload for a long long time, till 
virtually it were at the point where it were almost out of time-because 
you only have six months to do things. I think we did deal with that 
under the Treasure Act 1996, but of course it’s time restrained, so if we 
don’t get in there within six months we lose it, and I think we were 
within a couple of days. But that’s it...cops just panic” (Officer 7). 
 
 
A second complication which occurred from officers panicking was highlighted by 
another officer, who recalled how he had found himself re-opening heritage crime cases 
which had been closed unnecessarily, a problem he attributed to officers panicking: 
 
“But sometimes I do find myself re-opening cases that have been closed 
because people don’t think...they haven’t necessarily applied 
it...they’ve panicked, they don’t necessarily understand it, there’s a 
lack of knowledge.” (Officer 1). 
 
 
Ultimately, fear marred non-RWCOs perceptions of heritage crime, which would then 
have ramifications for their understanding of the area, namely, a clear reluctance from 
non-RWCOs to engage in a crime that seemed exceedingly complex in the immediacy. 
This led officers more generally, to, in some cases, downgrade the severity and validity of 
heritage crime as a crime. 
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ii) Downgrading the severity and validity of heritage crime 
 
 
A keen awareness was shared amongst the officers that there was little immediate 
incentive or motivation to police heritage crime for most police officers. Consequentially, 
the majority of RWCOs felt that officers had a tendency to either dismiss heritage crime 
entirely, or to compare it to the other crimes they were dealing with, thus mentally 
downgrading heritage crimes when it did occur: 
 
“...they’re instantly comparing it, and they’re downgrading it mentally 
as well. [The officer is thinking] It doesn’t matter, its somewhere down 
here.” (Officer 1). 
 
 
Officer 7 stated how he had once had to demand that a ‘regular’ police officer attend and 
investigate a report of illegal metal detecting ,which had come through over the radio, 
because the officer in question had immediately dismissed illegal metal detecting as an 
insignificant and unimportant crime: 
 
“And you get people metal detecting, and you can hear people on radio 
saying “Oh well it’s just metal detecting, I’ll go later”. “No, you’ll go 
now, because that is a scheduled monument site, you need to go 
because damage to it is criminal. “Oh right, I’ll do it now.” Then of 
course you read the report later and it says area searched, negative.” 
(Officer 7). 
 
Lastly, some officers suggested that because heritage crime did not ascribe to the high- 
octane, rapid response form of policing associated with ‘real’ police work, this meant that 
officers were unlikely to enthusiastically engage in the area. Heritage crime did not have a 
place in their conceptions of policing: 
 
“...it’s got this perception within policing as, and I speak of wildlife 
and heritage crime here, as not being sexy-young cops don’t grow up 
thinking I wanna be a wildlife or a heritage crime officer-but here we 
are!” (Officer 9). 
 
 
iii) Lack of training and knowledge on heritage crime 
 
 
All officers interviewed agreed that knowledge of heritage crime within their forces was 
severely limited. The following two officers stressed how, of the thousands of police 
officers within their force, only a handful would know what heritage crime was: 
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“And I bet, out of them 1600, I could count on both hands how many know what a 
heritage crime is, because it’s not taught to us” (Officer 7) when asked about the crime: 
“...oh, what’ve we got, about 4000 officers, you ask them what heritage crime is and 
[they’ll reply]“Oh, I dunno”. (Officer 8). Moreover, speaking to your ‘average copper’ 
would reveal an individual who had little to no awareness of the area: “...and I hate to say 
it, but if you ring up your average copper and start talking about cultural heritage 
crime...no” (Officer 12). 
 
Lack of training in the area was felt to be a sizeable contributor to the limited knowledge 
of heritage crime amongst police officers more generally, but the officers also recognised 
that delivering heritage crime training was virtually impossible. This was because heritage 
crime, much like the marginalised areas of rural and wildlife crime, was simply not high 
up enough on the policing agenda: “What we’ve got here, is that with both wildlife and 
heritage crime, is that it’s not a top priority for the police.” (Officer 8). Basic training for 
officers would not cover niche areas of crime, such as heritage crime, as the following 
officer highlights, and is otherwise very linear in its approach to crime and criminality: 
 
“...a bobby wouldn’t have clue about like that. They genuinely wouldn’t 
know...it’s just a lack of knowledge because when we do our initial 
police training its very much focused on the serious, acquisitive, black 
and white; that’s burglary, that’s theft, it’s an overview.” (Officer 5). 
 
 
Presenting crime in a ‘black and white’ manner is important when educating vast swathes 
of officers, but arguably inhibits their ability to recognise the nuances of niche crimes they 
may encounter, such as heritage crime. For example, the following interviewee described 
how it was only when a theft from a museum in his force area had occurred (a building 
which evidently holds heritage objects) that his colleagues perceived what had occurred as 
a heritage crime: 
 
“...[the crime] flagged up in people’s [officers] minds as a heritage 
type crime. But solely because of what it was and where it was taken 
from, stolen from a museum” (Officer 6). 
 
 
Theft from a museum may not always be a heritage crime (theft from a museum gift shop 
being one example), but theft is a crime which every police officer will understand. 
Contrastingly, his colleagues struggled to immediately understand that illegal metal 
detecting, which is always a crime, was not just, simply, individuals searching for metal in 
66  
the ground: “...[his colleagues would think] it’s just people with metal detectors looking 
for bits of metal in the field, so what’s actually that bad about that?” (Officer 6). 
 
Most officers are likely to not have been exposed to illegal metal detecting as frequently 
as they have been to theft. Familiarity with the crime is therefore, clearly important. In one 
force, some officers and internal staff had received a good level of training from the 
following RCWO. The officer in question emphasised however, that retention rates within 
policing (both frontline and internal) were low, thus meaning that any training had limited 
effectiveness in the long term: “There’s been an element of training, but turn around 
within these departments, can be-I'm not gonna say high-you get obvious turnaround.” 
(Officer 1). 
 
4.2.2 : Summary 
 
 
Section 4.2 has explored the three key issues that emerged in this research which 
contribute significantly towards poor police understandings and perceptions of heritage 
crime. It has also highlighted how ARCH is not very well-known by police forces, and for 
the two forces which did know of ARCH, revealed that there was a clear lack of interest 
and motivation to engage in a voluntary scheme for a crime which is not a force priority. 
The next section, 4.3, will explore the victims and impact of heritage crime. 
 
4.3 : The victims and impact of heritage crime 
 
Interviewees were asked who they thought the victims of heritage crime were and what the 
impact of heritage crime was. These questions were asked in order to determine if the 
interviewees, particularly the officers, were aware of both the far-reaching impact of the 
crime as well the multitude of victims that heritage crime can encompass. 
 
4.3.1 : Victims 
 
 
All interviewees acknowledged that the victims of heritage crime were broad and not a 
fixed category of person/s. The officers also highlighted that although heritage crime was 
considered by the general public and their colleagues alike to be “...very much a victimless 
crime...” (Officer 4) the officers agreed that this was certainly not the case. For all 
interviewees, the victims of heritage crime rippled outwards, much like: “…throwing a 
stone into a pond...” (HP2). 
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The interviewees identified the following victims of heritage crime: 
 
 
i. The individual 
 
 
Heritage crime could harm individuals, such as the people who owned heritage assets and 
sites “There’s the land owner, or the occupier” (HP1) or those who looked after them 
“...you’ve obviously got the person where the damage has been caused, such as your 
church warden...” (Officer 4). 
 
ii. Local community 
 
 
The local community was cited by every interviewee as a victim of heritage crime. For 
example, four officers proffered examples of churches which had been subject to lead 
theft. These churches were an integral part of the local community, and thus, when 
heritage crime occurred, swathes of local people were affected: “...it’s not just the church 
that’s damaged, it’s everybody that’s got their wedding there, it's part of the community, 
it's part of the rural life of people, it can be devasting...” (Officer 3). It was the strong 
sense of ownership that the community felt that they had over the local church which 
meant that heritage crime felt like a personal attack, leaving the community outraged: 
“...a church is considered a centre of community spirit...So, if somebody breaks into a 
church and trashes cultural items or takes valuable assets, there is far more outrage-far 
far more outrage” (Officer 8), and violated: “But also there’s the effect on people, you 
know, the violation they feel about a building that they love.” (HP3). 
 
iii. Wider society 
 
 
The concept of victimhood was also expanded to wider society. Society was considered a 
victim of heritage crime by every interviewee: “I think everyone’s the victim” (Officer 
11). Interviewees felt that society was a victim because of the permanent loss which could 
occur as a result of heritage crime: “Things like that, once it’s gone it’s gone forever, isn’t 
it? So I think the impact is on society really (Officer 10).” In particular, it was the loss of 
historical knowledge associated with heritage crime which meant that society was a 
victim, according to the following heritage practitioner: 
 
“So we do feel that it’s sort of society as one of the victims...they’ve 
[the criminal] damaged something, or removed something, or done 
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something [meaning] that we will now no longer know, be able to know 
through archaeology [heritage]. ...” (HP2) 
 
 
iv. Future generations 
 
 
Lastly, future generations were also considered to be victims of heritage crime, for these 
generations would never be able to enjoy, experience and understand the heritage sites and 
assets that the current generation does: “...if something disappears. .. [people will miss out 
on] not being able, in the future, to interpret, understand, investigate. . ” (Officer 1). 
 
 
4.3.2 : Impact 
 
 
All interviewees also acknowledged that the impact of heritage crime was broad, varied, 
and not always immediately apparent to regular officers. Heritage crime had a ‘. ..shock 
and awe impact on the local community” (Officer 8). Unlike many other forms of crime, a 
significant impact of heritage crime was the permanent loss associated with it. Once 
heritage sites or assets were damaged beyond repair or destroyed, they were impossible to 
recover: “I mean one of the key issues we have to get across is that damage to a scheduled 
monument won’t grow back, you know?” (HP1). An officer who was an amateur 
archaeologist in his spare time reiterated the heritage practitioners’ comments, adding that: 
 
“So any crime which impacts a heritage site, that artefact, if lost 
through theft, or destroyed through damage, whether accidental or 
deliberate, is irreplaceable” (Officer 11). 
 
 
Interestingly, one officer argued that another impact of heritage crime was the arresting 
contrast between the heritage site itself, and the ‘modern crime’ that had happened to it: 
 
“…we need to understand that there is without doubt a greater impact 
on the community when such a crime [heritage] happens. . You want to 
see a bit of history and enjoy it for what it is, not see a modern 
crime.. ” (Officer 8). 
 
 
Indeed, two impacts of heritage crime identified by the interviewees can be applied to a 
wider criminological framework. These were Broken Windows Theory (Wilson and 
Kelling, 1982) and fear of crime, and are explored further in section 7.5.1. 
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I). Crime attracting crime 
Six interviewees also recognised that when a heritage site or asset was subject to crime, 
this would increase the probability of attracting more crime to it. This was because the 
condition of the heritage site or asset after the crime had taken place would indicate that it 
was uncared for (which was rarely the case), and thus further crime could be committed 
without fear of consequence: 
 
“...but there’s also this thing where people see other people doing it, 
and I always think that people treat places the way they find them. 
And, if they’re kind of looking tidy and presentable, people will treat it 
that way. But when they see other people misbehaving, it kind of 




The impact of an initial heritage crime therefore, could snowball: “...so that sort of lead 
theft on a church that’s in the middle of this community which leads to graffiti, which 
leads to that village green being an undesirable place” (HP4). 
 
 
Officer 1 also highlighted how the open nature of many heritage sites could attract crime 
to the site. However, the legislation used to ensure the protection and preservation of these 
sites was, naturally, so strictly adhered to, and so incredibly restrictive, that even the most 
basic of crime prevention measures could not be used on these sites; such as increasing 
footfall. Thus, protective mechanisms could inadvertently contribute towards attracting 
criminality to the site: 
 
“…if you’ve got a site, and I know that an increased footfall on that 
site would reduce the crime, but to do that, you might need to put 
something on the site to encourage people to visit, but then you can’t 
do that because it’s not allowed. So you can’t have an ice cream van 
rock up...whatever it might be…you can’t park that there, you can’t 
drive that there, you can’t stick that fence up...” (Officer 1). 
 
 
II). Fear of crime 
Fear of crime was also identified as an impact of heritage crime. Communities which very 
rarely attracted crime would suddenly suffer heritage crime, resulting in their overall fear 
of crime increasing as a direct result of what had happened, as this officer explained: “And 
I've seen this before; if they see damage at a heritage asset, they become fearful of where 
they live...it cuts deeper.” (Officer 1). Furthermore, due to the sense of ownership that 
many people felt over their local heritage sites, there could be a negative impact upon the 
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communities’ perception of policing when officers failed to find out who was responsible 
for the crimes committed (because of lack of CCTV at heritage sites, for example): “The 
knock on effect on confidence in policing when we probably don’t find out who is 
responsible...” (Officer 5). 
 
Lastly, it is also important to mention that the impacts of heritage crime were not always 
fully grasped. Whilst the officers in this research thoroughly understood the impact of 
heritage crime quite clearly, heritage practitioners cited issues with getting police officers 
more generally to understand that heritage crime was actually a crime, let alone the impact 
of heritage crime: “I mean, we do struggle to get the police to understand the direct 
[impact] as well. That digging on a scheduled monument is a criminal offence” (HP4). 
This heritage practitioner’s comments correlated with a comment from Officer 9, who 
explained that although he understood the impact that heritage crime would have upon a 
variety of parties, within policing, he was conscious of a wider “...imbalance between the 
public perception of it and the police perception of it. For the police, it’s another crime...” 
(Officer 9). Consequently, it was suggested that a regular officer was likely to respond to 
heritage crime without realising the severity and impact of the crime. 
 
4.4 : Framing heritage crime within wider policing issues 
 
The current austerity-led policing environment means that it is necessary to contextualise 
any critique of the present police response to heritage crime within the constraints of 
austerity. Of course, it is important to remember that regardless of austerity measures 
across police forces in England and Wales, fighting heritage crime would inevitably 
remain an infinitesimal part of police work. As mentioned in section 2.4.4, this is because 
fighting crime comprises a very small portion of a police officer’s role (Charman, 2015), 
only accounting for a small percentage of police officer’s daily work duties (Bent and 
Rossum, 1976; Holdaway, 1984). 
 
Therefore, fighting heritage crime is a small area in an area of police that is already very 
small: crime fighting. As such, few officers are likely to be aware of the existence of 
heritage crime as a type of crime (unless they are allocated responsibility for it), regardless 
of the wider issues facing modern day policing. As such, it must be recognised that any 
impact policing in austerity may have upon police understandings, perceptions, awareness 
and overall responses to heritage crime, must be couched within the fact that tackling 
heritage crime is an infinitesimal part of an already small area within police work. The 
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following themes concerning wider issues in policing emerged from the interviews with 
the officers. These are explored below. 
 
4.4.1 : Policing in austerity 
 
 
Through wider discussion about resourcing issues in policing, all officers expressed 
concern regarding the funding situation across forces in England and Wales. Put simply, 
austerity was “…definitely something you need to bear in mind” (Officer 3), a factor 
which had become entwined with everyday policing. One officer described how his force 
could barely afford his patrol car and had to enlist outside parties to sponsor the vehicle. 
This officer went on to explain how he had been told upon starting his role that “ ... I was 
told anything you want, whatever it is, vehicles, anything, let us know, and we’ll get it. 
They’ve got nothing.” (Officer 6). Another officer detailed how the plan, amongst a group 
of forces, was to attempt to tackle heritage crime “…without any money or funding, and 
just people who’ve been given the titles, either by hook or by crook…” (Officer 9). 
Clearly, the resourcing issues within policing were sufficiently acute that even a multi- 
force collaboration to combat heritage crime was still operating on a shoestring. The 
heritage practitioners were also acutely aware of the resourcing difficulties assailing police 
forces across England and Wales, as the practitioners were familiar with resourcing 
problems themselves: 
 
“I’ve been to meetings with members of the senior police forces in X 
and they’ve all been talking about budget pressures, and they’re being 
asked to deliver more with less-which is very familiar.” (HP1). 
 
 
Whilst the heritage practitioners were very sympathetic, one practitioner did also 
recognise that despite the clear resourcing difficulties police forces were experiencing, this 
should not dissuade practitioners from stressing the importance of heritage crime to the 
police: 
“We have to be realistic and pragmatic about the world that we live in 
and the resources...at the same time, there’s no harm in making the 
legitimate case that this is a really important issue” (HP4). 
 
 
Officers were asked if resourcing issues had impacted upon the policing of heritage crime. 
Out of the 12 officers interviewed, five said that resourcing issues had not impacted upon 
the policing of heritage crime. However, they couched this statement within the fact that 
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they had extremely limited resources already and were thus used to policing crime with an 
insufficient budget: 
 
“I don’t think it [resourcing] has [impacted upon policing heritage 
crime]. We don’t have the resources. We’ve had limited resources, 
limited commitments...so the reduction in resourcing and funding for 
front-line policing yeah, hasn’t overly caused us that many problems. 
Cause we’re already wallowing in that difficult mire of...lack of 
support, lack of resource, lack of knowledge and education, you know. 
We’re already there. So no...we’re still struggling” (Officer 8). 
 
 
Resourcing issues had become so commonplace within policing, that not having the 
resources to police crime was the norm for these officers, a facet of modern day policing 
these officers simply adapted to: “I just think it’s one of those passive things. It’s made no 
difference anyway, cause we fit it in. If a heritage crime comes in, we will fit it in at some 
point. We can’t do anything else” (Officer 7). To add to the aforementioned issues caused 
by austerity, one RWCO suggested that austerity would have a direct impact upon an 
officer’s capacity to care about heritage crime, because officers across the force were 
stuck in a mechanical process of going from one crime to the next, such were their 
enormous workloads: 
 
“Anybody-out of our 3000 police officers in X and X, and I’m speaking 
really openly here-nobody really gives a shit. You’ve got a lot of 
response officers who are going to these jobs and they’re putting a 
sticking plaster on stuff. And response cops, by virtue of what they do, 
they’ll go to a job, deal with a job, get rid, they’ll go to the next job, 
deal with the job, get rid” (Officer 5). 
 
Budgetary constraints also created a lack of continuity and consistency surrounding which 
officers held responsibility for heritage crime. Forces could not afford an officer solely 
dedicated to policing heritage crime, so responsibility for heritage crime bounced between 
officers, or appeared to be given to officers who were close to retirement as a ‘stop-gap’ to 
address the heritage crime problem; without dedicating extra funding to it. Three officers 
described how officers close to retirement had taken upon the policing of heritage crime, 
including Officer 7: “We [as a force] said yeah we’ll sign up to it [policing heritage 
crime]. Then the Inspector that were dealing with it retired! (Officer 7). The responsibility 
for heritage crime was then suddenly passed to Officer 7, and this to the officer that 
heritage crime was of little importance to his force. 
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However, the allocation of heritage crime to retiring officers, although being indicative of 
a lack of funds, could be positive, as was HP4’s experience. HP4 recalled how an 
Inspector who was close to retiring had been delegated a heritage crime case because his 
force appeared to be struggling to find tasks for him until his imminent retirement. 
Working with this Inspector resulted in extra resources: 
 
 
“...He was absolutely brilliant-because there was that sort of novelty 
value as well as being quite serious-very serious-about his work, but 
also he was somebody that was within nine months of retirement. And I 
think they were struggling to find decent sized stuff to give him that 
wasn’t potentially going to go beyond his retirement. And again, him 
being an Inspector, made a difference in terms of the resources we 
were able to get to investigate the offence, and it was very interesting in 
terms of the amount of support we got on that as opposed to not 18 
months earlier, [mimicking police] “Well that man who’s waving a 
metal detector in the middle of that monument, you can’t prove he’s 
actually used it can you…”(HP4). 
 
 
The heritage practitioner regarded the Inspector positively, particularly because the 
Inspector’s policing role resulted in greater resources being allocated to investigate the 
heritage crime in question. Whilst this experience was positive for HP4, it also suggests a 
laissez-faire attitude towards heritage crime at a wider level amongst police forces in 
England and Wales. The delegation of heritage crime to retiring officers indicates that 
heritage crime is of little interest to forces, and may be simply allocated to retiring officers 
as a means of temporarily appeasing the external pressure from the NPCC to address 
heritage crime (NPCC, 2017). 
 
4.4.2 : Policing in austerity: lack of support and training available to officers to learn 
about heritage crime 
 
Every officer informed the researcher that they had received little to no training on 
heritage crime. Only two officers confirmed that they had received minimal heritage crime 
training. The rest of the officers had taught themselves about heritage crime, and in some 
cases also had to train the part-time RWCOs they were supervising. The officers who were 
not policing heritage crime out of choice had to spend a significant portion of their own 
time learning about an area of crime, and the associated legislation, which they had not 
heard of before:“It’s all self-taught.”(Officer 5). 
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Whilst the officers both suggested and accepted that police forces lacked the resources to 
provide internal heritage crime training or support, it was nevertheless frustrating that they 
received such little aid. Of the two interviewees who had received training on heritage 
crime, for one of these officers, the training had occurred five years ago, and only 
consisted of a two-hour session which had been embedded into a lengthier wildlife crime 
course. The RWCO, likening heritage crime to the equally as broad and complex area of 
wildlife crime, explained that whilst the training had been delivered well, two hours was 
not enough to cover a crime as broad as heritage crime in depth. The RWCO had been 
given the contact details of the Policing and Crime Advisor for Historic England and was 
simply told to call the Advisor should he need any advice on heritage crime. 
 
A lack of training also left one officer in a difficult position internally, being labelled as 
the force expert on heritage crime, despite having received no training and having only 
attended one heritage crime conference: “Because I’ve had no training. All I’ve done is go 
to a conference last year in London...I’m supposedly the expert. And you just think [makes 
skeptical face]” (Officer 6). This situation was coupled with a feeling of exasperation, as 
with no training and thus very little knowledge of heritage crime, the officer’s colleagues 
and the general public soon began contacting him for advice about an area which he barely 
understood. The officer felt like responding to those emailing him for advice on heritage 
crime by saying that they should look for the advice themselves, because his lack of 
knowledge paralleled theirs: “And you feel like emailing back and saying “I don’t know 
yet”, so why don’t you look, you look, [because] I’m gonna have to” (Officer 6). 
 
In turn, Officer 7 also emphasised how he, and the part-time RWCOs within the force (of 
which there were over 15) had received no form of heritage crime training, and that 
attempts to reach out to Historic England on the matter had been met with no response: 
 
“...X offered to come here and do free training, and we had a wildlife 
crime officer training day, once a year. So once a year, all thirty of us 
got together, in a room, and we had guest speakers come in...and X said 
he’d come and do that, and I’ve not seen or heard from him since. So the 
last two training days we’ve had, we’ve used other agencies. Whereas 
really, he could fill a half or a full day on heritage crime.” (Officer 7). 
 
 
On the other hand, in Wales, Officer 8 described how he had organised a day’s training on 
heritage crime the part-time RWCOs he oversaw, which was conducted by Cadw, who 
were very eager to help: “...officers out for a day of training, I’ve bought in Cadw to help 
with it. And it’s great!” (Officer 8). 
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Ultimately, the level of support the officers received mirrored the level of training that 
most of them had received, for support was largely: “non existent”(Officer 2). Indeed, the 
contradiction that resulted from this lack of support for the officers responsible for 
heritage crime was dryly described by Officer 9, as these officers would be subject to 
criticism for not policing the crime very well: “...but in the same breath, there’s no backup 
or support available to stop the spotlight from being on you for not doing very well!” 
(Officer 9). 
 
4.4.3 : Policing in austerity: NPCC document 
 
 
Despite having little to no support or training available, it was still necessary for the 
RWCOs to engage with the limited police specific literature on heritage crime which was 
available to help educate themselves. Consequently, the officers were often sent a report 
from NPCC National Working Group for Heritage and Cultural Property Crime, the 
NPCC Heritage and Cultural Property Crime National Strategic Assessment (2017). 
There was a strong belief amongst the officers that the report had failed to help them 
understand heritage crime, had not aided in the policing of heritage crime on the frontline, 
and was a very difficult and boring read; thus rendering the report completely redundant at 
an operational level: “I think I stopped after four pages and had to put it down...” (Officer 
8). Likewise, Officer 1 appreciated the contents of the report, but questioned the 
accessibility of it for all officers, RWCOs and otherwise: “And, I know all of this in here [ 
holds up NPCC report]...I appreciate why this is all in here. But it’s very heavy. This stuff 
can be interesting” (Officer 1). 
 
Two other officers reiterated the comments from Officer 1, explaining how they had skim 
read the report, having found that the length had prevented them from delving any further 
into it. In fact, even one of the three officers who had volunteered to take on board the 
policing of heritage crime concluded that the NPCC report was drawn-out and offered 
little motivation for officers to read up on the subject, due to both its linguistic style and 
size: “Yeah, this [holds up NPCC report]. Being frank, I read two pages and thought-fuck 
this. I’ve got better things to do on my day off.” (Officer 12) 
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4.4.4 : Heritage crime will never be a priority area 
 
 
There was a recognition amongst all officers that heritage crime would never be a priority 
area in policing: “It comes within an area of policing that’s already a priority if that 
makes sense…but it wouldn’t come as a single standalone priority” (Officer 3). This is 
completely understandable. Firstly, heritage crime remains largely unknown to police 
forces. Secondly, the extent and scale of heritage crime is currently unknown, as heritage 
crime is not a recordable crime. It is naturally impossible to prioritise a crime in policing 
that is unquantified. Thirdly, and most importantly, heritage crime does not have an 
immediate human victim. When calling 999 or 101, call handlers are assessing 
vulnerability straightaway, and officers are attending incidents based on vulnerability: 
“All forces are very stretched, and we have to go to those jobs that are the most 
vulnerable...” (Officer 1). 
 
As the officers all ascertained, the lack of an immediate, vulnerable, human victim with 
heritage crime, meant that police forces would always prioritise a crime with an immediate 
human victim: “...you have to prioritise don’t you? So, do you deal with a burglary, or do 
you send someone to look at a church that’s been graffitied?” (Officer 10). 
 
Clearly, burglary’s primary impact is upon the person (Maguire, 1980), whereas to any 
police force, the primary impact of graffiti on a Grade listed church is damage to a 
building, not a person. For example, as the following officer illustrates, it would be 
impossible to argue that a human victim of crime was less important than the material, 
non-human aspect of heritage crime, and resources would always been prioritised towards 
a human victim: 
 
“...because they would come in and say “Well if we don’t have the 
surveillance team that day, ten people are gonna die” and I would have 
to say “If we don’t have the surveillance team that day, we might lose a 
painting” And you have to accept that.” (Officer 12). 
 
 
Aside from the necessity of a human victim for any type of crime to receive substantial 
resources, five officers argued that because of the ‘kneejerk’ reactionary behaviour of 
policing, it would require a heritage crime to occur on a colossal scale before a force 
would consider providing any resources for the area: 
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“Unless it is somewhere that perhaps would create massive amounts of 
issues, Stonehenge for example, when there are either protests there, or 
when there’s been problems and it hits national media...” (Officer 4). 
 
 
Heritage crime was also often not a priority area for the officers who held responsibility 
for it. Officers who were already policing rural and wildlife crime recognised that these 
two crimes were their original priorities, and continued to be, particularly with the volume 
of rural and wildlife crimes that they were already wrestling with: “It’s probably at the 
lower end of the three priorities, if you like.” (Officer 3). 
 
4.4.5 : Summary 
 
 
Section 4.4 examined the role of austerity, and how continuous funding issues facing 
policing have impacted upon the ability of police forces to address heritage crime. A lack 
of resources contributed to the marginalisation of the crime, with findings highlighting 
how funding was so low and workload so high that officers were struggling to police 
heritage crime alongside their existing remit. Austerity measures were also found to have 
left officers without adequate support and resources to help them. Lastly, this section also 
explained why heritage crime will never be a policing priority area, meaning that adequate 
resources are unlikely to ever be dedicated to it 
 
4.5 : Consequences of embedding heritage crime in rural crime 
 
As established in the previous section, all the officers interviewed concluded that very 
few, if any, police officers outside of RWCOs would understand heritage crime, and that 
these officers would be likely to perceive the crime apathetically and be fearful of 
engaging in this unknown area. Indeed, many of the interviewees themselves had not 
heard of heritage crime prior to being allocated responsibility for it. 
With the above findings regarding the policing of heritage crime in the context of rural 
and wildlife crime, it was important to establish if the officers themselves felt that the 
affixation of heritage crime to rural crime, and thus their role as RWCOs (the three 
officers who volunteered to police heritage crime are exempt from this section), had 
caused the officers any difficulties. The difficulties identified by the officers are outlined 
below. 
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4.5.1 The policing of heritage crime as an attached role for RWCOs 
 
 
Two officers (one in England, one in Wales) felt that the attachment of heritage crime to 
rural crime was not an issue, as illustrated in the following exchange between the 
researcher and the officer from Wales: 
 
Researcher: “Has it not been an issue then, being bolted onto your 
role, at all? 
 
Officer 10: “Not at all. It’s the significance of giving me illegal off 
roading. So if they said to me, Officer 10, I think you should deal with 




However, every other officer interviewed did feel that the attachment of heritage crime to 
rural crime and thus their role as RWCOs, had been unceremoniously bolted onto their 
positions, adding to their existing stresses in juggling responsibility for the variety of 
crimes that fell under the categories of rural and wildlife crime. Officer 9 explained how 
he was: “...now bolted onto that role as the rural tac [tactical] advisor really for rural 
crime. And embedded in rural crime is heritage crime...” (Officer 9). Whilst Officer 7 
illustrated that heritage crime had simply been ‘tagged’ on top of existing Wildlife Crime 
Officers (WCOs) functions: “...all we’ve done is tag that onto the back of our job-we've 
got 26 part time wildlife crime officers, and all those 26 have had heritage crime tagged 
on top” (Officer 7)”. 
 
A lot of officers referred to their ever-growing number of responsibilities as wearing 
‘multiple hats’: “My role is that I wear three hats, wildlife crime, rural crime, and 
heritage crime” (Officer 6) and that this was a stressful practice for them. However, this 
was not considered an unusual precedent in modern day policing: “For our organisations, 
most of the time, you’re looking at double hatting. For example, I’ve got, rural, wildlife 
and hate crime as well.” (Officer 8). 
 
4.5.2 : Lack of choice in policing heritage crime 
 
 
Only three officers had volunteered to take upon the responsibility for policing heritage 
crime. The other nine officers made it clear that they had been given no choice in 
becoming responsible for heritage crime. For example, one officer explained how “It was 
something that was thrust upon me rather than something I chased” (Officer 8) whilst 
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another mused that for the RWCOs who had been told that they were going to be 
responsible for heritage crime on top of their existing role, it was likely that they had 
“...all been at the wrong place at the wrong time.” (Officer 5). The officer mentioned in 
section 4.2.1, who had received a brief two hour training session on heritage crime was 
told after this session that heritage crime was now within his policing remit: 
 
“ They said it was wildlife crime training week, there you are, off you 
go, oh and Wednesday afternoon, Chief Inspector so and so’s gonna 
come up and give you some training; there you go you’re a heritage 
crime officer.” (Officer 2). 
 
 
Although the officers expressed frustration at this lack of choice, it was ruefully accepted 
that being delegated unwanted tasks in policing was an inherent feature of policing, and 
the officers simply had to accept this: “I’m not sad that I was given it…do you see what I 
mean? I quite like it now I’ve got it, but I wouldn’t have gone out of my way to get it.” 
(Officer 8). However, this method of distributing heritage crime to the RWCOs did not 
account for the motivation needed to police niche areas of crime, such as rural and wildlife 
crime, which, as every officer discerned, often bares little similarity to the exciting, action 
packed policing ideal. All officers (excluding the three officers who were not RWCOs) 
became RWCOs because they had an interest in and a passion for the policing of rural and 
wildlife crime. The consequence of making officers police areas they are uninterested in 
were illustrated by the following RWCO: 
 
“Because just recently there’s another one of me [RWCO]…and he’s 
been just moved into it (heritage crime], he ain’t got a clue and hasn’t 
got an interest in it. So it’s pointless, absolutely pointless.” (Officer 6). 
 
 
Ultimately, despite heritage crime being thrust upon nine of the 12 officers, all of these 
nine officers expressed how they wanted to police heritage crime to the best of their 
ability, as they would with every other type of crime. Lastly, it is key to note that these 
nine officers had not let stress and pressure cloud their judgement, when expressing their 
belief that heritage crime had been thrust upon them with little choice, as HP3 found from 
personal experience that the officers did feel very much ‘put upon’: 
 
“But that thing…I mean, you’re right about the people [police] who 
wanted to do wildlife crime, who just feel that this whole thing has 
been...put upon. It is to actually say, look, this thing may help you, 
because, as I said, sometimes these are the same people [committing 
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heritage crime that are committing rural and wildlife crime]. You’ve 
met them in another field.” (HP 3) 
 
4.6 : Reporting and recording of heritage crime 
 
All interviewees identified various issues associated with the reporting and recording of 
heritage crime. Issues related to the reporting of heritage crime included: a general 
underreporting of the phenomenon from the public and heritage bodies, a lack of 
understanding from internal staff, and inconsistent reporting methods. Issues related to the 
recording of heritage crime included: an inability to record heritage crime on internal 
police recording systems, and a potential reluctance to record heritage crime within police 
forces and for heritage crime to be a policing problem. Each of these issues will each be 
explored, in turn, below. 
 
4.6.1 : Reporting: the underreporting of heritage crime 
 
 
Both officers and heritage practitioners alike felt that heritage crime was an underreported 
crime. One reason suggested for this underreporting was a lack of confidence in the police, 
due to poor practice stemming from their limited understanding: “People don’t have the 
confidence to report it because they don’t get a good deal from the police because the 
police don’t understand it” (Officer 10). Another officer explained how landowners 
adjacent to a battlefield had previously reported illegal metal detecting to the police, but 
the poor police response had prevented them from doing so on future occasions: 
 
“...in the past they used to report, quite often, nighthawking and stuff 
like that...[but now] they’ve gotta challenge these people on our behalf, 
because they’ll [the landowners] say “Oh you won’t come out, if we 
report it to you, you won’t bother coming out” (Officer 5). 
 
Other reasons for underreporting, suggested by the officers, included people neglecting to 
report heritage crime because they may feel as if they were wasting police time, an 
assumption that the crime was too low-level to be of importance to the police, or that 
people were simply unaware when a heritage crime had occurred: 
 
“...you’ve got a lot of old buildings, which would have historic listing, 
which may get anti-social behaviour, criminal damage...people may not 
realise that’s heritage crime, because they just think that it’s an old 
derelict building” (Officer 3). 
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4.6.2 : Call handlers 
 
 
There is no standardised method of reporting heritage crime in England and Wales. This is 
because heritage crime is not a “…statistic that the Home Office collects” (HP1), as 
discussed in further detail below. Therefore, it is common for the call handlers who 
receive a report of heritage crime via 101 or 999, to be completely unaware that heritage 
crime exists, nor to possess any understanding of what heritage crime is: “Because quite 
often you know, the person you’re talking to, has absolutely no idea [about heritage 
crime]”(HP3). However, there was also an assumption from the public that the police and 
police staff will be fully informed about every crime, which is unrealistic, particularly 
with marginalised areas such as heritage crime: “people do expect when the police answer 
the phone that they’ll know exactly what they’re on about, when you can’t physically know 
everything.” (Officer 6). 
 
One significant consequence of having no standardised method of reporting meant that 
there was also a lack of consistency in who the victims of heritage crime reported heritage 
crime to. Officers cited examples where victims had reported crime to heritage bodies, 
such as the National Trust and Historic England, instead of the police: 
 
“...a lot of heritage crime reported to me, comes through Historic 
England. Because people will contact them before they contact the 
police...it does come through the backdoor sometimes.” (Officer 3). 
 
 
However, heritage bodies did not always pass crime which was reported to them, on to the 
police. Two officers reported issues with the National Trust reporting heritage crime, 
specifically nighthawking. One of the officers attributed the underreporting of 
nighthawking specifically to National Trust landowners, who, he believed, kept instances 
of nighthawking hidden, perhaps to maintain the illusion of National Trust sites as being 
crime free: “...[the landowners] try and keep it to themselves...they never report it back to 
us” (Officer 7). Meanwhile, the second officer recalled a similar instance, in which he 
spoke to the manager of a National Trust property who did not appear to see the benefit in 
reporting nighthawking: 
 
“I think there’d been fifty nighthawking attempts, not one of which had 
been reported. But when you actually spoke to the person in charge 
[they said] “Well, what’s the point in reporting it”” (Officer 12). 
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4.6.3 : Recording 
 
 
Every interviewee, except for one officer, believed that the recording of heritage crime 
could be improved. The officer who disagreed that the recording of heritage crime could 
be improved, stressed that this was because heritage crime was already being recorded, but 
was not being recorded under the title of ‘heritage crime’: 
 
“...it’s a recordable crime anyway...it has to be dealt with. So if 
something got stolen, or something got damaged, the police have to 
deal with it...And it has to be nationally recorded” (Officer 10). 
 
 
However, on police recording systems, heritage crime does not “...carry a specific crime 
number, or category” (Officer 3). Heritage crime would therefore be recorded as the 
offence that had occurred, such as criminal damage, but without any indictor that there 
was a heritage element to the crime. 
 
Consequently, police forces all over England and Wales will be unconsciously collecting 
data on heritage crime: “...because we probably capture a lot of heritage crime on our 
databases. But we don’t know that it’s heritage crime” (Officer 9). 
 
Thus, whilst police databases may be bursting with heritage crime, there is no cost or time 
efficient method-or incentive-to sieve through all recorded crime to ascertain what is a 
heritage crime and what is not: 
 
“I’ll put in bat, I’ll pull up baseball bat, hundreds and hundreds and 
hundreds of them. Same with heritage crime...you’ll put in monument, 
and I’ll have someone’s stolen my garden monument” (Officer 8). 
 
 
4.6.4 : A reluctance to record heritage crime 
 
 
Alongside the internal recording issues, heritage practitioners also reported a reluctance 
from police forces to record heritage crime as heritage crime, or to record heritage crime at 
all. One heritage practitioner relayed an instance where he had phoned his local police 
force, on 101, to be told that the heritage crime he was reporting would not be recorded as 
a crime; despite the heritage practitioner citing legislation which proved the crime was a 
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valid crime. The practitioner felt that the force in question appeared unwilling to record 
heritage crime as a crime, which was somewhat infuriating: 
 
“…whereas I think, we have had difficulties in the past with getting 
some forces to record things as crime. “I’ll give you an incident 
number, but no I can’t record that as a crime” [heritage practitioner 
responds] “But I’ve just told you exactly why it’s a crime under this 
[law]” Including one case where we had a photograph of the man 
standing in a clearly identifiable location with his metal detector like 
this, going [waves] at the camera… [Police reply]“You can’t prove 
he’s using that metal detector, that’s the trouble” Just feels like you’re 
tying yourself in a knot, and they’re trying not to record it. He was 
perfectly acquitible...I completely understand where the officer was 
coming from, but at the same time that felt pretty poor…” (HP4). 
 
 
Indeed, when crime is reported accurately, it creates another policing ‘problem,’ insofar as 
it adds to an officer’s existing workload. As the following officer summarises, if more 
resources are put into finding a crime, through accurate reporting and increased policing 
efforts, these actions do not necessarily work in a force’s favour: 
 
“The more resources you put into it, the more you find, the bigger your 
problem. If you don’t look for it, you don’t find it, you don’t have to 
deal with it, you can get on with what you want to. So it is the police’s 
way of closing their eyes to something. And their argument will be well 
it’s a chicken and an egg. “Well prove to me we’ve got a problem, and 
I’ll dedicate it an officer. But we’ve got no reported crime-why do I 
need an officer?” So, yeah, you have to always, I always think of that. 




4.6.5 : Proving heritage crime is a policing problem 
 
 
As heritage crime is not recordable, when a heritage crime is reported via 101 or 999, 
there is no heritage crime ‘tag’ for the call handler to select and subsequently record 
heritage crime as heritage crime. This, it transpired, had great consequences for proving 
that heritage crime was a policing problem. As the following officer explained, in heritage 
crime remaining an unquantifiable crime, it is currently impossible for the police to 
establish how much of a problem heritage crime is, and how much of dwindling police 
resource should be allocated to tackle the crime: 
 
“...however, if you can’t quantify a problem, you can’t determine how 
much resource needs to be allocated to it...If you’re not aware of the 
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size of the problem, you can’t produce a proportionate response to the 
problem” (Officer 11). 
 
 
However, for the heritage practitioners who knew that heritage crime was a very pressing 
problem, the need for statistical proof that a phenomenon exists left them in an impossible 
situation. When the practitioners attempted to report heritage crime, it was inevitably 
never recorded as a heritage crime (if recorded at all), and so the resulting lack of data 
meant that police forces would never view the crime as a problem; leaving the 
practitioners in a ‘log jam’: 
 
“So one of the massive issues that we’ve got, is that we go to the police, 
and we have a meeting with them and say “We’ve got this real problem 
with heritage crime” and they go “Oh do tell us about it” And 
everything we say is anecdotal. And they say well you know we’ve 
evidence led, show us the evidence. And it's like well no we can’t, 




4.7 : Legislation 
With no legislation stating that heritage crime is a specific form of crime by itself, legally, 
there is “...no such thing as a heritage crime” (Officer 4). Furthermore, heritage crime 
acts as a ‘catch-all’ term, encompassing a myriad of criminal offences: “You know, you’re 
talking about theft, or trespass…”(HP1). Not only this, but whilst there are specific pieces 
of legislation pertaining to historic sites and assets which make it illegal to undertake 
certain activities on these sites and assets, much of this legislation remains largely 
unknown and unclear to police officers, who do not use it in daily policing: “I mean the 
1979 Act is…well I was going to say it’s quite clear, but its only clear because I’m used to 
the language.” (HP3). 
 
Therefore, although specific legislation could be employed in certain instances, for the 
‘every-day’ heritage crime offences such as criminal damage or theft, officers would 
gravitate towards the legislation they encountered regularly, such as the Criminal Damage 
Act 1971: 
 
“Whilst there is some legislation in relation to offences, fundamentally 
it tends to fall to theft, criminal damage...a lot of the time, for an officer 
who is legislation centric, he will think “Well, hang on, there’s not 
another piece of legislation that says this is a more special theft” 
(Officer 8). 
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Whilst legislation fails to differentiate a theft from a heritage site from other forms of 
‘everyday’ theft (e.g shoplifting), heritage crime can be added onto a criminal damage 
sentence as an aggravating factor. However, this is of course dependent on an officer 
knowing that a heritage crime had occurred, understanding that heritage crime is an 
aggravating factor, and then adding heritage crime as a note on the crime report before 
sending the information to the CPS. If not, the heritage element of the crime that had 
occurred would remain unknown, the CPS would fail to take the heritage element into 
consideration, and the sentence (if received) may not be proportionate to the crime: 
 
“But if you’re damaging an ancient monument, its criminal damage as 
far as your police officer down there [parade room] is concerned. But 
unless somebody like one of us in here, actually writes on the notes 
page, please treat this as a heritage crime, if it ever comes to 
sentencing, because the CPS can then change the sentencing guidelines 
to heritage crime rather than just criminal damage. Criminal damage 
you just get a slap on the wrist…” (Officer 7). 
 
 
Likewise, a Heritage Crime Impact Statement (HCIS) could be sought by the police from 
a qualified heritage practitioner to prove how impactful the heritage element of the crime 
was in court. However, this too required the officer to be aware that they were prosecuting 
a heritage crime, in order to then understand that they could approach an expert for a 
HCIS. Even then, it could be complex and time-consuming to find an expert in the area, 
for which officers received little help: 
 
“The actual crime bit is not difficult. The difficult bit is putting it all 
together so you get the right sentence for the right person. It’s having a 
list of experts who can go that burial mound is Anglo-Saxon or 
whatever and that is important because of this. And that’s the bit that 
nobody helps you with.” (Officer 2). 
 
 
The limited knowledge which officers possessed and the lack of help they received when 
attempting to guide heritage crime through the CJS, was contradicted by the fact that 
heritage practitioners needed the officer's expertise in order to progress heritage crime 
cases through the CJS. For the heritage practitioners from a heritage body where 
practitioners were not PACE trained, police involvement was a necessity as the 
practitioners were ‘...two steps removed...’ (HP1) in not being a prosecuting authority. For 
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the heritage practitioners from a heritage body where they were PACE trained, police 
involvement remained crucial: 
 
“I think in reality almost every time if it’s going to be pushed through 
[the courts], it has to be put through by the police. We can take our 
prosecutions, it has happened. But it’s not our main area of expertise, 
and it is the police’s” (HP4). 
 
 
4.7.1 : Existing legislation and aggravating factors: are they enough? 
 
 
Whilst there may be legislation and sentencing guidelines in place for heritage crime, 
encouraging regular officers to embed these considerations within policing practice 
appeared to be almost impossible. Officer 12 explained how police officers were only 
interested in law and legal definitions of a crime, of which heritage crime has neither: “All 
the police are interested in is law. And the legal definition” (Officer 12). As such, the non- 
linear approach to interpreting heritage related legislation, and guiding a heritage crime 
towards prosecution, involving various parties and extra work in an area many officers 
have never encountered (the heritage sector), went firmly again the ‘grain of policing’: 
 
“And should they then put it to court [heritage crime], I should hope 
that they would take it into account and give a bigger punishment for it. 
But, it goes against the grain [of policing]” (Officer 9). 
 
In a pressurised environment with increasing workloads, officers would be inclined to 
settle for the easiest option, which they clearly understood: 
 
“You’re sinking under a workload, [the officer will think] yeah I can 
deal with this as a theft. I understand theft, I understand what I need to 
put in the file to get him convicted. Yeah, it’s a heritage crime, but what 
am I gonna do after I put it on file?” (Officer 2). 
 
 
One potential method of encouraging regular officers to consider whether a crime was a 
heritage crime or not, was to demonstrate to the officers the practical benefits of doing so: 
 
“I had a police officer ask me, “Well why would we specially record 
this if this had happened on a listed building?” And I said: “Well 
because if you then get them, this is an aggravating factor in their 
sentencing!” [the police officer responded] “Oooh. Oooh is it?” 
(HP4). 
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Yet, opportunities to explain these benefits to officers would only arise in certain 
situations, as highlighted by the aforementioned heritage practitioner, and with heritage 
crime not being an operational priority, were highly unlikely to occur on a larger scale. 
It is worth noting that, at the time of interviewing, the Historic Environment Act (Wales) 
2016 had been passed but not yet come into full effect for the Welsh heritage practitioners. 
This recent change had removed the defence of ignorance, through the launch of a public 
website called Cof Cymru, which details all the historic sites and assets across Wales: 
“...people can now check to see whether there’s a designated historic environment asset in 
their local area [and if] they need to get ancient monument consent or listed building 
consent.” (HP1). 
 
In no longer having to prove to CPS that the defendant was not ignorant, this was 
anticipated to remove one of the main barriers which had resulted in prosecutions failing 
prior to the Act passing: 
 
“... [The CPS would say] we have very little chance of this reaching 
prosecution because effectively, you can’t prove that he knew it was 
scheduled, you’ve got no paperwork, etc. Whereas now, in theory, we 
don’t have to prove that.” (HP2). 
 
 
Whilst this legislative change was undoubtedly progression for the protection of heritage 
sites and assets, it could not combat one of the main problems incurred by practitioners 
and officers alike: ensuring CPS understood the gravity of heritage crime. 
 
4.7.2 : Lack of understanding from CPS 
 
 
Although in theory, there is meant to be a network of heritage crime prosecutors across 
England and Wales, with the CPS struggling under an increasing workload much like the 
police (Bowcott, 2018), it was not guaranteed that a heritage crime case would be put 
before a knowledgeable magistrate or judge: 
 
“…the frustrating things is trying to get that through to the people like 
CPS, who again, are dealing with incredible workloads. We’re not 
blaming anyone, we understand exactly why it’s difficult...” (HP4). 
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The lack of understanding from CPS was also extremely frustrating for the RWCOs, who 
would put extra effort into compiling a heritage crime file, only to have their additional 
work ignored: 
 
“Cause no matter how much we do, we can do all the work, we can put 
that file together perfectly, but it makes no difference whatsoever when 
it goes to CPS if they don’t understand it, they’ll just say charge 
criminal damage. But what about the heritage? [magistrate thinks] 
“Ah well doesn’t matter about that." (Officer 7) 
 
 
Furthermore, it appeared that the heritage crime Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
which had been signed between ACPO (now the NPCC), English Heritage (now Historic 
England) the CPS, and participating local authorities (Historic England, 2012) was not 
always adhered to by the involved parties. One heritage practitioner described an instance 
in which the CPS had made a decision not to prosecute a crime with a heritage element to 
it, but had failed to inform Historic England of their decision; which they were always 
meant to do. The heritage practitioner received an apology, but, evidently, communication 
of the terms of this MOU had failed to filter down as effectively as one might have hoped: 
 
HP3: “Unfortunately, the CPS threw it out. I only heard last week that 
they haven’t proceeded with it, because they said there was still some 
uncertainty about a proper identification of these individuals…but, the 
thing is that when the CPS decide to pull a case that has a heritage 
component, they’re supposed to talk to us first. And they didn’t. So 
we’ve had a little bit of toing and froing to say look, we’ve got an MOU 
with you lot, let’s just… 
 
Researcher: “And so you didn’t get anything through from them in 
relation to that?” 
 
HP3: “No, no. And they have apologised…” 
 
 
Furthermore, it is also important to note that for many of the parties involved in taking a 
heritage crime through the CJS, the central outcome is if a prosecution will be brought or 
not. For the heritage practitioners however, prosecution was not the only consideration. 
Unlike the police, the practitioners were responsible for the continued protection and 
preservation of a heritage site or asset which had been damaged: “In our minds, the 
prosecution is only one outcome. But often our big focus is trying to solve a potentially 
very unstable situation which we can be dealing with” (HP2). Indeed, although the central 
objective for both officers and heritage practitioners are similar, they are not identical. 
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This point of divergence could have potential consequences for partnership working 
between parties. 
 
4.8 : Partnership working 
 
Interviewees were unanimous that partnership working was integral to the prevention and 
reduction of heritage crime: “Partnership work in specialist areas, one hundred percent 
[essential]. Without a doubt” (Officer 8). Although working with partners did not always 
produce tangible results in the form of successful prosecutions, it was the connections 
which both parties made with each other, that were crucial for raising understanding and 
awareness of heritage crime within police forces: “I’m not sure that it [the partnership] is 
producing any prosecutions, but the amount of conversation that’s going on between 
parties is really good” (HP3). Indeed, the police officers naturally lacked expertise in 
heritage crime, and so collaborating with external partners in the heritage sector filled gaps 
in an officer’s knowledge. For example, Officer 3 had asked to be copied into emails from 
his local Inspector of Ancient Monuments, when the Inspector in question was dealing 
with heritage crime (that did not require police intervention), just so that he could increase 
his knowledge on the area: “I ask to be copied into everything, just to see the type of thing 
they are looking at...” (Officer 3). For the officers responsible for heritage crime across 
England and Wales, partnership working could also enable forces to share advice and best 
practice between each other, as the following officer anticipated: 
 
“You [can] share best practice...you can actually pick the phone up 
and say “Hi mate, have you had one of these?” “Oh no I haven’t but, 
so and so over in Bedfordshire has...”” (Officer 11). 
 
 
However, a system to facilitate partnership working and information sharing around 
heritage crime between forces is currently not in place. This meant that, as five officers 
explained, police forces rarely spoke to each other about heritage crime, and opportunity 
to share best practice was therefore extremely limited or non-existent. Subsequently, this 
could leave officers feeling rather isolated when tackling heritage crime. 
Ultimately, partnership working was believed to crucial by both parties, because neither 
heritage practitioners nor police officers could tackle heritage crime alone: 
 
“We totally believe we can’t tackle this on our own” (HP2) “You need 
the support of communities, partnerships and everyone else and their 
wife, the lot of them” (Officer 1). 
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4.8.1 : Negatives to partnership working 
 
 
Whilst all participants agreed that partnership working was key in preventing and tackling 
heritage crime, this of course, did not mean that it was always a positive venture. 
Partnership working came with certain difficulties for police officers. When heritage crime 
occurred, involvement with heritage practitioners was expected, but heritage crime could 
also attract a variety of invested parties who were emotionally attached to the heritage site 
or asset. Dealing with so many stakeholders, who were usually all very upset, complicated 
crimes which were otherwise easy for the officer to deal with: “It’s difficult, dealing with 
crimes that have got so many stakeholders” (Officer 9). It also became apparent that 
external agencies sometimes failed to understand that partnership working was meant to 
be an equal venture between the police and the external agency themselves. One officer 
described how he felt as if the burden was upon the police in partnerships “Do we [the 
police] feel that things are solely loaded towards the police? My view is yes.” (Officer 4). 
Three officers also reported problems, sometimes bordering on resistance, in engaging 
with their local Diocese, whilst simultaneously dealing with complaints of lead theft from 
the Grade listed churches in said Diocese! 
 
4.9 : Obstacles to officers’ understandings, perceptions, awareness of and 
responses to heritage crime 
 
All interviewees, heritage practitioners and officers alike (except Officer 11 and Officer 
12) identified numerous obstacles which hindered the police response to heritage crime. 
The following obstacles emerged: lack of internal and external awareness of the heritage 
crime SPOC, utilising the existing policing toolkit to police heritage crime, terminology 
and evidence, and lastly, the importance of a genuine interest. These obstacles will be 
explored in further detail below. 
 
4.9.1 : Lack of internal and external awareness of the heritage crime SPOC 
 
 
Internal and external awareness of heritage crime SPOCs was very poor. Externally, for 
the heritage practitioners, finding out the identity of their local heritage crime SPOC (if 
available) was at times a near impossible task. When they did find out, it was very difficult 
to maintain contact with the SPOC, as the role bounced between officers: “Because no 
sooner have you sort of got one who knows what they’re doing, they move on!” (HP 2). 
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Sometimes, the heritage practitioners concluded, it was a matter of luck that they had been 
able to find an officer within a police force who was sympathetic to heritage crime: 
“Sometimes, you just get lucky” (HP4). Nevertheless, the overall consensus was that it 
was a rather gruelling process to find and maintain contact with the officers responsible 
for heritage crime in police forces across England and Wales. 
 
Internally, the officers described how awareness of their responsibility for heritage crime 
was almost nonexistent. In juggling both the multifaceted areas of rural and wildlife crime, 
for most of the officers, heritage crime was their lowest priority, and workload pressures 
meant that they did not have time to raise internal awareness of their position. From 
personal experience, the RWCOs in this research knew that having a SPOC for rural and 
wildlife crime, resulted in officers who may have otherwise been reticent to engage in 
these two areas, phoning them for help and guidance. Similarly, officers could call the 
heritage crime SPOC for specific heritage crime advice. However, the majority of the 
‘regular’ officers in their forces were unaware that heritage crime existed, let alone who 
held responsibility for the area within their force. 
 
From the perspective of the officers interviewed therefore, the lack of internal awareness 
of the force SPOC for heritage crime was a significant barrier in officers’ understandings 
and responses to heritage crime. In fact, internal awareness of who held responsibility for 
heritage crime was so poor in once force, that the following officer described how, despite 
eagerly volunteering to take over responsibility for heritage crime from an officer who 
was: “…really not that interested in heritage…” (Officer 11), finding this officer was an 
overly complicated task: “It took me a few days to identify who the current incumbent was 
when I was saying “Oh yeah can I take this on”, people [internally] didn’t know who it 
was...” (Officer 11). 
 
4.9.2 : Utilising the existing police toolkit to police heritage crime 
 
 
Regular officers might be fearful of engaging in an unknown area of crime, but this does 
not mean that they are incapable of doing so. All interviewees felt that police officers had 
the existing skills in their possession, gained through the basic training all officers receive, 
to investigate heritage crime. Heritage crime could be: “...dealt with by every policeman, 
it’s just property at the end of the day.” (Officer 12). Officers were meant to be: 
“...omnicompetent...So any officer, PCSO or member of staff, should be able to investigate 
any heritage crime...”(Officer 1). This omnicompetence, Officer 1 explained further, 
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meant that every officer should be able to use their ‘policing toolbox’ to investigate 
heritage crime as they would any other crime: “...then they should apply PNLD. They 
should apply their toolbox that they carry round with them every day, to the crime!” 
(Officer 1). However, as mentioned in section 4.2.1, the apprehension and fear of the 
unknown which regular officers felt when encountering heritage crime, could result in 
officers forgetting that they had all the basic, versatile skills of policing at their disposal, 
which could be applied to policing heritage crime. 
 
Officer 8 explained how an existing problem-solving model within policing, the OSARA 
model, had been working, and was helping some of the RWCOs he supervised in tackling 
heritage crime: “...the OSARA model helps certain officers when it comes to heritage and 
cultural crime. Only because they know they’ve got to analyse, scan and analyse the 
problem. They’ve got to look at the response, they’ve got to report it” (Officer 8). 
Indeed, despite potential reluctance from officers when encountering heritage crime, it 
was thought that the existing skills an officer has should be enough to conduct a successful 
investigation, for the process was the same for every crime: “It’s exactly the same 
investigative methods, it’s the same process, it’s the same court, it’s the same outcome” 
(Officer 10). 
 
4.9.2 A: Inability to utilise the existing policing toolkit: an absence of evidence 
 
 
Although officers could employ their existing policing ‘toolkit,’ this did not mean that this 
toolkit was always useful for investigating heritage crimes. Two officers recognised the 
ineffectiveness of utilising the routine investigative techniques ordinarily used at other 
crime scenes, such as forensics, for heritage crimes: 
 
“...whereas you look at something old, remote, made of stone, you’re 
losing a lot of your investigative things. I mean, they would send a CSI 
for us but, fingerprints on stone-useless...it’s finding those investigative 
alleys then when there’s not much there” (Officer 8). 
 
 
These issues were further compounded by the inability to use certain traditional crime 
prevention methods, such as CCTV, on heritage assets: “You don’t usually have CCTV 
overlooking it [the heritage asset or site], you don’t have witnesses, so it’s very difficult 
you know...(Officer 10). 
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For example, in a force which was struggling with high levels of lead theft from church 
rooves, one officer revealed how the local community would be quick to criticise the 
response of the police, questioning why no action appeared to have been taken. However, 
the community had failed to understand that the police were almost entirely powerless to 
prevent these thefts, due to both the lack of traditional crime prevention methods, and the 
nature of the crime circumventing the existing policing toolkit: 
 
“[the community asks] Why aren’t you doing anything about it?” Well, 
we can’t because these people strike in the middle of the night, 3 in the 
morning...we’ve got no CCTV, there’s no forensic evidence, there’s no 
witnesses, and no police officers are around...” (Officer 5). 
 
 
In addition to this, there was a cultural conflict exhibited between churches and the crime 
prevention advice which the officers would provide. Historically, a key facet of churches 
is that they are kept open on a daily basis for the public to access, meaning that the most 
basic crime prevention measures clashed with this important cultural aspect of a church, as 
explained by Officer 4: 
 
“I responded back to an email from, a very nice chap, and he said that 
we’ve got a church that’s a mile away from the village, and nobody 
does anything, but we open it up at 8 in the morning and we close it 
again at 6pm at night, and we’re getting a bit fearful about leaving any 
of the valuable stuff in it. What advice would you give me? [Officer 
responds]...Lock the doors. And it is sad.” (Officer 4) 
 
 
The absence of evidence when investigating heritage crime also had consequences for 
officers’ understandings of why heritage crime was a serious crime. In the case of illegal 
metal detecting described below, regular officers were met with an illegal metal detecting 
case where nobody, not even the RWCO (the heritage crime SPOC in this instance), could 
prove what had been taken; nor were there any potential leads. The regular officers 
subsequently found it very difficult to comprehend why illegal metal detecting was 
actually a serious crime, when there was no evidence of what had been taken or by whom: 
 
“Yeah, we’ve had difficulties with this...we go there, and we [RWCO] 
say there has been metal detecting here, they’re looking for valuable 
items within the listed area. And then they go [the regular officers] 
“Well, what’s the effects? What’s been taken?” [RWCO responds] 
Well, we don’t know! And all we’ve got is tuft of grass and raised clobs 
of earth! And they go [the regular officers] “Well what’ve we got?!” 
(Officer 8). 
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4.9.3 : Terminology and definition 
 
 
Both officers and heritage practitioners recognised that the term ‘heritage crime’ could be 
a key obstacle contributing to poor understanding and negative perception of the 
phenomenon within policing more widely. As mentioned in Chapter 2, heritage crime is a 
‘catch-all’ term for various types of crime which regular officers deal with on a daily 
basis: “At the end of the day, it’s just a theft or a damage…it’s just putting that label onto 
a crime” (Officer 5). However, the term heritage crime confused officers, and became a 
stumbling block for them: “But if you said, “Can you go and deal with the theft of a 
mantle from an old building” He’d say “Yeah okay, on my way” You say about heritage 
crime, people go “Oh my god” So it’s the way you term it” (Officer 10). 
 
It appeared that the term ‘heritage crime’ added a layer of complexity to crimes which 
officers would ordinarily face no obstacles when investigating: 
 
“…he [another police officer] phoned me and I said “You do realise 
that’s a piece of triple SI land, and it’s an ancient wall of some 
description” [Officer responds] “Well what does that mean!” “It 
means that you’ve got a heritage crime” “Well what does that 
mean!”…and he said “Well what do I do?” And I said “Well you 
haven’t got to do anything, but mark it up as a heritage crime” (Officer 
7). 
 
In short, Officer 8 summarised how it was simply the ‘alien title’ of heritage crime which 
made officers reluctant to engage in the area. 
 
4.10 : The importance of a genuine interest 
 
 
Heritage crime has never been, and is very unlikely to be, of great interest to the police as 
an organization: “Heritage crime, by both national and international, was of no interest to 
the police at all. And it still isn’t to the vast majority of forces, I have to say.” (Officer 12). 
The other officers echoed these sentiments, explaining how heritage crime appeared to 
have been reluctantly added to the policing portfolio, cemented by the ill-thought-out 
affixation of heritage crime to rural and wildlife crime. The current scenario, wherein 
responsibility for heritage crime is commonly defaulted to RWCOs, bypasses other police 
staff who possess a genuine interest, passion, knowledge and eagerness to police heritage 
crime; such as the following PCSO: 
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“Cause we’ve got PCSOs, we’ve got one in X, he’s brilliant, metal 
detecting type stuff and heritage, he knows loads…And he can reel 
loads off. He knows far more than me. If there was an incident, I’d ring 
him. I’d ring him up first, and say just have a look at that, and see what 
you think and then he’d go “Oh yeah” and get really excited…and 
those are the people that you need in the role.” (Officer 6). 
 
 
All officers stressed that responsibility for heritage crime must be delegated to those who 
are genuinely interested, passionate and motivated, an individual: “…whose got a passion 
for it and can understand it could and can explain it...” (Officer 3). Indeed, these key 
characteristics that the officers suggested were essential to policing heritage crime, were 
revealed to already be key in practice. According to the heritage practitioners, when they 
encountered officers with the passion and motivation necessary to police heritage crime, 
these characteristics were key to providing a good service, and often resulted in 
circumventing existing challenges in policing, such as resourcing: 
 
“There’s individual officers who are interested and have got engaged 
with a particular issue, and that undoubtedly does help when you get 
somebody that’s having something to do with the X site at X [heritage 
practitioner says] “I know this is difficult for you to put a lot of 
resources into…”[police officer responds] “Ooh no, this is really 
iconic to my area!” Oh right, that’s really interesting, we’re gonna get 
on all right, kind of thing” (HP4). 
 
 
Put simply, without passionate and interested officers policing heritage crime, the problem 
would continue to fester, and policing would never be able to ‘win’ against heritage crime: 
“You won’t win. You need someone that cares” (Officer 1). 
 
4.11 : Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined police understandings, perceptions and awareness of heritage crime 
across England and Wales. It began by exploring why police understanding and perception 
of heritage crime is generally poor and revealed that the following three factors were key 
contributors to this poor understanding and perception: fear of the unknown, downgrading 
the severity and validity of heritage crime, and a lack of training and knowledge of the 
phenomenon. The victims and impact of heritage crime were then explored, and it 
transpired that both the officers and heritage practitioners were unanimous in their 
assertions of who the victims were and what the impact of heritage crime was; despite 
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only three of the officers having a strong interest in heritage. Next, this chapter explored 
the impact of austerity measures upon the policing of heritage crime, revealing that 
austerity measures have had little impact upon officer’s abilities to police heritage crime, 
because these officers were well accustomed to policing with limited resources. It was 
found, however, that austerity measures had prevented officers from received adequate 
training and support relating to heritage crime. 
 
Penultimately, this chapter revealed that there were significant flaws in the reporting and 
recording of heritage crime, leading officers to believe that the phenomenon went 
underreported. It also became clear that the scale of heritage crime cannot currently be 
assessed accurately. Notably, heritage practitioners often felt that there was some 
resistance from police officers to heritage crime being recorded as a crime, despite these 
heritage practitioners citing laws which suggested otherwise, which was a clear barrier to 
proving that heritage crime was a policing problem. This chapter highlighted problems 
facing officers and heritage practitioners in relation to employing specific heritage crime 
legislation, and moving heritage crime through the CJS, demonstrating that agencies 
across the CJS possess a lack of understanding and awareness of it. Lastly, this chapter 
explored how partnership working both helps and hinders the policing and prevention of 
heritage crime. The next chapter examines policing and heritage crime from the 
perspectives of victims of the phenomenon themselves. 
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CHAPTER 5: ESTABLISHING HERITAGE CRIME 
OFFICERS ACROSS ENGLAND AND WALES: FREEDOM 
OF INFORMATION REQUESTS (FOI) 
 
5.1 : Introduction 
 
In order to supplement the core qualitative component of this research, FOI requests were 
sent to police forces across England. FOI requests were not sent to the four forces in 
Wales, the reasons for which are explained in greater detail below. The FOI requests asked 
forces whether they had a heritage crime officer, and what policing position the heritage 
crime officer had alongside the heritage crime officer role; as the heritage crime officer 
role is secondary to the primary position of being a police officer. Firstly, sending the FOI 
requests helped ascertain if each police force in England did indeed have a heritage crime 
officer, as NPCC documentation states that all forces in England and Wales do have a 
heritage crime officer (NPCC, 2017). Secondly, it also establishes what kinds of police 
officers are policing heritage crime, including their rank and role. A total of 38 requests 
were sent to 38 of the 39 police forces in England (the Metropolitan Police were not sent 
an FOI request, in having the AAU). Of these 38 requests, a response rate of 36 was 
achieved; with 2 forces failing to reply. 
 
From the data collated, in total, 20 (16 in England, all 4 in Wales) police forces in England 
and Wales have specified that they have a heritage crime officer. 20 forces in England also 
stated that they do not have a heritage crime officer. Of these 20, 12 stated that they either 
have an RWCO or team of RWCOs who presumably deal with heritage crime on a case by 
case basis, or a team of officers that include heritage crime in their policing remit. 
However, although the policing of heritage crime may be covered within these RWCO’s 
remits, these officers were found to not all be, specifically, heritage crime officers. As 
such, responses from forces which stated that they had RWCOs that policed heritage 
crime, but did not specify that one or more of these officers were heritage crime officers, 
are not included within the final number of heritage crime officers (the latter is explained 
further below). The reasoning behind this is that although the policing of heritage crime is 
included within the operational remit of rural and wildlife crime, therefore meaning that 
RWCOs and officers in Rural Crime Teams (RCT herein) often police heritage crime by 
default, the inclusion of heritage crime in an officer’s remit does not automatically make 
this officer a heritage crime officer (see 2.4.3A). Therefore, if the FOI response has failed 
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to identify one officer who has been designated as the force heritage crime officer 
(SPOC), or has failed to state that the officers in the force’s RCT are all heritage crime 
officers, such as Kent Police who state that all “Officers of the Kent Police Rural Task 
Force also adopt the role of Heritage Liaison Officers”(Kent Police) and Hampshire 
Constabulary who also explicitly state that their RCT polices heritage crime; then this 
force cannot be included in the final number of heritage crime officers. 
 
5.1.1 : Result summary 
 
 
In Wales, all four Welsh forces each have a heritage crime officer. Of the 16 forces in 
England and the 4 forces in Wales which do have heritage crime officers, the 
responsibility for heritage crime is bolted onto an existing policing role. For example, in 
South Wales the heritage crime officer is a PC, more specifically a Wildlife and 
Environmental Crime Officer. This ‘bolting on’ is replicated across all forces in both 
countries. 
 
However, a specific pattern shared between the heritage crime officers in England and 
Wales is the delegation of heritage crime to specific areas of policing; namely that of rural 
and wildlife crime. In total, across both countries, 24 forces have delegated responsibility 
for heritage crime to police officers or internal police staff (such as rural and wildlife 
crime co-ordinators), who are primarily concerned with rural and wildlife crime. For 
example, the officer responsible for heritage crime in Lincolnshire Police is described as 
‘Chief Inspector: Rural, Wildlife and Heritage Crime Lead’ (Lincolnshire Police) and in 
Hertfordshire, the 3 officers who police heritage crime are ‘…Rural Crime Officers, part 
of the Rural Operational Support Team (ROST)’ (Hertfordshire Police). 9 of the 12 
officers interviewed for this research were also RWCOs (those who were not, had had 
heritage crime bolted onto their existing role). The allocation of heritage crime to 
RWCOs, RCTs, or staff officers who are concerned with rural and wildlife crime, appears 
to be a nationwide trend in both countries. This trend reflects the recommendations of 
policing literature, such as the NPCC’s Rural Affairs Strategy (2018a) and Wildlife 
Policing Strategy (NPCC, 2018b), and both of the NPCC’s Heritage and Cultural Property 
Crime National Strategic Assessments (ACPO, 2013; NPCC, 2017). These 
recommendations state that heritage crime is the responsibility of RCTs and RWCOs, and 
that heritage crime can be confidently linked into rural and wildlife crime. The FOI 
responses demonstrate that most forces have followed these recommendations from NPCC 
literature, but in allocating heritage crime to RWCOs or RCTs, this could indicate to 
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officers that heritage crime occurs chiefly in rural areas, as regular officers assumed in 
previous research (Poyser and Poyser, 2017). 
 
Furthermore, the affixation of heritage crime to rural and wildlife crime, both of which are 
marginalised specialist areas of policing that officers generally receive training to police 
(NWCU,2019a), could potentially complicate the perception of heritage crime amongst 
regular police officers. Regular officers may assume that they need the help of a specialist 
officer to investigate heritage crime, when, as established in 4.9.2, every officer possesses 
the existing skills necessary to investigate heritage crime themselves. Officers more 
generally might also assume that investigating a heritage crime case which they encounter 
is not their responsibility, as it has been allocated to a specific type (or group) of officers. 
 
Whilst there are similarities in the area of policing (rural and wildlife crime) and the type 
of police officer (RWCOs/WCOs) that heritage crime has been allocated to in England 
and Wales, a significant difference between both countries is the limited consistency 
between the rank and role of heritage crime officers in England. In comparison, there is a 
far greater sense of structure and consistency in the rank and role of heritage crime 
officers in Wales. Three of the heritage crime officers in Wales, specifically South Wales, 
Gwent, and North Wales, are all PCs; and in Dyfed-Powys, the heritage crime officer is an 
Inspector. With the most senior heritage crime officer being an Inspector, there is a clear 
hierarchy in Wales, arguably simplifying the Welsh response to heritage crime. For 
example, the three Welsh PCs have a clear national lead who can give them advice, 
direction, facilitate cross-collaboration, and co-ordinate the response between the four 
forces. Contrastingly, in England, the heritage crime officers consist of nine PCs, five 
Sergeants, five Inspectors, one Detective Sergeant and two Chief Inspectors; as well as 
nine non-operational staff. To organise a lead for heritage crime in England (outside of the 
NPCC) would be far more complex, both culturally and logistically. Culturally, the 
Inspector in Wales is somewhat closer in perspective to front-line officers, and literally 
closer in proximity to front-line officers than a Chief Inspector would be, if they were to 
take the lead on heritage crime in England. Logistical issues would also be likely to be 
occur when attempting to co-ordinate operational staff and civilian staff in England. 
 
Indeed, this variation of officers responsible for policing heritage crime in England is 
another difference between the policing of heritage crime in England and Wales. This 
variation could result in great discrepancies in the attitudes, perceptions, and responses to 
heritage crime in each force across England. For example, heritage crime officers who are 
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also senior police officers in a more managerial position, such as the Chief Inspectors in 
Nottinghamshire and Lincolnshire Police, will have greater access to resources and more 
power available to them than the lowest ranking heritage crime officers. The hierarchal 
nature of policing means that more senior heritage crime officers could (although 
unlikely), order lower ranked officers in their forces to focus more upon the policing of 
heritage crime, and may be able to carve out time for officers to attend training. Such 
actions are unrealistic for PCs, who hold little influence over decisions concerning policy 
and resources. 
 
Comparatively however, officers who are situated at a lower level within policing are at an 
advantageous position, in that they may be able to influence their colleagues on the ground 
level, introducing heritage crime to them more naturally, without their colleagues feeling 
as if the policing of the crime is being imposed upon them from above. This may 
encourage these colleagues to take heritage crime more seriously and perceive it as less 
burdensome. It is also questionable as to how senior officers who are simultaneously 
heritage crime officers, can spare the time in an already demanding role, to spread 
knowledge of heritage crime throughout their respective forces. Their opportunities to 
attend events to raise awareness of, and host collaborative meetings with partners 
concerning heritage crime, are also likely to be limited. 
 
5.2 : No heritage crime officer 
 
Twenty forces responded to their respective FOI requests with either ‘No information 
held’ or ‘No.’ Contrary to the information provided by the NPCC documentation on 
heritage crime (NPCC, 2017) therefore, these results show that every force in England and 
Wales does not have a heritage crime officer. This is a significant finding, as it helps 
explain why the officers in this research struggled to build networks of heritage crime 
officers and share best practice. The spread of heritage crime officers is clearly patchy, 
and the rank and role of the officer varies hugely between forces, meaning that forging 
links between, and accessing such a wide variety of officers, is likely to be difficult and 
time consuming. Moreover, the information supplied alongside some of the ‘No’ 
responses matched the issues which the interviewed officers raised in Chapter 4. In 
particular, the FOI request from Cheshire Constabulary revealed that their Rural Crime 
officers would occasionally respond to heritage crime, but that there was nothing on force 
systems to highlight that these officers could deal with heritage crime if it occurred: ‘We 
do not have anything on Force systems to highlight this…’ (Cheshire Constabulary). Due 
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to the ‘No’ response, these officers cannot be classified as heritage crime officers within 
this research, but the fact that these officers do police heritage crime means that they 
could, of course, be considered as heritage crime officers. However, even if the latter was 
the case, their role would be rather redundant without anything on internal systems to 
highlight that these officers can deal with heritage crime; echoing the difficulties of the 
officers in this research in relation to overall internal awareness of their position. The 
participating officers in this research lacked the time to inform anybody internally of their 
role as heritage crime officers, and therefore were often not recorded on their force’s 
systems as being the heritage crime SPOC (at the time of interviewing). With nothing on 
force systems to identify them as heritage crime officers, this meant that their colleagues 
could not approach these officers for clarification or advice about heritage crime cases. 
Furthermore, it seems that these actions let future victims of heritage crime down, who 
may not be put in touch with an officer who is accustomed to dealing with heritage crime, 
if this officer is not highlighted as such internally. 
 
5.2.1 : Team or individual officer? 
 
 
Nine forces have RCTs which according to the FOI responses, deal with heritage crime, 
despite some of these teams not having a named heritage crime officer. The heritage crime 
officers who form part of an RCT or RCTs which police heritage crime, due to its 
inclusion under the rural and wildlife crime schematics, arguably have some advantage 
over the heritage crime officers who operate alone. In a team, there is an opportunity to 
share best practice amongst each other, to compare cases and seek advice from colleagues. 
As such, teams may grasp heritage crime much faster than individual heritage crime 
officers, possibly leading to RCTs developing a greater understanding and broader 
knowledge of heritage crime than individual heritage crime officers. 
 
The overall level of knowledge of the phenomenon is likely to vary greatly between 
individual officers and RCTs, therefore. The latter could be mitigated by utilising the 
existing internal systems used by all police forces, such as the Police OnLine Knowledge 
Area (POLKA), which has a page that allows officers to communicate with each other and 
share best practice about heritage crime. However, the officers described how the page 
was uninformative and underused, as Officer 11’s experience illustrated: “Yeah, there’s a 
whole section for heritage crime, nothing’s gone onto it...I posted on there saying I'm the 
new heritage crime officer, contact me...nobody did”. Furthermore, it is inevitable that 
caseload distribution will be far greater for individual officers than RCTs, as cases can be 
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distributed more evenly across an RCT. This is disadvantageous for individual heritage 
crime officers, and may result in them taking a longer time to respond to and investigate 
heritage crime, in comparison to officers within an RCT. Ultimately, whilst the rank, role, 
and number of heritage crime officers differs across each force in England and Wales, 
officers are generally allocated heritage crime on the basis that they are involved in the 
policing of rural and wildlife crime in some capacity. 
 
Not all forces, however, have followed the trend of linking heritage crime to rural and 
wildlife crime. Six forces have allocated the policing of heritage crime to ‘every’ police 
officer in their force. 
 
5.2.3: No heritage officer as every officer can police heritage crime 
 
 
Three forces (Devon and Cornwall, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire) all responded to 
their FOI requests stating that they did not have a heritage crime officer, because every 
officer was capable of policing heritage crime. For example, South Yorkshire responded 
that: ‘Incidents or Crimes of this type would be part of the daily duties of all Officers, 
within all districts as required’ (South Yorkshire Police). The responses from these three 
forces are valid, as every officer possesses the skills in their metaphorical policing 
toolbox, to police the crimes which come under the overarching title of heritage crime. 
Indeed, the latter was stressed by the officers in this study. However, the experiences of 
the officers in this research also indicated that when heritage crime was allocated to 
officers as part of their daily policing duties, the vast majority of these officers struggled 
to comprehend the area and were reluctant to police it; due to a lack of understanding and 
interest in heritage crime. 
 
It is welcome that these forces have not simply bolted heritage crime onto rural and 
wildlife crime, as it embeds heritage crime within these respective forces as a ‘normal’ 
crime that any officer would naturally encounter. However, it is questionable as to how 
effective the allocation of heritage crime to every officer is, in the policing of the 
phenomenon. Indeed, this thesis has raised numerous issues concerning the allocation of 
heritage crime to officers who have no interest in or motivation to police the area. Such 
issues have included officers mistreating victims, not taking heritage crime seriously, and 
closing heritage crime down prematurely and without due consideration. Thus, responses 
from these three forces indicate a wider lack of understanding of heritage crime within 
policing. The suggestion that ‘heritage crime is included in an officer’s role’, is correct at 
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a policy level, but does not account for the additional knowledge, motivation and interest 
required to police heritage crime in practice. 
 
Similarly, three other forces also revealed that they did not have heritage crime officers, as 
responsibility for policing heritage crime was allocated to all officers, specifically 
however, officers within Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs). These forces include 
Devon and Cornwall, Dorset, and Leicestershire: 
 
‘No, we do not have specified roles of this nature. This activity is 
normally aligned to Neighbourhood and Local Investigation Police 
Officer roles…this covers all Police Officer Ranks’ (Devon and 
Cornwall Police) 
 
‘However, the thematic of heritage crime does sit under the Territorial 
Policing Command as does rural crime’ (Dorset Police) 
 
‘The role involves liaising with a team of our officers who will also 
have wildlife and rural crime within their portfolio's (as well as their 
normal neighbourhood responsibilities)’ (Leicestershire Police) 
 
 
This approach may prove advantageous for these three police forces. For example, the 
allocation of heritage crime to NPTs is likely to help dismantle internal policing myths 
surrounding heritage crime, such as the notion that heritage crime requires specialist 
officers to police it. The actions of the above three police forces, in not allocating heritage 
crime to RWCOs and RCTs specifically, and instead allocating heritage crime to officers 
more generally, is arguably an instrumental step in normalising heritage crime within 
policing (much like the aforementioned six forces incorporating heritage crime into every 
officer’s role). In addition, another potential merit of allocating heritage crime to NPTs is 
that officers within these NPTs may have a greater understanding of the impact of heritage 
crime upon the local community, as their presence within local communities means that 
they are likely to know the importance of local heritage to the communities they serve. As 
such, they are likely to be more sensitive to the impact and victims of heritage crime. 
 
Of course, there are also some negatives to this method of allocating heritage crime. 
Whilst NPTs are more likely to have the drive and interest to police heritage crime, from 
the perspective that it impacts upon their local community (as opposed to being personally 
interested in heritage crime), these officers may struggle without any form of accessible 
guidance or training. Heritage crime may also be downgraded by these officers, if nobody 
has informed them as to why heritage crime is important to police, and is likely to be 
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relegated to the bottom of these officer’s workloads, as it lacks a direct human victim (and 
therefore ranks low in terms of policing importance). These NPTs also do not appear to 
have an identifiable SPOC available to support them if they need advice. Whilst allocating 
heritage crime to non-specialised areas of policing and officers is a step towards the 
normalisation of heritage crime internally, the wider, largely negative, policing attitudes 
towards heritage crime cannot be remedied without additional support and training for 
officers in these NPTs. 
 
5.3 : Volunteers 
 
Three forces mentioned utilising volunteers to help police heritage crime. In Cheshire, 
there is one ‘Heritage watch volunteer’ (Cheshire Constabulary), whilst Leicestershire 
Police has ‘a team of heritage watch volunteers who are people who have academic 
knowledge of heritage and a passion to deliver crime prevention advice and guidance for 
some of our locations’ (Leicestershire Police), which their heritage crime officer 
supervises. Lastly, the response from Essex Police mentions that it has ‘…a Heritage 
Watch portfolio’ (Essex Police) within the force, and of course, police ‘Watch’ schemes 
consist of volunteers. Indeed, according to the Essex Police website, the members of this 
group include various agencies which are duty bound to protect heritage alongside 
interested members of the general public (Essex Police, 2019). 
 
For Leicestershire and Essex Police, a network of heritage crime volunteers to supplement 
the work of their heritage crime officers is likely to be far more useful than allocating 
heritage crime to officers who lack interest in the area. Heritage crime volunteers not only 
have the necessary motivation and interest in heritage crime to help police it, but they also 
arguably have more time available to them than police officers do to engage in the 
enhancement of practice. 
 
5.4 : The heritage crime officer role 
 
Many of the FOI responses illustrated that there was confusion surrounding what the role 
of a heritage crime officer actually constituted. This meant that it was often dependent on 
the researcher to ascertain from the gathered data if a force had a heritage crime officer or 
not. For example, both Cambridgeshire Police and Northamptonshire Police described 
how they did not have a heritage crime officer. However, in Cambridgeshire, their RCT 
polices heritage crime as ‘part of their overall remit…’ (Cambridgeshire Police), whilst in 
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Northamptonshire their Rural Crime officers ‘oversee the investigation of Heritage 
Crimes’ (Northamptonshire Police). These comments mean that any of the officers in 
Cambridgeshire or Northamptonshire could, potentially be classified as heritage crime 
officers by their respective forces. However, both their FOI responses have not clearly 
stated that these officers are heritage crime officers, and therefore they cannot be counted 
amongst the final number of heritage crime officers in England and Wales. 
 
By contrast, Hampshire Constabulary responded that their force has ‘a team of Rural and 
Wildlife Crime Officers who all deal with heritage crime’ (Hampshire Constabulary). 
Whilst there is little discrepancy between the responses of these three forces, it is because 
Hampshire Constabulary has overtly stated that the officers in their RCT are heritage 
crime officers, that means that Hampshire has been included amongst the overall number 
of heritage crime officers in England and Wales. Indeed, despite the similarities between 
the responses from these three forces, it seemed that whether a force provided a ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’ response was largely dependent upon individual force interpretation of the heritage 
crime officer role. This theme emerged throughout the FOI responses, with each 
individual force taking a slightly different approach to what they classified as a heritage 
crime officer. For example, the responses provided by Cambridgeshire and Hampshire are 
identical, both forces have a team of RWCOs policing heritage crime, but Cambridgeshire 
responded with ‘No’ whilst Hampshire responded with ‘Yes’. 
 
Clearly, there is no regulation or standardisation in the implementation of heritage crime 
officers, which has led to internal misconceptions about what a heritage crime officer 
constitutes. Therefore, with no clear instruction from senior levels of policing, forces have 
decided for themselves whether they have a heritage crime officer or not, as opposed to 
following a strict set of criteria to establish if an officer is considered a heritage crime 
officer. In addition, those forces which cite that numerous officers are responsible for 
policing heritage crime, do not specify which of these officers is the heritage crime SPOC 
within their force, indicating that a SPOC does not exist. 
 
The general confusion surrounding the breadth of the heritage crime role, and its links to 
rural, wildlife and heritage crime observed in the FOI responses, is exemplified in two 
responses, from Bedfordshire Police and Greater Manchester Police (GMP). Both forces 
answered ‘No’ to the FOI request, but then supplied additional information regarding 
wildlife crime: ‘We have an RCT which incorporates wildlife crime within their role’ 
(Bedfordshire Police) and ‘GMP does have some wildlife liaison officers as a bolt-on to 
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their normal role’ (Greater Manchester Police). These responses are particularly 
confusing as wildlife crime is even more tenuously linked to heritage crime than rural 
crime, a point which the officers in this study made very clear (see 4.5.1). 
 
A further, similar, theme emerged from the FOI responses, concerning the assumptions 
forces make regarding the links between heritage crime, rural crime, and wildlife crime. 
These assumptions are likely to stem from the embedding of heritage crime within rural 
and wildlife crime (as mentioned in 5.1.1) at NPCC level (without any clear reason as to 
why heritage crime fits into these aforementioned areas). In turn, assumptions are being 
made internally by forces regarding the links between rural and wildlife crime and 
heritage crime, which vary per force, in the same way that forces are interpreting the 
heritage crime officer role individually. Evidently, heritage crime is assumed to be linked 
closely enough to these two crimes, that the additional information provided by these 
forces is perceived to be relevant. 
 
This suggests a deep-seated internal inference that wildlife crime officers, specifically, 
will be policing heritage crime as part of their wildlife crime officer role, due to the 
‘bolting on’ of heritage crime to rural and wildlife crime more generally. Such 
assumptions are not only observed in the responses from GMP and Bedfordshire Police, 
but are also reflected in the following responses from Norfolk and Thames Valley Police 
‘In Norfolk, the dedicated rural officer is a Wildlife Crime Officer’ (Norfolk Police), and 
Thames Valley ‘Thames Valley Police have a designated officer who will deal with 
wildlife and rural crime’ (Thames Valley Police). In each of these responses, no 
explanation is provided as to why this additional information is supplied, or indeed, why it 
is relevant to heritage crime. These prevailing assumptions could be viewed as a success if 
heritage crime only occurred in rural areas and had a strong, tangible link to wildlife 
crime, but as this thesis has examined, the latter is not the case (see 4.5.1). This additional 
information and the assumptions being made internally indicate a greater 
misunderstanding of heritage crime which appears to extend through multiple police 
forces. 
 
There were two anomalous responses which emerged from the FOIs. These relate to West 
Midlands Police’s subject matter expert, ‘West Midlands Police have a subject matter 
expert for Wildlife Crime, Rural Affairs and Heritage Crime’(West Midlands Police) and 
Essex Police’s crime prevention tactical adviser ‘Essex Police also has a crime prevention 
tactical adviser who also has a heritage crime portfolio’ (Essex Police). The FOI response 
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from West Midlands Police failed to elaborate upon what exactly a subject matter expert 
was, and this therefore raises numerous questions. Firstly, the nature and remit of the role 
is unclear. West Midlands Police does not provide a definition of what a subject matter 
expert is, but there are many other policing areas within the force which also have subject 
matter experts, who are simultaneously operational officers (West Midlands Police, 2019). 
Presumably, the role of a subject matter expert is similar to that of a SPOC, within which 
this officer provides essential information and guidance to frontline officers policing 
heritage crime, but the efficacy and accessibility of the Detective Chief Inspector who 
fulfills this position is debatable. As mentioned previously, the ability for high-ranking 
officers to disseminate knowledge of their role internally, and for officers to approach 
them for advice regarding heritage crime cases, may be difficult due to the demands and 
breadth of their workload as a more senior officer. 
 
Secondly, if this officer is an expert in heritage crime, it is also questionable as to why 
they have not been allocated the role of force heritage crime SPOC. Thirdly, and most 
importantly, what qualifies this officer to be a subject matter expert is unclear. The officer 
may be required to have sufficient qualifications (such as a heritage related degree), a 
personal interest in the subject, expertise gained throughout their policing position, or a 
mixture of all three. There is of course, no existing measurement for what qualifies an 
officer to be a heritage crime officer, nor a subject matter expert on heritage crime. 
 
The appointment of the heritage crime subject matter expert therefore, not only 
exemplifies the lack of clarity surrounding heritage crime in police forces in England and 
Wales, but also emphasises the ill-thought-out implementation of the policing of heritage 
crime across England and Wales more generally. The second anomalous response 
concerns Essex Police’s crime prevention tactical adviser, who has a heritage crime 
portfolio to aid in the policing of heritage crime. The latter shows how heritage crime can 
be successfully embedded within normal policing practice, similarly to the allocation of 
heritage crime to police officers more generally, and NPTs. This crime prevention tactical 
adviser compliments Essex Police’s heritage crime SPOC, the officers supporting this 
SPOC, and the Heritage Watch volunteers. Essex Police have covered multiple areas of 
policing, from proactive preventative policing, to utilising frontline officers for a more 
reactive response. This multi-faceted approach to tackling heritage crime is likely to prove 
effective in the long-term. 
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Amidst the confusion which emerged from these FOI responses, it is important to briefly 
recognise the forces which other forces might learn from, in terms of best practice. The 
most comprehensive approach to heritage crime emerged from Essex, Leicestershire, and 
Kent Police. All three forces have multiple officers who engage in the policing of heritage 
crime and a clear heritage crime SPOC. Notably, all three forces have also created an 
external presence in relation to heritage crime, either through voluntary schemes or 
engaging in outside initiatives. For example, both Essex and Leicestershire Police have a 
voluntary Heritage Watch scheme, whilst Kent Police sits ‘on the heritage watch steering 
group, where the key iconic sites of Kent are represented, alongside Historic England and 
other partners’ (Kent Police). 
 
These three forces are existing examples of how forces can effectively and efficiently 
police heritage crime, through transparently policing the crime internally, and externally 
engaging with the public and partners through Watch schemes and meetings. Ultimately, 
these FOI responses have demonstrated that whether a force has a heritage crime officer or 
not is a matter of individual force interpretation. This reflects the lack of guidance that 
forces have received in relation to heritage crime and has in turn, led to greatly differing 
responses from forces which have supplied very similar answers. 
 
5.5 : Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the nature of the role of the heritage crime officer in police forces 
across England and Wales and provided an in-depth analysis of forces which possessed a 
heritage crime officer, and those which did not. It was found that there were a greater 
number of heritage crime officers across England and Wales than was predicted, however, 
they were extremely varied in their rank and role which is likely to inhibit cross- 
collaboration and information sharing between forces. This chapter also revealed that the 
20 forces which did not have heritage crime officers occasionally fulfilled the role in other 
ways, through the use of heritage crime volunteers, or by generalising heritage crime 
within policing and allocating the crime to NPTs. 
 
Analysis also revealed that the FOI responses were indicative of broader 
misunderstandings and confusion surrounding the heritage crime officer role. For 
example, the forces which responded with identical information regarding heritage crime 
officers, where one force reached the conclusion that they had a heritage crime officer, 
whilst the other force responded that they did not. Lastly, the ‘patchwork’ spread of 
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heritage crime officers is important to investigate further, and indeed, strongly links to the 
next chapter concerning the victims of heritage crime, as with an unequal spread of 
heritage crime officers across England and Wales; the experiences of the victims of 
heritage crime are likely to vary greatly. 
110  
CHAPTER 6: VICTIM FINDINGS 
 
6.1 : Introduction 
 
This chapter concerns the issues associated with the policing of heritage crime from the 
perspective of the victims of heritage crime in England and Wales, and goes some way to 
answering, RQ2, RQ4, and RQ5. Exploring how police officers understand, become aware 
of, perceive and respond to victims of heritage crime (RQ2), is a key component of this 
thesis, and understanding victims’ personal experiences are vital in providing a 
comprehensive answer to this question. This chapter will address who the victims of 
heritage crime are and how they understand, perceive and respond to heritage crime 
(RQ4). Collating the perspectives of victims will also help to address RQ5, by informing 
the development of victim focussed mechanisms relating to heritage crime. 
 
Specifically, this chapter explores the responses the 16 victims of heritage crime 
interviewed for this research, received, when engaging with the police about heritage 
crime. It also examines how far these victims feel that police officers in England and 
Wales understand and are aware of heritage crime, and what the police perception of 
heritage crime appears to be from the perspective of the victim. 
 
Firstly, the victims’ experiences of police understandings and perceptions of heritage 
crime, and how these impact upon their response to victims, are explored. Next, the role of 
the PCSO in the policing of and engagement with victims is outlined. Following this, 
heritage crime is situated within some of the wider issues facing modern day policing, 
examining factors such as austerity measures which have inhibited the policing of heritage 
crime, and affected the treatment of victims of the phenomenon. The second section of this 
chapter establishes the issues associated with the reporting and recording of heritage crime 
and goes onto explore who the victims are, and the nature of their experiences. The third 
section interrogates some broader themes, including crime prevention and heritage crime 
occurring out of ignorance. Finally, the chapter concludes with a selection of victim 
focussed recommendations of how to improve police practice in relation to the area. For 
this phase of the research, 16 interviews were conducted with victims of heritage crime 
across England and Wales, eight from England and eight from Wales. 
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6.2 : Alliance to Reduce Crime Against Heritage (ARCH) 
 
As mentioned in section 4.2.1, ARCH is a voluntary, cross-collaborative network which 
draws partners together in order to prevent and tackle heritage crime. Similar to the police 
officers, victims were also asked if they had ever heard of ARCH, and whether it had 
proved useful in achieving its aims. Of the 16 victims interviewed, 14 were unaware of 
ARCH’s existence. For the two victims who were aware of ARCH, it appeared that little 
had been achieved through signing up to ARCH and that the direction of the initiative was 
unclear: “There’s a lot of intentions. I think what we were all hoping, those that agreed to 
sign it, was...the actual signing of something was very simple” (Victim 4). Indeed, it was 
evident that although police forces and victims had signed up to join ARCH, the initiative 
lacked strong leadership and defined aims and objectives, leading to its eventual 
stagnation. Moreover, it transpired that the pressure to join ARCH upon parties was not 
well received, and had a negative impact upon parties joining up: 
 
“…I dunno if it was English Heritage or somebody, but they tried to 
impose it [ARCH]. Because there wasn’t that sense of custodianship 
amongst the people they were trying to get on board. It was seen as a 
bureaucratic imposition from outside rather than something organic, 
from within’ (Victim 16) 
 
 
Clearly therefore, there had to be a strong motivation from potential parties to get involved 
in ARCH, a motivation which could not be manufactured, and stemmed from a deep sense 
of ownership over and desire to protect and preserve the heritage site/s or asset/s they 
cared for. 
 
6.3 : Police understanding, perception and awareness of heritage crime: 
 
Victims were asked if they thought that police officers and their local police force 
understood heritage crime, and how these officers had responded to heritage crime when it 
had occurred. It transpired from the interviews that the overall understanding, awareness 
and perception of heritage crime amongst police officers and staff was poor. Four reasons 
were identified: lack of understanding and awareness of heritage crime, lack of follow-up, 
downgrading the severity and validity of heritage crime, and the role of call handlers as 
gatekeepers. However, some examples of good practice did emerge, in which officers 
were knowledgeable on heritage crime, passionate about the area, and considerate of 
victims. 
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6.3.1 : Lack of understanding and awareness of heritage crime 
 
 
Victims in both England and Wales revealed how the police officers they had encountered 
showed a clear lack of understanding and awareness of heritage crime. For the 10 victims 
who had had police officers respond in person to the crime they reported2, the attending 
officers demonstrated a clear lack of knowledge and awareness surrounding heritage 
crime: “…it [heritage crime] was a very small part of their job. They were not very well 
informed” (Victim 13). The response the victims received from the police was usually 
substandard, as officers struggled to comprehend exactly why heritage crime was 
important “…the response of the police was very poor…they just really couldn’t be 
bothered to look into it seriously” (Victim 9) and stumbled over of the less ‘normal’ 
aspects of heritage crime (such as an absence of evidence). 
 
Officers displayed a distinct lack of knowledge. This meant that four victims had to 
introduce attending officers to the concept of heritage crime after the incident had 
occurred, reiterating to these officers that what had happened to the site or asset was 
indeed a crime. Victim 1 recalled how, after a particularly devastating incident in which 
the asset had clearly been almost completely destroyed, he was forced to explain to the 
investigating officers the impact of the offence and that it was, in fact, a heritage crime: 
 
“The two officers that came out to start the initial investigation, both 
had never really heard anything about heritage crime at all…And I was 
going “Oh-this is a heritage crime actually” And that was [met with] 
“Oh…we don’t really know what that is.” Errr…it didn’t get that sort 
of, they didn’t really [say] “Oh, well it isn’t criminal damage, it’s that” 
there was this “We don’t really know what heritage crime is so we’re 
just gonna consider it as a criminal damage”…But then when you 
actually start talking about it [the officers realise] you know what, this 
is heritage crime…they just didn’t have the knowledge to go “Ah okay, 
yes okay fine we can note that down” (Victim 1). 
 
 
It is unreasonable to expect every officer to understand or possess an equal level of 
knowledge of heritage crime. Nevertheless, this lack of knowledge meant that the officers 
in question were not adequately equipped with the skills, and crucially, the confidence, to 
pursue a heritage crime focussed investigation. Victim 9 described a similar experience, 
 
 
2 It is worth noting that six interviewees engaged solely with PCSOs and did not encounter police officers, 
which is explored later in this chapter 
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and also felt that the police did not know how to proceed when encountering a heritage 
crime: 
 
“I don’t think they know what to do with it. When I went to make a 
statement about the nighthawks, she said “Well what crime has been 
committed here?” and I said “Well its heritage, its vandalism…” and 
said “How do you mean?” and I said “Well, when they’re digging into 
the ground, they’re actually disturbing the archaeological 
context”…[officer replies] “Oh yes, that’s a good one” [mimes writing 
down notes rapidly]” (Victim 9). 
 
 
Moreover, one victim described how the lack understanding and awareness of heritage 
crime which many police officers had, manifested itself in an inability to comprehend why 
heritage crime was such a serious offence. This lack of understanding was further 
compounded by a refusal to listen to the following victim, who understood the crime 
better than the officer did, and cited relevant legislation which clearly illustrated that what 
had occurred was a criminal act: 
 
“I’ve had a bike, come down the X, channelled a massive groove down 
the [heritage site] the police officers have come here and said: “Well 
they’re not doing any harm are they?” “They’ve just archaeologically 
dug a Scheduled Ancient Monument, it’s a criminal act.” [officer 




However, a key issue which police officers face when understanding and perceiving 
heritage crime as a ‘real’ crime, is that many of the offences which occur on heritage sites 
and assets would not otherwise be regarded as crime, or at least would not carry the 
gravity they do on heritage sites and assets, as Victim 3 explained: 
 
“…but, the problem is, is that the crimes that are happening here as 
well, if they happened elsewhere they wouldn’t be a crime. If you pulled 
your back brake on a BMX track and turfed that up, it’s what it’s there 
for. If you did it down the ditches around the car park, although it’s a 
bit of a hindrance to the council because they might have to come and 
grass seed it or whatever, it’s not a crime. It’s a crime here” (Victim 
3). 
 
This contrast, where in one place a particular action is criminal and in one place it is not, is 
arguably a contributing factor to the lack of understanding among officers. As the officers 
in this research stressed, they are looking for clear-cut crimes, reflecting the black and 
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white approach to crime which is taught in initial training (see 4.2.1). Where a crime is 
sometimes a crime in certain places but not in others, this will inevitably confuse some 
officers. 
 
Although heritage crime is a marginalised area of policing, it is concerning that the 
victims found themselves responsible for informing police officers that the incident they 
were investigating was criminal in nature (particularly as heritage crime is an umbrella 
term for a myriad of recognisable crimes with which officers are already familiar). It is 
arguable that the poor treatment of victim stems from a reluctance amongst police officers 
to engage in an unknown area, and the fact that officers cannot possibly know or 
understand every area of crime, as the officers in this research suggested. However, 
victims in this section also described an unwillingness of police officers to listen, 
sometimes bordering on outright resistance, and refusal to recognise, that heritage crime 
was indeed a crime. 
 
6.3.2 : Follow-up 
 
 
When the police responded to reports of heritage crime, a recurring problem the victims 
encountered was a lack of official follow-up: “Because there’s never a follow-up. I 
haven’t had a follow-up” (Victim 9). The lack of follow-up was especially frustrating 
when police officers would attend the crime, respond well, and then disappear: “…when 
there are issues, the police tend to respond. But when it comes to the follow-up with it, 
that’s where we certainly have problems. And trying to get them to engage with it is the 
real issue…” (Victim 4). 
 
Five victims were aware that without any of the key elements of a police investigation 
such as witnesses, suspects, or sufficient evidence; the options for the police would be 
limited. Therefore, they anticipated and accepted that the probability of the police 
following up the cases they had reported would be minimal. Yet, even when the police 
were quite literally handed evidence of a heritage crime occurring, this was no guarantee 
that they would provide any form of follow-up: 
 
“…with respect to the police, I further informed the police when more 
information came to my notice, and received no response at all. They 
never got in touch. I specifically went to the local police station with 
typed up information, photographs…” (Victim 2). 
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While the victims understood the difficulties officers may experience in investigating, the 
lack of any form of follow-up/inconsistent follow-up was strongly felt to be a product of 
the limited awareness of heritage crime amongst officers. 
 
6.3.3 : Downgrading the severity and validity of heritage crime 
 
 
The participating officers in this research explained how the lack of an immediate human 
victim associated with heritage crime, and the unlikelihood of the crime conforming to the 
notion of ‘real’ police work, would result in regular officers mentally downgrading the 
severity and validity of heritage crime (see 4.2.1). Victims, too, reported instances where 
police officers would overtly downgrade the severity and validity of heritage crime. 
However, the reasons the victims cited for police officers downgrading the severity and 
validity of heritage crime, were slightly different than those which the participating 
officers suggested. 
 
Two victims explained how they felt that the police organisation (including PCSOs) 
assumed that heritage bodies and church bodies were in receipt of enough funding, to 
mean that heritage crime was not a devastating issue for these parties, and could be 
remedied without police involvement. Victim 1 explained how a PCSO appeared to think 
that heritage crime was the responsibility of the heritage body, due to the perceived greater 
resources available to heritage bodies to tackle heritage crime incidents. To this PCSO, 
heritage crime was not a police problem: 
 
Victim 1: “We’ve always had a relatively good strong relationship 
with the local PCSOs...and I’ve had a few meetings with them, but I 
almost got the impression that was on the basis of we are not looking 
good on the crime statistics so therefore what are we doing about it. 
And I think there was a bit of emphasis of it being pushed back onto us 
to deal with the problem, which…I think in hindsight we should have 
pushed back a little bit more to say actually this is a wider policing 
problem and not just a what we can physically do to stop it because 
you know, if you look at the metal theft, we are a bit limited on what 
we can do, like we said, where do we put alarms and so on…” 
 
Researcher: “So do you think this is symptomatic of austerity 
policing, or more of an attitude thing? 
 
Victim 1: “Ummm, no, no, I think the initial thing was a bit of an 
attitude problem actually…they see X as a commercial organisation, 
and a business, and therefore actually, what are you doing about 
these issues in your area…” 
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Victim 14 detailed an almost identical scenario. In this victim’s experience, there appeared 
to be an assumption from the attending police officers that churches and church bodies 
were well funded. Subsequently, this led the officers to believe that heritage crime was not 
particularly impactful upon churches. As Victim 14 described: 
 
“…because they think “Oh well, it’s the CofE, they have loads of 
money” and it’s like “Well it’s a redundant church, its actually not 
owned by the CofE anymore, and the CofE might have lots of money, 




These findings are indicative of a perception that the heritage sector, and church bodies, 
are inherently wealthy, to those outside of these sectors (such as police officers), perhaps 
because they largely reflect and display (primarily) elite heritage. As these victims 
explained however, austerity measures have affected the heritage sector, just as they have 
the policing sector, but the perception that heritage bodies have huge resource appears to 
have prevailed. Consequentially, it appears that attitudes deriving from this perception 
have impacted directly upon police response and treatment of these victims. 
 
On occasion, officers informed victims that what had occurred on their site or asset was 
not a crime. Three victims described how they had been told by attending officers that the 
incidents which they had reported were in fact, not crimes at all. In one case, police 
officers had even argued with one of the interviewees: 
 
“If I’m telling that police officer that it’s a crime to dick on this site, 
regardless of if they know it, they should be taking that as gospel so 
that’s protracted to the people that’re doing the damage…otherwise, 
I’ve had police officers arguing with me, in front of the people that are 
doing the crime, so those people that have done the crime just see it 





Undeniably, such reactions delegitimise a victim’s lived experiences. This behaviour was 
particularly distressing and frustrating for victims, as heritage crime covers a range of 
perfectly valid crimes which require police attention. As officers inwardly downgraded the 
importance of heritage crime, they appeared to disengage, deciding that heritage crime 
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was not worth police time; simultaneously delegitimising the victim and treating them 
inadequately. 
 
6.3.4 : Call handlers as gatekeepers 
 
 
Call handlers could also delegitimise and invalidate victim status. Call handlers were 
usually the first contact that victims had with the police, and five victims explained how 
call handlers would often dismiss the crimes they attempted to report, closing crimes 
down and removing the possibility of access to the police, as Victim 1 illustrated: 
 
“For all of the other incidents that we’ve had, whether it be lead thefts, 
or ASB, we had very little, in fact we had no police response to it, other 
than a crime number. Because the immediate question always comes up 
“Have you got CCTV?” and of course our answer is usually “No” 
because where we have got CCTV is not necessarily covering those 
areas…So ultimately, it almost rules you out, you’re given a crime 
number and they then close it down” (Victim 1). 
 
 
Assessing whether a victim requires a police response by determining if they have crime 
prevention methods which, as discussed in section 2.5.2, can rarely be applied to heritage 
sites and assets due to the damage associated with installing them; immediately rules out 
any form of police response. This suggests that the call handler was using a strict call- 
script, which could not account for the anomalies that heritage crime callers would 
present, such as an inability to use crime prevention on many sites and assets. Whilst the 
use of a call script is not the call handlers’ fault, call handlers still acted as gatekeepers to 
the police response, thereby abrogating legitimate victims of crime. 
 
6.3.5 : Good police practice relating to heritage crime 
 
 
Good practice relating to heritage crime generally stemmed from police officers having a 
genuine interest in the area (as officers predicted in Chapter 4). The victims revealed that 
engaging with officers who were interested in heritage or heritage crime, resulted in them 
receiving a far better response than officers who displayed little interest in the area. 
Officers who expressed an interest in heritage crime, or an affinity for their local heritage 
sites and assets, possessed a greater motivation to engage with heritage crime than their 
colleagues did: 
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“…it can be when an officer who is particularly interested in heritage 
crime is what drives something...For a good while, probably several 
years ago now, we had some potential metal detectorists around 
X…And this one policeman was interested in the site, he knew the site, 
he managed to track down the individuals and, well, not formally 
cautioned [them] as he didn’t actually catch them in the crime, but they 
were warned, they were known and warned from the areas and so far 
we haven’t had a repeat” (Victim 4). 
 
 
Evidently, an officer invested in the area would put more effort into pursuing a heritage 
crime case than an uninterested officer, as they were personally incentivised to do so. 
However, a positive response from the police was not always dependent upon an officer’s 
interest or motivation to police heritage crime. Victim 15 described how he had received a 
prompt and compassionate police response from officers who had responded to his report 
of a heritage crime, for the following two reasons. Firstly, the officers were local, their 
station being a five-minute drive from the heritage asset in question. Secondly, these 
officers also possessed a good level of awareness of the heritage asset (not heritage crime 
itself). The asset was not only visually prominent within the town and therefore almost 
impossible to be ignorant of, but more importantly, the asset was based on the local 
officer’s patrol route [on foot and by car]. While the officers might not have understood 
the historical significance of the asset, they were very much aware of it and recognised its 
importance to both the victim and local community: 
 
“One is our local PCSO, and the others [police officers] are based 
around, obviously [police station] is not very far away. So they 
obviously do know the church, and it’s part of their routine circling 
around when they do their patrols. So they’re well aware of us. And, 
no, I can only say that they looked after us as best they could, and they 
did it well” (Victim 15). 
 
 
This example proves that a personal interest and understanding of heritage crime are not 
necessary prerequisites of positive police responses to the crime. Good responses from 
police officers can be driven by a combination of factors unrelated to heritage crime, such 
as the proximity of heritage sites and assets to an officer’s patrol routes. Recognition too, 
that heritage sites and assets are important to communities, or the inability to ignore said 
sites or assets if they are financially integral to the local area, also impact upon how 
officers treat heritage crimes: “…I mean, they certainly recognise that places like X and X 
are [important]. They’re the only thing that keeps the bread on the table. So I think they 
appreciate that” (Victim 10). 
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Overall, the level of understanding and awareness of heritage crime across England and 
Wales was very limited. There were exceptions to this, however. One victim who had 
been subject to heritage crime in both England and Wales, was well positioned to compare 
the police response in each country. This victim argued that they had received a better 
response in Wales than in England for numerous reasons, including Welsh officers 
expressing more sympathy, and responding more efficiently, than their English 
counterparts. Perhaps the most important reason cited by the victim was the fact that the 
police officers in Wales did not display such a defeatist and nonchalant attitude towards 
heritage crime incidents: 
 
“I would say that my experience in Wales is different…the police were 
there [attended the reported heritage crime], and they took 
photographs, and, they didn’t find anybody, they couldn’t do anything, 
but they did seem more responsive, I would have said. And maybe more 
sympathetic as well. And it got picked up by lots of local newspapers as 
well, which is helpful I suppose. And that is something that’s different, I 
think, here [England]. You know, a lot of the time in England, with lead 
theft and roof covering theft, it’s almost like the accepted fate of these 
things...it does seem that way, that you know, that “Well, what do you 
expect” kind of” (Victim 14). 
 
 
Whilst a personal interest and motivation in heritage or heritage crime were generally 
where good police responses to heritage crime stemmed from, this section has shown that 
these are not always essential. Victims did not strictly need an officer who held either of 
the aforementioned attributes, they simply wanted officers to afford heritage crime the 
same level of care they offered to the other crimes they attended: “But all we want 
somebody to do is take an interest” (Victim 9), instead of being left feeling isolated and 
unsupported. 
 
6.4 : Policing: the role of the PCSO 
 
 
The importance of PCSOs to the victims of heritage crime was not to be underestimated. 
PCSOs filled the policing gap in relation to heritage crime, where police officers could 
not: “X and X [PCSOs] have done so much for us…they’re extremely helpful” (Victim 6). 
Benefits of liaising with PCSOs as opposed to police officers reported by the interviewees 
included: the easier facilitation of regular contact with PCSOs (which resulted in 
meaningful relationships being built between parties), swifter responses from PCSOs that 
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impacted directly upon the heritage sites or assets (such as increasing patrols or altering 
their patrolling habits) and lastly, the fact that PCSOs demonstrated a far better 
understanding of the impact heritage crime could have, particularly upon the local 
community. 
 
Nine victims reported a very productive relationship with their local PCSO/s: “I get on 
very well with the PCSO that we’ve got now” (Victim 12). Almost universally, these 
victims attributed their good experiences to their PCSOs, who provided a positive and 
understanding response to heritage crime. PCSOs were often more accessible than police 
officers, and would happily attempt to reduce low-level crime (such as ASB and minor 
vandalism) by making their presence more known on heritage sites, usually in the form of 
increasing patrols: “In the past when we were having a lot of this [low level crime] we did 
liaise with the community police team. Who then put up extra patrols” (Victim 7). Victims 
also # reported being able to engage more directly with PCSOs through local surgeries the 
PCSOs held. Indeed, such direct engagement led one victim to acquiring the direct number 
of his local PCSO, who the victim would occasionally ask to monitor the heritage site he 
was looking after whilst it was being excavated, which the PCSOs readily did: 
 
“I mean, I used to have the direct numbers of the PCSOs, and that was 
useful. Particularly, when we were doing the excavations, we were 
worried that we would get people up there at night-time and things like 
that. And we had a really good relationship with the PCSOs at the time, 
so I would say “You know, do you mind just going up there and having 
a look and see if you spot anything?” and they would say “Yeah, just 
give us a call”” (Victim 11). 
 
 
In this way, PCSOs also proved instrumental in alleviating the fears of victims of heritage 
crime and provided a clear and reassuring presence through their accessibility and 
visibility. Another important role PCSOs played was their ability to improve victim 
satisfaction, negating the negative treatment victims had received prior to the PCSOs 
involvement. For example, Victim 3 had experienced poor treatment from police officers, 
but this treatment had improved dramatically when a PCSO had volunteered to become a 
heritage crime officer in his local force and began building a relationship with Victim 3: 
 
 
“It changed immensely. The reason for this is because we had the 
backup. We had that essential support. We had someone that we could 
go to. We had someone that could advise us. We had someone that was 
coming down here on a regular basis, showing the X Police badge, 
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proving that actually the problems we were having down here are a 
problem…And that’s where X was different. He spoke to us, and he 
heard us, and listened. Whereas other people just spoke at us, told us 
what we can and can’t do, what they can’t do for us cause funding was 
running out, and then we never saw them again” (Victim 3). 
 
 
PCSOs proved instrumental in repairing the fraught relationship between this victim and 
the police force in question, as well as the negative opinion of the police more generally 
which had been generated from the latter. Furthermore, in being firmly embedded within 
the community, PCSOs appeared to be willing to engage with the victims of heritage 
crime more than police officers. This is possibly due to PCSOs having more dedicated 
time within their job role for direct engagement with the community than police officers 
do (Sutherland, 2014). 
 
From the victim’s point of view, the only downside of PCSOs filling the policing gap was 
that they could change quite regularly. This meant that victims had to rebuild the 
relationship they had spent time creating, with the replacement PCSO, as well as hopefully 
ensuring that the new PCSO understood the site as well as the previous individual: 
 
“…the PCSOs, for example, change quite regularly. So you get to 
know someone, and they get to know the site, and then they leave, and 
you get someone else in who doesn’t know the site as well…And I 
mean, good for them, because they’re moving up the police force, but in 
another respect it’s like you know, when they do leave, it’s like, ah, 
okay, we’ve gotta kind of cultivate another relationship” (Victim 11). 
 
 
Nevertheless, this disadvantage was considered minimal in comparison to the merits of 
liaising with PCSOs, as opposed to police officers. 
 
6.5 : Framing heritage crime within wider policing issues: austerity 
policing 
 
Victims were not asked directly about austerity measures within policing, but the topic 
arose in each interview, either through discussions surrounding police responses to 
heritage crime or because the victims were grappling with austerity measures themselves. 
Although the topic of austerity arose unintentionally, it was considered important to 
extract this theme (and subthemes) from the interviews. Situating the responses victims 
received from police officers within the current austerity-led environment in policing, is 
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contextually important (Dodd, 2019a), and may provide greater insight into how funding 
cuts have impacted upon treatment of victims more generally. 
 
Every interviewee was highly conscious of the monetary difficulties currently facing 
modern policing: “I do know the police are stretched. I know all these types of things” 
(Victim 14). In particular, the victims who were employed by heritage bodies empathised 
with the funding struggles facing police forces in England and Wales, having had personal 
experience of the consequences of budgetary constraints; which in some cases increased 
the vulnerability of the sites and assets they cared for: 
 
“And I hinted with my HQ to have CCTV put on site, but obviously the 
cost implications are tremendous for them. Because nothing bad has 
happened yet...it’s a Catch 22. Resources are low, so wait for 
something bad to happen and we’ll do it, but you need to do something 
once something bad has happened anyway” (Victim 8). 
 
 
Good responses from the police were also couched in the knowledge that the police had 
limited resources, and therefore such responses were not always guaranteed and could be 
circumstantial: “We were fortunate…we know how police resources are stretched…but if 
they’d been somewhere else on another call, it might not have been so blunt” (Victim 15). 
 
6.5.1 : Heritage crime and policing priorities 
 
 
All 16 victims expressed an understanding that crimes which did not have an immediate 
victim would rarely be a police priority, unless in extreme cases. This view echoed the 
comments made by the heritage practitioners and police officers. Ten victims argued that 
this was primarily due to the absence of an immediate human victim in cases of heritage 
crime: “…I know the police have got no money. There is no danger to people. For the 
police a monument is not people. So it is not a priority” (Victim 8). In Victim 9’s 
experience, individual officers were concerned about heritage crime, but resourcing meant 
that heritage crime was simply not a priority for his local force to respond to: “It’s just 
resource. It’s basically a case of we’ll send somebody when we can. Individually, yes, they 
are concerned. But it doesn’t seem to be a priority” (Victim 9). 
 
The victims also contextualised the fact that heritage crime was unlikely to be a police 
priority in comparison to the other issues that their local areas were facing. The seemingly 
innocuous nature of heritage crime meant that it was unlikely to be urgently responded to: 
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“But again, there’s so many issues in the area...the fact that someone’s digging a couple 
of holes into an enormous site isn’t, I don’t think, particularly high on their agenda” 
(Victim 11). 
 
As discussed in section 4.4.1, police forces and officers are under huge pressure, which 
has only increased with continued budget cuts. Forces must make hard decisions about 
which crimes demand an immediate response. Explaining this to victims helped them to 
understand why heritage crime was so low down in terms of police priorities. In Wales, 
one victim had been able to meet with the local Inspector, who explained how crimes that 
demand a more immediate response in terms of harm and vulnerability, but may not 
always be visible to the public, will be prioritised over crimes without a human victim or 
‘minor’ low level local issues: 
 
“…we’ve spoken to the local Inspector about these issues, and he’s 
made it quite clear that the police have got priorities on organised 
criminal gangs, modern day slavery, domestic violence…. People tend 
to raise issues about parking and speeding and things like that, and 
although that’s important to local people, it’s not what the main 
business of the police is about…” (Victim 12). 
 
 
This victim further explained how the Inspector had shown him a diagram of an iceberg in 
order to demonstrate where priorities were focussed, and that the police’s lack of response 
to heritage crime was not due to wilful neglect. This was a particularly helpful exchange, 
as it offered Victim 12 clarity as to why heritage crime was not being prioritised: “Yeah-if 
there’s been a fire in a bread oven [on the site]…it did fracture one of the stones, but it’s 
never to feature as a priority as far as the police are concerned” (Victim 12). 
 
Finally, a key point raised by one victim concerned how police perception of heritage sites 




“They probably would have [attended] if it was art in a museum, or 
jewels in a big glass showcase…I think they would’ve gone to that. But 
because you can’t put a value on it, you can’t say “That cost this 
much” it’s very difficult for them to prioritise it for their…in what they 
have to deliver, and their targets…” (Victim 5). 
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Victim 5’s assumption is particularly interesting in light of Officer 6’s comments 
concerning the theft of an object from a museum, which his colleagues automatically 
perceived as a heritage crime, and yet did not perceive illegal metal detecting as a heritage 
crime (thinking the latter was just a hole). Additionally, this quote illustrates that the 
victim was keenly aware of how modern policing functions within a target driven 
environment, where measurement and quantification are now a quintessential part of any 
officer’s role. The inability to place any sort of monetary value on the site in question and 
to quantify the damage that had occurred, led Victim 5 to believe that the police have little 
incentive to prioritise heritage crime; where the value of heritage can be impossible to 
quantify and the unrecordable nature of heritage crime cannot contribute to target driven 
goals. 
 
6.5.2 : Victims de-victimising themselves 
 
 
Whilst all of the victims considered themselves victims, one concerning trend which 
emerged from was how victims tended to ‘de-victimise’ themselves. Indeed, 11 victims 
accepted the subpar police treatment and response to heritage crime, citing their awareness 
of the struggles police officers were facing without sufficient resources as their reason for 
doing so: “And I think, with so much other crime and stuff going on, it’s difficult to give it 
the attention it needs. It is difficult for them, I can sympathise. Nobody was in immediate 
danger” (Victim 5). After heritage crime had occurred, four of these 11 almost 
immediately resigned themselves to the fact that the police would be unlikely to achieve 
anything: “I suppose I was sad, but I had low expectations. I had low expectations the 
police could do anything” (Victim 2). Repeatedly, victims couched their expectations of 
the police in certain parameters, such as their knowledge of the budget cuts which were 
affecting police forces in England and Wales, for example: “…if they had more resources, 
yeah, they could do a lot more, and we could ask a lot more of them” (Victim 10). In doing 
so, these victims did not assert their victim status and were instead rescinding their status 
as a victim, despite being legitimate victims of legitimate crimes. 
 
Austerity measures and their impact upon policing appear to have firmly permeated public 
discourse regarding policing and impacted upon victims’ perceptions of policing and what 
they expect of police officers. The police officers interviewed for this research described 
the impact that austerity measures were having on their practice (see 4.4.1); heritage crime 
was being squeezed in where it could. Nevertheless, austerity measures should not be 
synonymous with the inconsistent and often inconsiderate treatment victims received from 
125  
officers. Indeed, Victim 3, who had repeatedly experienced bad police treatment in the 
past, argued that: 
 
“…if they say it’s down to funds and all this, and officers are being 
retracted, whatever…but it shouldn’t make the police officer care any 
less. If there’s a police officer that’s turned up here, then they need to 
do the job to the best of their abilities.” (Victim 3). 
 
 
6.6 : Reporting of heritage crime 
 
All interviewees identified various issues associated with the reporting of heritage crime. 
Issues related to the reporting of heritage crime included: underreporting, difficulties 
explaining heritage crime to call handlers, and reporting heritage crime internally. 
 
6.6.1 : Reporting: the underreporting of heritage crime by victims 
 
 
Although heritage crime may appear to be being underreported in the opinions of officers, 
most victims in this study assiduously reported offences, regardless of the police response 
they received. The exception was Victim 3, who had refrained from reporting heritage 
crime in the past due to a lack of confidence in the police, which had been caused by the 
continuous poor treatment this victim had received when attempting to report heritage 
crime. Whilst the police response to and treatment of Victim 3 had since improved (he 
now reported all crime which occurred) the previous response was so poor that Victim 3 
simply never reported the crime: 
 
“Oh bloody hell it’s not you again.” That was the attitude about two 
years ago. We just didn’t report it because there was no point…the 
uniform has let me down. Why should I bother reporting every bit of 
crime if nothing’s done?” (Victim 3). 
 
 
This quote clearly demonstrates how impactful negative police attitudes towards heritage 
crime can be (see 6.3). Presumably, limited understanding, awareness, and poor perception 
of heritage crime resulted in a victim who was not only let down, but who also completely 
ceased reporting heritage crime. Overall, the victims described how they would always try 
to report heritage crime, regardless of the police response, out of a ‘moral obligation’ they 
took from their position as caretakers of the heritage asset or site: 
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“I think we would report it irrespective of their attitude or their 
response in any particular situation. We are wardens, stewards of the 
building, and the surrounds, for the community and whatever we may 
feel about police response time, say, we would still feel that we had to 
report it and would do so” (Victim 15). 
 
 
This kind of commitment was echoed across every interview. The strong sense of 
responsibility victims felt towards what they viewed as ‘their’ heritage sites and assets 
eclipsed any potential doubts, or scepticism, about whether the reporting of heritage crime 
was actually effective, or indeed if regular reporting had any bearing on the police 
response to heritage crime. Indeed, this approach was observed in practice from Victim 
14, who, despite lacking confidence in the police, was not dissuaded from reporting 
heritage crime. Instead, the substandard police response made this victim more determined 
for reported heritage crime to be responded to properly. This led Victim 14 to create a 
script for colleagues, to ensure that they would receive a consistent police response: 
 
Victim 14: “…when there was a heritage crime reported, or we 
discovered something, there was a script that they had, that you had to 
use to speak to the police, so you would say “It’s a designated asset” 
“It’s this that and the other”…you had to say that it was a designated 
heritage asset and that you were reporting a heritage crime…and then 
there was a form that we had made that you had to fill in, you know 
what type of damage was it, and obviously trying to get the crime 
reference number and the police officers, you know... 
 
Researcher: Their collar number? 
Victim 14: Yes 
Researcher: That’s a clever idea. Because then you have somebody that 
is held accountable… 
 
Victim 14: Exactly, and that’s exactly what we’d do, and this was really 
developed out of [the police] having said “Yeah we’ll send someone 
out” and nothing ever happening. And never being able to follow 
through.” 
 
Whilst a script seemed effective insofar as the response of the police improved, the onus 
fell on the victim to devise a mechanism which would receive a consistent and maintained 
response from the police. Such experiences also corroborate with the views of the 
interviewed police officers, who believed that police forces did not take heritage crime 
seriously. It became apparent that were two complex factors which contributed to heritage 
crime being underreported: the reporting of heritage crime internally, and difficulties with 
explaining heritage crime to call handlers. 
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6.6.2 : Reporting heritage crime internally 
 
 
The internal reporting procedures within many heritage bodies meant that heritage crime 
was underreported simply because it failed to reach the police. Three victims, who were 
employed by such bodies, explained that instances of heritage crime they had encountered 
were seldom reported. For example, Victim 8 explained that if a heritage crime had 
occurred, he would file a report internally, which were collated over time and then sent to 
a senior staff member who would meet to discuss the crimes with the police: “So every 
time we see a heritage crime, we file a report, and the report is sent to HQ. And I believe, 
every month, one of our managers meet with the police and discuss them” (Victim 8). 
These three victims did agree that an exception to reporting straight to their heritage body 
as opposed to the police, would be in cases where a very severe heritage crime might be 
occurring in front of them. However, it was clear that although there were standardised 
reporting methods to follow within the heritage bodies, these reporting processes could be 
subject to personal interpretation by the victims themselves. These victims worked very 
independently and thus had a great deal of autonomy. Therefore, they were the individuals 
who decided if a heritage crime was serious enough to report to the police: “But we do 
have a policy on sort of near misses, so you say, er, somebody tried to do something, but 
we were able to stop them before they did it, or we were able to clean it off, then that’s 
considered a near miss” (Victim 10). 
 
Of course, this autonomy could also result in discrepancies in reporting practices with 
regards to heritage crime: “It’s quite difficult. Because we’re all different…Some people in 
my job are quite strict and follow all of the rules to the point, and they file a lot of reports, 
and call the police a lot of times” (Victim 8). 
 
Assets and sites owned by local councils could also have specific internal reporting 
systems. Victim 7, who chaired a charity which looked after an asset owned by the local 
council, described how they had been told to follow a specific reporting procedure. All 
crimes were initially reported to the council, who would then decide if the crime, once 
reported, was passed onto the police: “That’s the format that we’ve been given. We will 
report to the council, and then the council will report to the police, if it’s perceived to be 
criminal activity” (Victim 7). 
128  
Victim 7 went on to explain that the council would provide him with a reason as to why 
the crime had or had not been passed onto the police. Although it is understandable that 
sites owned by councils and heritage bodies must have their own reporting systems in 
place (to collect their own data on crime), this indirect form of reporting could inhibit 
police understandings and perceptions of heritage crime. Dealing with heritage crime 
internally and not reporting all incidents to the police, prevents the police from building up 
a problem-orientated picture, as Victim 11 summarised: “You’ve still got to phone them, 
you’ve still got to phone 101 or whatever, and report the crimes as they happen. Because 
it’s that kind of volume over time, that’ll make...that’ll raise the profile of heritage crime 
and the site” (Victim 11). 
 
Thus, when heritage crime is reported, this could lead officers to believe that the incident 
is rare, downgrading the severity of heritage crime not just because of the absent human 
victim, but also because internal data does not reflect the volume of crime actually 
occurring on the site or asset. As explained in section 4.6, although the incident would not 
be recorded as a heritage crime, it would be instead recorded as a specific type of offence, 
leaving an internal record of reoccurring crime on the heritage site or asset. 
 
6.6.3 : Call handlers: explaining the unknown 
 
 
The interviews revealed that a key, recurring, reason behind underreporting stemmed from 
a lack of understanding on the part of call handlers when the victims reported heritage 
crime via 101 or 999. Victims would attempt to report heritage crime, but the call handlers 
receiving the call failed to understand what heritage crime was, sometimes outright 
challenging the victims or even telling them that heritage crime could not be considered as 
a crime: “The call centre would be like “I’m really sorry X, but we’re not gonna send an 
officer because this isn’t a crime…”” (Victim 3). Therefore, whilst heritage crime may 
appear to be going unreported, it appears that recording, rather than reporting, is the crux 
of this issue, for two reasons. Firstly, call handlers were unable to record heritage crime on 
internal police recording systems, as there is no heritage crime category. Secondly, call 
handlers were refusing to recognise heritage crime as a crime, and therefore not recording 
heritage crime under another crime category (such as criminal damage, theft); thereby 
giving the illusion that heritage crime was being underreported. For example, Victim 5 
described how an individual had phoned the police as a heritage crime was occurring on 
the site which Victim 5 was responsible for, but had been unable to express the severity of 
the heritage crime rapidly and succinctly to the call handler: 
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“And so she saw it and called it in the police. But she was trying to 
explain to the person at the other end of the phone at 101 what was 
happening and she said that she felt really silly because it’s a really 
important thing, but how do you put that across in a phone call? And 
you can kind of understand to us it [heritage asset] means a hell of a 
lot, but when you try to put it into words, what it means, it was a bit like 
“Hmmmm?” [sceptical tone from call handlers]. So yeah, that was one 
of the interesting things where somebody was like “What do you mean 
they’re pushing [heritage asset]?” “Like off the top of a wall?” And 
she [caller] was like “No, it’s bigger, its bigger than that!” If 
someone’s not seeing exactly what’s in front of you, it’s a bit difficult to 
communicate…I think in the end she just hung the phone up and left 
them to it…” (Victim 5). 
 
 
In this instance, the impacts of a call handler not understanding nor recognising heritage 
crime were significant. Firstly, the crime was left unreported, as the individual reporting 
the crime was so frustrated that she hung up before anything could be taken down on 
police recording systems. Secondly, by debating with the individual about the crime, this 
wasted valuable time when the call handlers could have escalated the incident: a crime 
was happening during the call, in front of the victim. Lastly, this example illustrates the 
repercussions of the marginalisation of heritage crime within the police. The asset to 
which Victim 5 refers was a prominent and well-known heritage asset within the county. 
Had brief training been provided to the call handler, the asset could have been identified 
over the phone and an appropriate response provided. Instead, in this case, the asset was 
destroyed beyond repair. 
 
6.6.4 : Reporting: discovering heritage crime 
 
 
Fifteen of the 16 victims were unable to monitor the sites they looked after 24 hours a day, 
7 days a week. This led to members of the public often finding heritage crime before the 
victim themselves: “I’m not usually the first person to find it, because I don’t go through 
the park every day. It’s usually somebody like one of my neighbours, or one of the dog 
walkers, who rings me up and says “Oh, you’ll be sad to know…” and then I report it” 
(Victim 6). 
 
An implication of this inability to constantly monitor the heritage sites and assets they 
looked after, was that heritage crime was usually reported after it had happened: “…it’s 
usually reporting it after the deed is done, you know, you come up and see a bloody huge 
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hole” (Victim 9). Again, although this did not prevent all interviewees from reporting 
heritage crime, when they did report the crime, victims were at an immediate 
disadvantage. They were highly conscious of the likelihood that the police were unlikely 
to respond with urgency, or at all, as the crime had already happened and had neither 
human victim nor witnesses: “In the East [side of the church] there was a blind spot 
where the theft happened. The entire left of the chapel went, and a quarter of the church’s 
roof; all done where it couldn’t be seen from the footpath…” (Victim 2). 
 
It was also found that the inability to pinpoint when heritage crime had happened, after it 
eventually was discovered, did prevent two victims from reporting the crime to the police. 
Both victims explained how they felt that the police would be unwilling to investigate a 
crime without any idea of when the crime had been committed: 
 
“…a lot of it goes unreported because we are only here once a fortnight 
on a Sunday regularly…the timeframe to pinpoint any action that’s 
been happening is gone, so before X came along, we didn’t report 
anything. Because I couldn’t give them [the police] a window that’s 




Ultimately, whilst the fifteen victims who did not have constant surveillance (in the form 
of CCTV) attempted to report as much heritage crime as was practical, they agreed that it 
was impossible for every incident of heritage crime to reach them due to factors outside of 
their control. These factors included not only the inability to maintain a constant presence 
at the site(s) or asset(s) of which they took care, but also because there was no guarantee 
that members of the public would be able to recognise that an offence had taken place at 
the site or asset. 
 
 
6.7 : The victims and impact of heritage crime 
 
The victims were asked who they thought the victims of heritage crime were and what the 
impact of heritage crime was. These questions were asked in order to ascertain who the 
victims of heritage crime thought the victims of heritage crime were, and if they 
considered the impact of heritage crime to be as extensive as literature on the topic 
suggests (Grove and Thomas, 2014). In congruence with the heritage practitioners and 
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police officers, the interviewees argued that the victims of the crime were broad and 
encompassed a multitude of persons. 
 
6.7.1 : The victims 
 
 
i) The individual 
 
 
As mentioned in section 6.5.2, the victims interviewed in this research all considered 
themselves to be victims of heritage crime. Therefore, every interviewee strongly believed 
that victims could encompass individual people. Interestingly, one victim argued that the 
victims of heritage crime may also constitute the offenders themselves: 
“I want to say that victims are the ones coming as the offenders…the future belongs to the 
kids even though the kids don’t care that we will lose our monuments” (Victim 8). 
 
From this victim’s point of view, the offender was also a victim, because the majority of 
the offenders, he felt, were unaware that they were committing heritage crime. Therefore, 
by damaging or destroying what was to be their heritage in the future through their current 
actions; the offender simultaneously became the victim. 
 
 
ii) Local community 
 
 
Members of the local community were also believed to be victims of heritage crime: “It’s 
very diffusive, because it affects the whole community” (Victim 2). Heritage assets 
represented: “…something within the community. Life goes on around it, and it’s 
important to a lot of people” (Victim 15), and so when an asset was subject to heritage 
crime, the whole community could be left feeling aggrieved. Indeed, Victim 5 discussed 
how the nature of certain heritage sites and assets could draw every member of the local 
community together regardless of class, in outrage, when heritage crime occurred: 
 
“Yeah, all of our visitors, and people from further afield as well. Very 
wide ranging. I don’t even think…because with some heritage crimes, 
there might be like a divide with the class systems or whatever, with 
some classes caring more about it than others, but here, everybody, no 
matter who you are, is gonna be bothered about this” (Victim 5). 
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Heritage assets were key facets of numerous local communities, and whether or not the 
community recognised the historical value of the heritage assets, they ascribed their own 
personal values to them, meaning that heritage crime had a profound personal impact upon 
most members of the local community. 
 
 
iii) Wider society 
 
 
In common with the responses from the police officers and heritage practitioners, the 
concept of victimhood was extended to wider society: “I think all of us [are victims]. I 
think society” (Victim 16). Universally, the interviewees believed that each member of 
society was a victim of heritage crime “We’re all victims of heritage crime” (Victim 13). 
More specifically, heritage sites and assets were firmly embedded within the lives of a 
wide variety of individuals, including visitors from afar to these sites and assets, holding 
an importance and sense of ownership for these individuals that extended beyond the 
immediate community:“…people get very emotive about X and how it’s being looked 
after…people have historically come here as children and then grown up and brought 
their own children” (Victim 1). Overall, the victims of heritage crime were: “…a little bit 
of everybody” (Victim 8). 
 
 
iv) Future generations 
 
 
Mirroring the responses of the police officers and heritage practitioners, the interviewees 
also felt that future generations were victims of heritage crime. Heritage crime jeopardised 
the ability of future generations to learn about the past: “Future generations is one. Future 
generations who are being denied the opportunity to appreciate and learn about what 
existed in the past” (Victim 12). Furthermore, if heritage crime was so severe that heritage 
was completely destroyed, from the interviewees’ perspectives, this permanent loss was to 
the detriment of future generations, who would lose both tangible and intangible 
connections to the past: “…with the piece of heritage, it’s the memories associated with 
that, and the connections that are broken down and lost to future generations…” (Victim 
4). 
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6.7.2 : The impact of heritage crime 
 
 
All 16 interviewees discussed how the impacts of heritage crime were broad and complex, 
many of which had a ‘ripple effect’, wherein the overall impacts of heritage crime were 
usually far more extensive than the initial crime which had occurred. For example, the 
victims explained how heritage crime could cause a loss of historical context 
(provenance), which is essential for understanding how and why historical assets are 
found where they are: “As soon as you dig something up, you’ve lost the 
context…”(Victim 16). Moreover, victims also suggested that if heritage was lost to crime 
before it could be recorded, there was no way of accurately knowing what had been lost: 
“We don’t know what we’re losing, and that is the real crime if you like” (Victim 13). 
Such impacts are significant, and can be incurred from very minor acts, such as illegal 
metal detecting, which involves the arguably simple act of digging a hole in the ground 
without permission and removing an artefact from the hole. 
 
Another significant impact which resulted from heritage crime cited by the victims, 
included a recognition that heritage crime could be so severe that it would result in the 
permanent loss of heritage sites and assets which: “…leaves us all poorer”(Victim 12). 
Churches were highlighted as specific heritage assets which were part of a larger national 
collection, and their loss through heritage crime was not only cultural, but would also 
erase an architectural legacy: “I find that it’s a cultural loss. They’re part of a national 
collection. I really do think with churches they are the greatest architectural legacy. 
You’re kind of eroding that architectural legacy every time something like this happens” 
(Victim 14). 
 
On a smaller scale, heritage crime caused outrage amongst the local community when it 
occurred, owing to the strong sense of ownership the community felt over ‘their’ local 
heritage site or asset: 
 
“People have a pride in their local heritage. I’m quite surprised 
actually, with how much pride that people take in it, how much 
ownership they feel that they have of it, even if they don’t verbalise that 
a lot of the time. And so, if there is damage to it…then that is usually 
followed by outrage.” (Victim 7). 
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Victims also reported feeling powerless to stop heritage crime, through a frustrating 
combination of the inability to utilise crime prevention methods and a poor police 
response: 
 
“…and there’s also been a huge impact on the staff and volunteers who 
are involved within X…And it’s been kind of, a real morally demoting 
sort of time for everybody, cause everybody just kept seeing incident 
after incident after incident happening, and we were almost left a bit 
powerless to stop it” (Victim 1). 
 
 
Indeed, whole communities could be left feeling helpless after a heritage crime had 
occurred, as they were sometimes powerless to respond in the wake of a heritage crime, 
where the site or asset had been destroyed entirely: 
 
“So I think it’s that thing where a lot of people feel deep ownership 
over this place, and someone has interfered with it and damaged it, and 
it’s kind of that helplessness, I think, cause people are just like “It’s 
gone, and there’s nothing I can do”” (Victim 5). 
 
 
As the impacts of heritage crime were not always immediately apparent to police officers, 
it became clear that conveying these impacts could be extremely difficult. This was further 
complicated by the fact that regular officers may have never considered impacts as 
significant as those associated with heritage crime, prior to encountering a heritage crime. 
Crimes which might appear to be reasonably innocuous and easily resolvable to an officer, 
such as the theft of lead from a church roof (the lead can be replaced with a non-lead 
alternative) could actually lead to the closure-‘death’-of the building itself: “And I would 
say there are cases with churches that don’t have much congregation, something like a 
lead theft, for them to fundraise for that, that can actually be the death of that building. It 
really can, you know?” (Victim 14). 
 
Indeed, many impacts of heritage crime manifested themselves in ways which would not 
be (and possibly never would be) apparent to police officers. For example, heritage crime 
could result in an overall devaluing of history more widely. Assets which were removed 
from where they originated and then sold online (a product of illegal metal detecting in the 
case of the following interviewee) without recourse, could significantly damage the 
public’s perception of the importance of heritage: 
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“I also think it’s a devaluing of history…if we get to the point where all 
we’re interested in is bits of bling and we’re not troubled by how they 
came to be there and what the significance of them is, then it becomes a 
snowball. Because you’re less and less likely to think these things are 
important because they become, well, they’re just items on Ebay that 
look nice. Rather than being something that reflects where someone 
who was hacked to death or where a great political decision was 
decided” (Victim 16). 
 
 
This is an intangible impact which very few officers might consider unless they had an 
interest or educational background in history and heritage 
 
6.7.3 : Emotional impact 
 
 
Officers may also struggle to understand the emotional dimension of heritage crime upon 
victims. Whilst heritage crime is devoid of an immediate human victim, the victims 
interviewed for this research all felt the emotional impact of offences acutely. The strong 
sense of ownership and close connection the victims felt for the sites and assets they cared 
for, alongside a keen awareness of the wider ramifications which could develop from a 
singular instance of heritage crime, was a recurrent theme for victims: “I think X is 
something that a lot of us feel quite strongly about” (Victim 2). 
 
 
More broadly, the local community, who also considered themselves victims in the 
experience of the interviewees, felt a spectrum of emotions after a heritage crime had 
occurred. These feelings ranged from unease and sadness “I think it’s unease. And 
unhappiness” (Victim 15) to despair “So a lot of people’s reactions were “How do we fix 
this?!” and then when you tell them that we can’t, it is gone, they were a bit like “Oh”. 
Quite bereft I think” (Victim 5) and outrage: “…[there was] a whole groundswell of 
outrage on behalf of the church” (Victim 2). Indeed, Victim 11 illustrated how heritage 
crime could have a secondary emotional impact for these local individuals, long after the 
initial heritage crime had occurred: 
 
“…although it is no longer the parish church and hasn’t been for 40, 
50 years, there is a significant group of people who still live in the area 
who remember it being the parish church, and it is a very emotive 
building for people…some people I’ve spoken to have got married 
there, or baptised there, or christened there. So they’ve got this very 
close connection with it, and they also remember it when it was still in 
use, when it had a roof, when it looked beautiful…And so a lot of 
people, when they come up and see the state of it now, where it’s been 
graffitied, or where it’s been damaged by people just picking bits off it, 
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or deliberate destruction in some cases where people are, presumably, 
taking sledgehammers up to it…it’s very very emotional for those 
individuals” (Victim 11). 
 
 
Furthermore, any criminal activity on these sites and assets undermined the hard work, 
time and effort that had been put into taking care of them, heightening the general 
emotional impact upon the victim: “…your heart breaks really. You think; why are we 
doing this? We’ve worked so hard, we’ve raised all this money, and it looked lovely” 
(Victim 6). 
 
6.7.4 : Financial impact 
 
 
Inevitably, heritage crime incurs a financial impact. Every victim believed that the 
financial impact of heritage was secondary to the intangible impacts outlined above: “They 
can say oh yes, this has been smashed…but the actual cost is incalculable really” (Victim 
6). Nonetheless, this did not mean that the financial impact upon the site or asset was not a 
pressing issue. The urgency to repair heritage sites and assets before they were damaged 
further (incurring internal water damage from loss of a church roof, for example) and the 
cost of repairing damaged heritage sites and assets weighed heavily on victims’ minds, to 
the extent that the financial impact directly impacted upon the physical health of Victim 2, 
in the form of sleeping troubles: 
 
“Sleepless nights...certainly in the period before the insurance said 
they were going to repair it, I was you know, really really worried that 
somehow, because we’re in an extremely poor area, we haven’t got, 
you know, wealthy benefactors who are gonna say “Oh here take ten 
grand towards the cost” It’s really an uphill struggle” (Victim 2). 
 
 
Seemingly mindless damage, undertaken rapidly, resulted in financial ramifications and a 
lengthy repair process which dwarfed the initial crime: “This was just smashed out with a 
wrecking bar, smashed all the way through. That was repaired last year. That cost a 
grand” (Victim 9). Overall, it was evident that the financial impact of heritage crime was, 
more often than not, far more significant than the initial crime that had occurred, “…there 
was thousands of pounds worth of damage for nothing, for a fiver…” (Victim 12); and 
could incur a slew of mental, physical and emotional issues. Clearly, the impacts of 
heritage crime were rarely isolated and instead, coalesced, with each impact likely to 
prompt another. 
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6.7.5 : Appearance of the heritage site 
 
 
Two victims discussed how the appearance of the heritage sites or assets they looked after 
was a contributor to the likelihood of crime occurring on that site or asset. These scenarios 
bear similarity to Broken Windows Theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) (see 7.6.1 for 
further discussion on this) but, in these cases, an initial crime against the heritage site or 
asset does not act as a catalyst for the site or asset to be subject to further crime. Firstly, 
the age of the sites and assets made them appear to the untrained eye as if they were being 
uncared for, whereas in fact they were simply in a ruinous or aged state: “It’s in too much 
of a ruinous state to actually look like its anything important. That’s the biggest problem. 
And I think, if you go back to when we first started here, and the site was even more of a 
wreck, it did happen a lot more [crime]” (Victim 3). 
 
Secondly, if the land the site or asset was situated on, or the area around it, was even 
slightly unkempt, this implied to the general public that it was being uncared for, and thus 
would attract crime to the site or asset. For both victims, it was the simple act of cutting 
the grass on and around their sites which would directly increase or decrease incidents of 
crime: 
 
“The minute we cut the grass out there, and it looks cared for, the 
crime reduces. Because it does look like someone’s been here, they’re 
looking after it, whatever. If we leave all of the grass to just grow for 
one season, you’d be surprised at how much crap happens again on 
this site” (Victim 3). 
 
“This is one of the dilemmas…when you’ve just had the grass cut look 
over here, it’s not Royal Park standard, but it is being looked after, 
somebody’s up here doing something to it. And hopefully that’s 
enough…that might alter their behaviour” (Victim 9). 
 
 
The fundamental difference between these examples and Broken Windows Theory is that 
the actions which incur criminality for Wilson and Kelling are deliberate (a result of 
disorder), whereas the inability to maintain the appearance of a well looked after heritage 
site or asset because victims cannot afford to regularly cut the grass constantly, is not. 
Furthermore, the fact that the site or asset may already be ruinous (thus appearing uncared 
for) skips a step in Wilson and Kelling’s theory: there is no gradual process of decline 
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which acts as a catalyst for criminality on the site or asset as said site or asset is in a 
permanent state of disrepair. 
 
6.7.6 : Fear of crime 
 
 
Interviewees revealed that one impact of heritage crime which could be situated within a 
wider criminological framework was the potential increase in fear of crime resulting from 
heritage crime. For example, Victim 11 discussed how the local community were reluctant 
to visit the heritage site he cared for, due to rumours surrounding the behaviour and 
actions of individuals who frequented the site: 
 
“You know, we’ve spoken to a number of people who say they’re 
scared to go up there, they hear stories about what happens up there, 
there’s youths up there, they don’t want to go up there, they’re scared 
for their own safety kind of thing. And so, you know, that’s problematic 
because it discourages the kind of footfall that you want to encourage, 
because, in our opinion, the way that you reduce ASB, the way that you 
reduce it sustainably and in the long term, is by encouraging good 




Unfortunately, in a cyclic fashion, fear of crime then had an impact on the levels of crime 
which occurred on the site. The community, fearful of engaging with the heritage site, 
chose not to visit it or incorporate it into their daily activities. Yet, frustratingly, as Victim 
11 was aware, if the community had increased their engagement with the site, the 
increased footfall and routine presence of people at the site would have made them 
capable guardians (Cohen and Felson, 1979); and their presence would have removed the 
incentive to commit crime without fear of recourse. 
 
6.8 : Crime prevention 
 
 
Chapter 2 explored how utilising crime prevention measures on heritage sites and assets 
can be very difficult. Indeed, of the 16 interviewees, 15 were unable to use traditional 
crime prevention measures on the heritage site or asset they looked after. The one victim 
who could utilise crime prevention measures, specifically CCTV, was able to utilise this 
because the asset was in the centre of a small town, meaning that cameras could be affixed 
to external structures which overlooked the site without damaging the historical fabric of 
the asset. For the other interviewees however, preventing crime was very difficult. In 
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Victim 1’s case, some of the most basic crime prevention techniques could not be used, as 
the site was open access: “[There are] a lot of places where you can come in and out. And 
in fact, the [road] that runs through the middle of X is a public highway, so that’s open 24 
hours a day” (Victim 1) and could not simply be closed off. 
 
The cost of crime prevention measures was also a considerable barrier to their 
implementation. Many of the victims relied upon their local councils, which decided if a 
heritage site or asset was to be in receipt of crime prevention measures. These councils 
often had a paradoxical attitude towards crime prevention, where crime had to occur 
before crime prevention measures could be considered being used. This was particularly 
exasperating, as heritage sites and assets were therefore, being subject to further damage 
as they waited for crime prevention measures: “…but at the moment, the council aren’t 
agreeing…they’re saying that there has to be another attack before we get CCTV” (Victim 
6). 
 
Universally, the victims recognised that an effective method of reducing heritage crime 
was to place a permanent guardian on the site, as it removed the incentive to commit crime 
unseen: “If people know that somebody is up here, then they will stay away” (Victim 9). 
Permanent guardians could rarely be installed however, due to budgetary constraints. 
Some sites had had a guardian in previous years, but they had eventually been rescinded 
due to dwindling resources: “They also built a visitor centre that was very popular, and 
used, but money ran out, so the visitor centre closed, and there was nobody seeing if 
anything was going on” (Victim 7). 
 
Although not cost effective, a permanent guardian on the site appeared to be the most 
effective method of reducing heritage crime. Two victims described how there was a 
direct correlation between the presence of a permanent guardian on their site and the levels 
of crime on their sites. Upon receiving funding in 2015 to make his voluntary role a full 
time paid position, Victim 3 explained how crime against the site was virtually non- 
existent (apart from crime occurring out of ignorance), a result which he attributed to his 
permanent presence on the site: 
 
“And in 2015, I don’t think, apart from uneducated crime [ignorance], 
like kids throwing stones through rifle loops and seeing it as a game, 
we didn’t have any crime that year because we were on site…The crime 
rate went down, because we were here at regular times” (Victim 3). 
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Victim 10 reported a similar instance. When there was a heritage officer based at one of 
the heritage sites Victim 10 was responsible for overseeing, crime decreased, but when 
this officer was removed from his position, crime increased: “…a few years ago, there 
was a presence up there, a heritage officer based in the building up there. So it all kind of 
went away when he left, and wasn’t replaced…then it all sort of came flooding back 
again” (Victim 10). 
 
Lastly, it is important to note that historical and cultural factors meant that some of the 
most basic crime prevention measures could not be utilised. For example, target 
hardening, in the form of closing and locking a Grade listed church, directly clashes 
against the cultural belief that churches should be left open for the public: “It should be an 
open building” (Victim 15). 
 
Clearly, when the crime prevention measures were able to be used on heritage sites and 
assets, they worked well. However, the inability to use crime prevention measures was, 
largely, due to factors beyond the victims’ control. These reasons included inadequate 
financial resources, long-standing cultural reasons, and understandably strict rules 
surrounding the preservation of heritage sites and assets; meaning many crime prevention 
measures cannot be utilised, for fear of damaging the historical fabric. 
 
6.8.1 : Police forces unable to understand when crime prevention fails to work 
 
 
To compound these issues further, a focus upon crime prevention has become widespread 
within police forces. This led to complicated exchanges with victims when crime 
prevention measures appeared to be the obvious solution to heritage crime, for police 
officers and staff (internal crime prevention officers/advisors), but could not be utilised, 
either due to cultural and historic aspects, or because of third party advice which 
conflicted with police crime prevention practice. Indeed, the advice four victims received 
from their insurance companies was to keep the church or churches they cared for open. In 
turn, this could lead to confusing exchanges between the victims and the police, where the 
latter could not fathom why the victim had voluntarily left their asset in a vulnerable 
position. Indeed, Victim 14 explained how a crime prevention adviser was baffled when 
she enquired as to how locking the doors of the asset would help, when the perpetrators 
were targeting the windows: 
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“But then the chap came along and he said “Well, what do you expect, 
you’ve had your church open” I was like “Yeah but they’re breaking 
down the door going into the tower” you know? And he said “Yeah, 
well, the first thing you need to do is lock the church” And I said “But 
they’re breaking in the windows, so you know, we don’t want to 
lose[cultural aspect of keeping church open]...what can we do here?” 
And he just said “Well you know, you’re putting yourself into this 
position by leaving the church open” And...I can understand that, 
but…if our insurers are giving us advice to the contrary 
then...anyway... He couldn’t understand, he said “Well you wouldn’t 
leave a shop open or something like that” and we were like “Yeah but 
it’s not a shop!” And, just the windows were being smashed out 
constantly…And again, we had this chap come out, and there 
wasn’t. . there wasn’t really any kind of constructive advice really, or 
any .. it was “Well just report it”” (Victim 14). 
 
 
As the above example demonstrates, the rigidity of crime prevention measures did not 
account for their unsuitability on some heritage sites and assets, and their failure to work 
in certain scenarios resulted in a defeatist attitude amongst both police staff (a crime 
prevention advisor in this scenario) and police officers. 
 
Officers/police staff appeared to be unable to suggest any means of tackling heritage crime 
which did not rely upon crime prevention measures. Neither officers nor police staff 
thought critically about what else they might do, or how else the crime prevention 
measures which could be utilised upon heritage sites and assets (such as ‘extending 
guardianship’ by involving the community or neighbourhood watch) might be achieved. 
Of course, crime prevention measures are not taught to officers/police staff with the caveat 
that they may not work on heritage sites and assets, as this is far too specific for broad 
training on crime prevention. Nevertheless, the inability for officers/police staff to 
reconcile that many of these measures would not work and could not be applied to 
heritage sites and assets, and their insistence upon applying them despite this, was 
indicative of a myopic attitude where crime prevention was the only option; and there was 
little else police officers/staff could do for heritage sites and assets if it did not work. 
 
However, in the instances when officers/police staff did think critically regarding the 
delivery of crime prevention methods, this could reduce the need for a police presence on 
the site or asset. In the following example, a PCSO delivered educational sessions on 
heritage crime to the local community, which had led the members to develop a sense of 
ownership over their local heritage site, resulting in community members acting as 
collective guardians: 
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“lt is the fact that, with the education that X gives…You’ve got a whole 
community that are taking ownership, they are looking out for these 
sites, and the police, actually, although it’s being reported to them, 
you’ve got eyes and ears everywhere that should be preventing the 
problem. And if they gave it a long enough time, there wouldn’t be a 
problem. Because the community would be looking after all of these 
areas under the advice of X” (Victim 3). 
 
 
6.8.1: Different crimes creeping in 
 
 
Without overt crime prevention measures to deflect crime, six victims reported how 
heritage sites and assets were perceived as a convenient place to commit crime without 
fear of being caught. Consequently, victims explained how this would attract low-level 
criminal behaviour onto heritage sites and assets, such as drug taking “…we started to 
have some drugs and some other problems…the paraphernalia of drugs addiction” 
(Victim 8), trespassing, verbal abuse of volunteers on the site, littering, and arson: “…we 
were getting these really intense small fires. I think it was barbeque coals, disposable 
barbeques…” (Victim 9). 
 
A major problem incurred from the different forms of crime which crept onto heritage 
sites was that these crimes dissuaded local people, who would regularly incorporate the 
site into their daily routine (such as running or walking their dog) from maintaining their 
routine, because these individuals felt intimidated by those who were openly committing 
these crimes. In turn, this led the individuals who would regularly use the site, to change 
their routine, meaning that the site lost its capable guardians (Felson, 1998), who both 
reported and discouraged criminal behaviour on the site: 
 
“Yeah, there is definitely drugs. And it’s got to the stage now where we 
do have residents that will look after this site, they’ll walk their dogs 
here or whatever, phone it into us if there’s a problem, but they’ve got 
to the stage now where they say they don’t feel safe coming here to 




Indeed, it was not just intimidation which could lead to the loss of informal social control 
and the increase in low-level criminal behaviour. When sites were subject to building 
work for restoration purposes, for example, this would prevent members of public from 
engaging with the site as they usually did: “…because of that [building work] there isn’t 
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the deterrent effect of the members of the public who are legitimately going up there and 
walking around. So people can go up there and have a drink...and then they leave 
graffiti…” (Victim 7). 
 
 
The loss of this type of informal social control system could be disastrous for a site or 
asset, as these victims illustrated. Indeed, in no longer attracting those who were willingly 
exercising social control, these sites were left increasingly vulnerable to criminal activity. 
 
6.9 : Heritage crime occurring out of ignorance 
 
Victims were unanimous in their belief that heritage crime was rarely committed 
intentionally. Instead, they argued that heritage crime largely occurred out of ignorance, 
and every victim had experienced heritage crimes which they attributed to ignorance. A 
primary reason cited by the victims for crime committing out of ignorance, amongst 
children and teenagers specifically, was boredom: “…a lot of the crime is…what I would 
describe as low-level stuff, which is…a result of boredom” (Victim 11). The victims also 
made a distinction between the crimes which occurred out of ignorance, and those that did 
not: “The kids-I don’t mind cleaning up after the kids. It’s the adults, they genuinely just 
don’t care” (Victim 9). 
 
Furthermore, the circumstances and environment of heritage sites and assets could also 
contribute to crimes occurring on them which were a result of ignorance. As mentioned 
previously, many heritage sites and assets do not have permanent guardians, are not 
overlooked, and therefore, may be seen as inviting places for individuals to commit low- 
level offences without being caught: 
 
“I don’t think a lot of people that come and commit these crimes 
actually know that it’s a heritage site. I think a lot of the crime that’s 
happening on heritage sites are, where they’ve stumbled across an 
area, and seen an advantage, or a place where they can just muck 
around. They don’t realise-it’s just a place where they’ve stumbled 
upon. And it’s like, “Gosh guys, look at this. There’s no-one around, 
there’s lots of bricks we can throw, there’s massive graffiti on all these 
walls, no-one cares about it, we can smoke cannabis, we can do our 
drugs without anyone seeing us” So I don’t think they’re actually here 
purposefully to create heritage crime, it’s just they’ve found that place 
they can do it without disturbance (Victim 3). 
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From the victims’ responses, it was found that those who were most likely to commit 
heritage crime out of ignorance were young people and teenagers. The actions of these 
two groups must be contextualised, however, within the current austerity led environment 
affecting local councils and young people’s services (Weale, 2020). These groups were 
more likely to be found unintentionally causing damage on heritage sites as the local 
amenities for young people, such as skateparks and youth clubs, had been shut down: “We 
now have cyclists that are using this as a BMX track, because the council shut down the 
BMX track a mile and a half down the road” (Victim 3). Young people did not have 
anywhere to gather that was catered towards them, and heritage sites and assets became a 
place to seek shelter and a refuge from authority. 
 
One victim disclosed how heritage crimes which had been committed out of ignorance 
could, perhaps ironically, be moved through the CJS far more effectively (e.g. through 
diversionary action) than those which were committed consciously or deliberately. More 
serious and, arguably, malicious infractions such as illegal metal detecting, which in the 
victim’s opinions was far more likely to be deliberate, left little to no evidence. This 
created a frustrating dichotomy: 
 
“And then you have to have the evidence. And the police’ll say 
“Where’s the evidence?” to bring a prosecution. It makes simple 
things, which are actually very minor, like a case of graffiti, which was 
really somebody who probably didn’t know they were doing anything 
wrong...it’s reported by locals, who are outraged about it, the local 
police officer says “Well, look, you know, we can do something about 
this, this is a crime”…Historic England wrote a crime impact 
statement, and they were obviously cautioned. But most cases, you’re 
looking at, you know, metal detecting, where you can’t find...there’s 
very little to do if you don’t have the evidence” (Victim 4). 
 
 
Indeed, Victim 10, too, argued that illegal metal detecting was a heritage crime which was 
likely to be committed deliberately, with the perpetrator possessing full knowledge of 
what they were doing, but when undertaken on open sites (akin to that described by 
Victim 4) were very difficult to catch: “I think it’s just people seeing somewhere that they 
think they can play with their new toy, and oh I’ve found something so I’ll dig it up, 
finders keepers. I mean there’s nobody around so why not, that sort of thing” (Victim 10). 
 
 
Therefore, crimes that were the product of ignorance, but left tangible evidence proving 
that they had occurred, and which police officers understood, moved more successfully 
through the CJS, despite the relative ‘innocence’ of the individual who had committed 
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them. Contrastingly, deliberate heritage crimes such as illegal metal detecting, rarely leave 
any tangible evidence (except a hole in the ground), making it more difficult to justify a 
police investigation. 
 
6.10 : Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored police understandings and perceptions of heritage crime from the 
perspective of the victims of heritage crime. Interviews with victims revealed that there 
were four reasons for the substandard police understanding and negative perception of 
heritage crime, alongside one reason for the good understanding and positive perception of 
heritage crime from police officers. The role of PCSOs in the policing of heritage crime 
was then analysed. This chapter then examined what the consequences of austerity 
measures had been for victims of heritage crime, finding that austerity measures had had a 
tangible influence upon victims’ expectations of police response. This examination of 
austerity measures further revealed an instrumental finding of this thesis; the notion of 
victims of heritage crime ‘de-victimising’ themselves. 
 
It was also found that, contrary to the finding in the last chapter, victims did not 
underreport heritage crime due to a lack of confidence in the police. Instead, the victims 
endeavoured to report all the heritage crime they could but were often prevented from 
completing their reports by call handlers. In relation to the recording of heritage crime, 
this chapter highlighted how victims could be inadvertently contributing to the 
downgrading of heritage crime within police forces, by only requesting for the recording 
of heritage crime for the purposes of receiving a crime number; as opposed to asking for a 
police response. 
 
The victims and impact of heritage crime were then discussed. The responses from the 
victims mirrored those of the heritage practitioners and police officers, with all 
interviewees agreeing that the impacts of heritage crime were felt by individuals, the 
community, wider society, and future generations. Moreover, such impacts were far 
broader than they might initially appear to a police officer. The difficulties of employing 
crime prevention measures on heritage sites were then addressed, alongside the problems 
which incurred from these difficulties. Lastly, this chapter also revealed that victims 
unanimously believed that heritage crime was rarely undertaken maliciously. 
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7.1 : Introduction 
 
This chapter synthesises the findings of Chapters 4, 5, and 6, and specifically returns to 
address the five research questions which underpin this thesis: 
 
1. How has the heritage sector in England and Wales influenced attitudes towards heritage 
and heritage crime in each country? 
 
2. How do police officers understand, become aware of and perceive heritage crime, and 
how does this affect their response to victims? 
 
3. What obstacles exist to impede the effective policing of heritage crime in England and 
Wales? 
 
4. Who are the victims of heritage crime, and how do they understand, perceive and 
respond to it? 
 
5. Can victim-focussed mechanisms be developed to overcome the obstacles to the 
effective policing of heritage crime? 
 
Section 7.2 begins by examining the factors behind the generally poor police 
understanding, perception and awareness of heritage crime in England and Wales. It also 
addresses the problems which participants in this study encountered when engaging with 
call handlers, illustrates the consequences of affixing heritage crime to the existing remit 
of RWCOs; and considers the role of the PCSO in relation to the policing and prevention 
of heritage crime. Section 7.3 illustrates how partnerships have struggled to be successful 
in tackling heritage crime, and why the CPS struggles to take offences through the CJS. 
Potential solutions are proposed. Finally, section 7.4 centres upon the victims of heritage 
crime. It proposes a new typology for victims of heritage crime and unpicks why victims 
tend to de-victimise themselves (first noted in 6.5.2). Section 7.5 focusses upon methods 
of improving understanding and awareness of heritage crime across the police, and 
considers why heritage crime policy has not transferred into practice. This section also 
illustrates the issues with reporting and recording heritage crime in greater detail.  Lastly 
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section 7.6 discusses how existing criminological theory has been advanced in the context 
of these findings. 
 
7.2 : Policing factors 
 
7.2.1 : Police understandings, perceptions, and awareness of heritage crime 
 
 
A key aim of this research was to establish the understandings, awareness and perceptions 
of heritage crime amongst police forces in England and Wales. The results of this research 
have established that police understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime 
are, on the whole, poor (excluding of course, officers in this research, and officers who are 
personally interested in heritage crime). The findings from this research are consistent 
with existing qualitative empirical research findings, namely those from the Nighthawking 
Report (Oxford Archaeology, 2009a; 2009b) and Shelbourn’s (2014a; 2014b) research. As 
explored in section 2.4.3, both the Nighthawking Report (Oxford Archaeology, 2009a) and 
Shelbourn’s (2014) survey to archaeologists, revealed that police officers lacked 
knowledge and interest in heritage crime, did not give sufficient recognition to the victims 
of heritage crime, and often perceived it as victimless. Findings from this research, 
meanwhile, revealed how police understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage 
crime have altered little in the years since these earlier studies. Aside from this, this thesis 
also builds upon the existing body of literature by establishing the reasons for the lack of 
understanding, poor awareness and poor perception of heritage crime amongst police 
officers. 
 
In this chapter, 7.2.1 explores the following three internal policing factors which 
contribute to a poor police understanding, perception and awareness of heritage crime: 
downgrading the severity and validity of heritage crime, fear of the unknown, and a lack 
of training and knowledge. These factors are all significantly influenced by police culture 
and are therefore grouped together. They also focus upon front-line officers. Two more 
internal policing factors also contribute to poor police understanding, perception and 
awareness of heritage crime. These are: call handlers as gatekeepers, and the rural and 
wildlife conundrum. These factors cover more areas of policing (not just front-line 
officers) and therefore necessitate more detail. As such, they are considered in their own 
respective sections (see 7.2.2 and 7.3.3) 
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7.2.1A: Downgrading the severity and validity of heritage crime 
 
 
Prevailing police culture underpins the following three internal policing factors. Firstly, 
downgrading the severity and validity of heritage crime. Police officers believe that only 
police officers understand policing (Sparrow et al, 1990) and therefore they have the 
greatest understanding of crime and criminal law (Reiner, 1992b). This was observed in 
their poor responses to victims of heritage crime and heritage practitioners, where 
‘regular’ police officers downgraded the severity and validity of heritage crime, by telling 
victims and heritage practitioners that: i) heritage crime was not a crime, ii) the crime 
would not be responded to as it was not a valid crime, and iii) arguing with victims about 
whether heritage crime was a crime. The attitude was one of ‘We, the police, know best’ 
(Adlam, 2002: 25). However, when this mantra is challenged by victims citing legislation 
for example, this may undermine the officer’s authority and his/her identity. 
 
Victims of heritage crime and heritage practitioners fall into what Holdaway (1983:77) 
refers to as ‘challengers’; individuals who stem from various disciplines which allow them 
to quite literally challenge police practice and threaten the control police officers have 
over their territory. These individuals crack the protective shell of police culture 
(Holdaway, 1986: 150) by, for example, revealing that they know more about heritage 
crime than police officers, through citing legislation that the officer does not understand. 
As such, the officer’s authority and position as the most knowledgeable individual in the 
policing-victim exchange is challenged, as occurred in many of the cases explored in this 
thesis. In the experiences of victims and heritage practitioners, this challenge was met with 
strong resistance, with officers refusing to acknowledge that heritage crime was indeed a 
valid crime. 
 
7.2.1B: Fear of the unknown 
 
 
The second factor is ‘fear of the unknown’. Through this factor, a central facet of police 
culture is manifested, namely the fact that officers do not like being given tasks which take 
them out of their comfort zone (Skogan, 2012). A general fear of the unknown in relation 
to heritage crime therefore, arguably stems from a reluctance on the part of officers, to 
engage in policing areas they do not understand, as Goodman (1997:480) writes ‘...police 
officers, like other human beings, do not like doing things they are not good at or do not 
understand…’This echoes the sentiments of the police officers in this research, who 
argued that regular officers would not want to engage in heritage crime as they were 
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worried about encountering an area, which they had limited knowledge of, to the point at 
which this reluctance threatened potentially successful heritage crime cases progressing 
through the CJS. Indeed, the fear and reticence regular officers felt when engaging with 
heritage crime cases also illustrates why having a heritage crime SPOC was so crucial, to 
the interviewed officers. The officers in this research stressed that a heritage crime SPOC 
was an important solution to alleviating these fears: 
 
“You’d have people that are more willing to deal with it if you could 
have that fallback, and sort of say “Right, I have spoken to an expert 
(SPOC), he’s given me X Y Z advice, and then I’m gonna go to 
interview my suspect and I feel more confident in dealing with it” that’s 
what I’d say” (Officer 5). 
 
A heritage crime SPOC would remove this fear of the unknown, to a great extent, as well 
as the fear of recourse for making mistakes in an area that officer is unfamiliar with. 
 
 
7.2.1 C: Lack of training and knowledge 
 
 
The last factor concerns the lack of training and knowledge on heritage crime amongst 
police officers. Officers in this research felt that they lacked training in heritage crime, 
which impacted upon their knowledge of the area. Lack of training was symptomatic of 
the lack of internal support they had also experienced, and whilst it is widely accepted 
within policing that officers will learn on the job (Charman, 2017); gaining on the job 
experience was difficult when heritage crime was so marginalised within their workloads. 
If police officers had the relevant training, their knowledge of heritage crime would, 
naturally, be better than that which officers have currently. Training would also mean that 
these officers are in a better position to educate regular officers about heritage crime and 
help the same officers tackle heritage crime cases with confidence. 
 
A possible explanation for the lack of training could be a product of the police cultural 
attitudes towards new areas of crime. When faced with a new ‘problem,’ forces often form 
specialised squads or units in response to the problem (Maguire, 2003). This was 
internally recognised by the Metropolitan Police in the saying ‘‘When in doubt, form a 
squad and rush about’ (Sparrow et al, 1990). However, the creation of these squads 
indicates to officers outside of the squad that they are absolved of responsibility for 
policing anything within the squad’s remit (Moore, 1992: 115). ‘Squad creation’ can 
hinder innovation; police forces are unlikely to actively seek for ways to improve upon 
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their existing practices, as the squad is seen as already dealing with the ‘new’ crime (Ibid). 
These issues are replicated in many ways for heritage crime officers. Regular officers 
expressed no awareness of, nor interest in heritage crime, removing the need for large 
scale training. As the heritage crime problem was already being dealt with through the 
creation of the heritage crime officer (paralleling the squad in this case) there was no need 
for training for heritage crime officers, and no need to improve upon the policing of 
heritage crime; as the heritage crime problem has been tackled from a policing 
perspective. It is suggested that this is a very short-sighted approach, but, nonetheless, 
would go some way to explaining why heritage crime officers interviewed within this 
study had received little to no training. 
 
Lastly, although the understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime were 
largely poor amongst regular officers, Chapter 6 did reveal pockets of good practice across 
England and Wales. This good practice stemmed from officers who already had an 
existing interest and passion for heritage and heritage crime. This interest and passion led 
these officers to have a positive perception and understanding of the crime, resulting in 
victims receiving a good response from these officers. Their awareness of heritage crime 
also gave them an ability to recognise both the crime, and the severity and impact of it, far 
better than their colleagues. Yet, despite these pockets of good practice, it appears that the 
overall understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime amongst police 
officers across England and Wales, are poor. 
 
The two further factors which contributed to poor overall understandings, awareness and 
perceptions of heritage crime are explored further below in sections 7.2.2, and 7.2.3. 
 
7.2.2 : Call handlers: the crucial link 
 
 
A key theme which emerged from this research were the difficulties victims and heritage 
practitioners had in conveying the importance of heritage crime to police call handlers, 
who did not have the resources to ‘triage’ heritage crime accurately, record it, and then 
send it onto the heritage crime SPOC (if necessary). Call handlers ‘…set the agenda and 
act as gate-keepers to police assistance’ (Garner and Johnson, 2013: 35). In this study, the 
gate-keeping position meant that call handlers were at times responsible for preventing 
heritage crimes which did merit a police response, from progressing through the CJS. In 
being the first point of contact for victims of heritage crime seeking a criminal justice 
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response, call handlers should ideally be equipped with the skills to recognise and log 
heritage crime as ‘heritage crime.’ 
 
The call handler role is fast paced and demanding. Their primary goal is to rapidly 
determine the nature of calls they receive, assign a level of urgency to the call, and 
determine the most appropriate response to it (Milne and Bull, 2016:178). As part of this 
role, they are constantly having to engage in what Lumsden and Black (2018: 614) term 
‘boundary work’, wherein call handlers assess whether the call that they receive falls into 
the boundaries of police work. Boundary work is an unfixed concept (ibid), so call 
handlers must individually determine if a call necessitates a police response. When 
receiving a phone call, call handlers ask a series of questions (usually working from a list 
of question prompts, referred to as a call-script), in order to establish if there are any 
specific lines of enquiry for a police investigation (Leeney and Johnson, 2012). Examples 
include if there were any witnesses, or if CCTV was in use and may have captured 
anything regarding the incident (Stafford, 2018). 
 
Call handlers clearly lack understanding and awareness of heritage crime. This, combined 
with the issue of boundary work amongst police call handlers, and a call script which does 
not account for heritage crime, means that the repeated issues the victims and heritage 
practitioners experienced, when calling the police in this study, were somewhat inevitable. 
Both boundary work and the call script heightened the existent issues regarding a lack of 
understanding and awareness of heritage crime on the part of call handlers and incurred 
various consequences. Call handlers are not taught to recognise the nuances of heritage 
crime, such as the inability to utilise crime prevention methods on heritage sites and 
assets. They would follow their normal call script, assessing heritage crime calls on the 
basis that they were the same as other crimes. This included asking the prescriptive 
questions on call scripts, which could not account for the unique aspects of heritage crime 
and heritage sites and assets, such as asking if the site or asset had CCTV. Indeed, after 
asking these standardised questions, victims explained how call handlers would close 
down what was in fact a valid crime, leaving victims disappointed and frustrated. 
 
Although the purpose of the call handler is to filter out incidents which do not require 
police involvement (Manning, 1982), all of the above issues meant that call handlers were 
simply unable to differentiate heritage crime from ‘normal’ crimes, and thus filtered 
heritage crime out of police systems incorrectly. These issues came to the fore when call 
handlers told victims and heritage practitioners that there was no possibility of them 
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recognising and recording certain heritage crimes on police recording systems, despite 
victims and heritage practitioners citing legislation to explain that what had occurred was 
a crime. In the face of a crime which call handlers did not understand, victims and heritage 
practitioners also reported call handlers being sceptical and discouraging. Indeed, there 
appeared to be a disjuncture between the caller and call handlers. This disjuncture is 
known as frame mismatch, where ‘interactional trouble’ between the caller and call 
handler occurs as ‘…organizational resources are already pressed and the caller's difficulty 
is not a high priority one, or [the call] involves asking callers for certain types of 
information’ (Tracy, 1997: 338). Heritage crime is rarely a high priority call (as there is no 
human victim) and a heritage crime call necessitates the call handler knowing what 
heritage crime is, to ask for the specific information which would identify a heritage 
crime. Call handlers are unable to do so without relevant guidance or training. 
 
The officers and heritage practitioners interviewed for this research felt that educating call 
handlers about heritage crime would both streamline the reporting process and gradually 
improve general police understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime. With 
a better understanding of what heritage crime was, callers would not have to persuade call 
handlers that heritage crime was both serious and merited a police response. From a 
policing perspective, knowledgeable call handlers could improve the overall police 
response to heritage crime by being able to accurately assess incoming calls, and then 
distribute and inform officers accordingly, as the following officer explained: “And then 
with contact and call handling, I think that should be a yearly input [of training]. Because 
they are likely to come across it far more...I need them to know. If they know, then they 
should resource it correctly” (Officer 1). In turn, officers would approach the crime with a 
reasonable level of informed awareness of what they were attending; allowing them to 
respond accordingly. Call handlers might benefit from face-to-face training, but this is 
only likely to be possible in certain forces where the heritage crime SPOC is provided 
with enough time to engage in internal outreach: time which the SPOCs in this research all 
struggled to achieve. The call handling role also has problems with high staff turnover 
(Stafford, 2016), meaning training would have to be repeated, and would therefore likely 
be unsustainable. 
 
Whilst training may not be feasible, there is a pressing case for call handlers to be 
provided with short guidance on heritage crime, developed by a heritage body. Such 
guidance might assist call handlers in identifying heritage crime. For example, guidance 
might include a short explanation of what heritage crime is, and key terminology such as 
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‘Ancient Monument’ or ‘Grade listed.’ A call handler’s guide has been produced for the 
similarly marginalised area of wildlife crime by the National Wildlife Crime Unit 
(NWCU) (NWCU, 2018), which suggests that such an option would be feasible. Although 
the NWCU is firmly embedded within policing (more-so than heritage crime, meaning 
that suggested guidance is more likely to be accepted), having been a police intelligence 
unit since 2006 (NWCU, 2019b), there is arguably, scope for Historic England and Cadw 
to develop similar guidance utilising the resources and connections through Historic 
England’s Heritage Crime Programme. Indeed, developing guidance in conjunction with 
police officers is likely to produce guidance which translates effectively into practice. 
Technologically, guidance could be complemented by a flag on internal systems, which, 
when the call handler had identified the location of the caller, highlighted if the location 
was a heritage site or asset. However, this could pose resource challenges for many forces. 
 
Of course, guidance would not completely resolve all of the issues associated with logging 
and recording heritage crime accurately. Good guidance does not negate human error. 
Nevertheless, any actions towards ensuring that heritage crime is logged and recorded 
accurately, as far as possible, are important to undertake. Implementing guidance for call 
handlers is the first step in improving the recording and responses to heritage crime, and 
the treatment of victims, and heritage practitioners, by call handlers. Further issues with 
reporting and recording, which are not linked to police culture, are explored in section 7.6. 
 
7.2.3 : The Rural and Wildlife conundrum 
 
 
As illustrated in Chapters 2 and 4, heritage crime is inextricably linked to rural and 
wildlife crime and is (wrongly) considered to be a subset of both these crimes. Indeed, the 
FOI responses supported the latter, revealing that responsibility for policing heritage crime 
was mostly delegated to Rural and Wildlife Crime Officers, (RWCOs) or civilian officers 
specifically concerned with the co-ordination of RWCOs. This section will specifically 
focus upon the nine RWCOs identified within this research. 
 
This research found that the attachment of heritage crime to rural and wildlife crime, and 
subsequent allocation of heritage crime to the policing remit of RWCOs, was both 
perplexing and frustrating for the RWCOs interviewed. The ill-thought-out grouping of 
these crimes, without an overt link, had simply resulted in an increased workload for these 
officers, a workload consisting of another marginalised area of crime for which they had 
received no training, guidance or support. Indeed, current policing literature offers no 
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clear explanation as to why heritage crime has been subsumed under rural and wildlife 
crime. The NPCC’s Rural Affairs Strategy states that there will be a continuous link to 
heritage crime when policing the rural, as heritage crime is said to be an intrinsically 
linked theme within rural policing (NPCC, 2018a: 6). Its sister document, the NPCC’s 
Wildlife Crime Policing Strategy, also cites heritage crime as an: ‘…intrinsically linked 
theme[s]…’ (NPCC, 2018b: 3). Neither document explains why and how heritage crime is 
intrinsically linked to both rural and wildlife crime. Compounding these issues further, the 
aforementioned Rural Affairs Strategy document states that heritage crime (alongside off- 
road biking and fisheries related crime) is placed amongst Organisational Priorities, as 
opposed to the key Operational Priorities. This means that the policing of heritage crime 
will be managed by each individual police force regionally and locally (Ibid, 2018b), 
resulting in forces having significant autonomy (explored further below) over how they 
police heritage crime. This possibly explains why the FOI responses in this research are so 
varied. 
 
This autonomy, and lack of priority afforded to heritage crime within the NPCC 
documents, contradicts the prioritisation of heritage crime in police forces which is 
suggested by Historic England. For example, in 2013 it was announced that every police 
force within England would have a dedicated ‘Heritage Crime Liaison Officer’, and since 
this time, it has been reported that every force in England does have one of these officers 
(Kerr, 2018). This research has revealed that this is, unfortunately, not the case. Indeed, 
these contradictions between policy and practice may provide an explanation for the 
inconsistences in the implementation of heritage crime officers across England (all four 
Welsh forces had a heritage crime officer), described in the FOI responses, and the 
seemingly rash allocation of heritage crime to RWCOs. Despite subsuming heritage crime 
into the policing of rural and wildlife crime, the policing of heritage crime is not being 
imposed upon police forces by the NPCC, and in not being policed at a national level, all 
accountability is also removed from the NPCC. Arguably, the fact that police forces are 
not being explicitly told to police heritage crime and are being left to manage heritage 
crime at regional and local levels themselves, leaves little incentive for police forces to 
police heritage crime rigorously, if at all. Indeed, Officer 12 firmly believed that the only 
method of policing heritage crime effectively, considering that many forces would not be 
enthusiastic about creating another policing problem for themselves, was to make the 
policing of it obligatory: 
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“So the only way to deal with that is to, at an NPCC level, to dictate 
that all forces will do this. Make it obligatory. And if its obligatory, 
they’ll all preserve it, they’ll have to tick a box to say they’ve got one 
[heritage crime officer], and when he leaves, or she leaves, they have 
to bring someone else in, and then they will complete this national 
training course before they do this and whatever” (Officer 12). 
 
 
With no internal authority monitoring police performance of the area, forces do not strictly 
have to police heritage crime; resulting in the patchwork approach documented by this 
research. However, some interviewees did experience external pressure to police heritage 
crime (likely from Historic England’s Policing and Crime Advisor). This, the officers felt, 
had led to the generally haphazard allocation of the crime (bar the three officers who 
volunteered for the role), where heritage crime was hastily thrust upon them as their forces 
responded to this external pressure. Nevertheless, overall, it appears that there is almost no 
internal pressure to police heritage crime, which feeds into a continuous cycle of a lack of 
guidance, direction, and resources to police the crime. Indeed, police officers can tell if 
senior officers are serious about policing certain crimes through the amount of resource 
allocated to a particular area (Chan, 1997); of which heritage crime has little. 
 
The reasons for affixing heritage crime to rural and wildlife crime may never become 
entirely clear, but this affixation has resulted in a plethora of issues for the officers 
responsible for the policing of heritage crime. This research revealed that it was difficult 
for many of the officers to undertake the core parts of the heritage crime officer role, such 
as raising awareness of their position internally, as they were juggling multiple areas of 
crime already. The officers who were RWCOs were forced to prioritise their limited time 
towards rural and wildlife crime; those crimes were their chief focus, and remained so, 
before being allocated heritage crime. Such findings mirror the existing literature on 
wildlife crime, where Wildlife Crime Officers (WCOs) reported that their effectiveness as 
WCOs, and ability to have any sort of impact in their role was limited; for they were 
juggling responsibility for wildlife crime alongside their current policing position (Fyfe 
and Reeves, 2011). Organisational perceptions of wildlife crime also forced these officers 
to prioritise every other crime over wildlife crime (Ibid, 2011). Although all interviewees 
were juggling additional responsibilities alongside their core policing role, the pressure 
associated with juggling crimes is arguably amplified for RWCOs, who are already 
contending with two areas of crime which usually involve extensive partnership working, 
outreach work, and having to provide guidance as the ‘expert’ in their force to colleagues 
who may encounter the crime (Enticott, 2011; Mawby, 2016). 
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Compounding these issues further, nine of the 12 officers in this research had received no 
choice in the allocation of heritage crime to their existing role. Superiors delegating 
responsibility for certain areas of crime to officers without these officers having a choice, 
is normal cultural practice in the hierarchal policing structure, where officers are simply 
‘…expected to follow orders within an organised bureaucracy with militaristic leanings’ 
(Jefferson, 1990: 20). However, as noted in 4.5.2, if the heritage crime role continues to be 
allocated without taking into account the personal enthusiasm and motivation of individual 
officers, such actions are likely to result in the ineffective policing of the area. 
 
It would perhaps, have been advisable to consult the scant literature on heritage crime, and 
the wealth of literature on policing the similarly marginalised areas of rural and wildlife 
crime, when developing the heritage crime officer role. However, the implementation of 
heritage crime officers has instead been poorly organised and ill-thought-out. Prior to 
implementation, there should have been a much greater level of engagement with what 
existing research already tells us, such the Oxford Archaeology reports, (2009a, 2009b), 
Kirkwood’s (1994) research on the best models for allocating wildlife crime within 
policing, and findings regarding the errors in policing arts and antiques crime (Committee 
for Culture, Media and Sport, 2000; Steel, 2007). Using this existing knowledge base 
could have helped to circumvent potential challenges and difficulties. Policing is a largely 
practical task, but research findings can be an important resource in streamlining 
approaches to marginalised areas of crime. 
 
7.2.4 : Differences between the policing of heritage crime in England and Wales 
 
 
Research Question 4 (RQ4) concerns how police officers understand, perceive and 
become aware of heritage crime in England and Wales. It was anticipated that there may 
be differences in the understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime between 
England and Wales, and that this may manifest itself in a difference in the policing of the 
crime between both countries. 
 
Analysis of the interviews revealed that there were minimal differences in the policing of 
heritage crime between England and Wales. One important difference to mention, 
however, is that in contrast to England, all four police forces in Wales have formed an All 
Wales Heritage Crime Group, with the aim of sharing best practice and pooling resources 
together to police heritage crime more efficiently (Pers comms, 2018). It remains to be 
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seen what kind of impacts the creation of this group will have upon the policing of 
heritage crime in Wales, but as these forces are already accustomed to working together 
(Gwent PCC, 2019), they are likely to be positive. Indeed, cross-force collaboration comes 
with a host of benefits, including the ability to spread limited resources more widely, 
saving money, and increasing policing capabilities (Rogers, 2017). Furthermore, because 
this cross-force work is specifically within Wales, many of the issues which may inhibit 
cross-force collaboration, such as clashing of regional identities and imbalance between 
big and small forces (Ibid), are likely to be mitigated. In addition, the small number and 
close proximity of the forces in Wales (all are within the same country) means that the 
efficiency and effectiveness of this group is likely to be far higher than the very disjointed, 
and arguably isolating, nature of policing heritage crime in England. 
 
7.2.5 : The importance of the PCSO 
 
 
It transpired from the victim interviews that there was a distinct correlation between 
victims who reported a universally positive response to heritage crime, and a PCSO 
attending the incident, whilst victims who had police officers attend heritage crimes were 
far less satisfied with their response. This is an important area to explore further, as it 
suggests that police forces are potentially allocating responsibility for heritage crime to the 
incorrect areas within the organisation. Indeed, the FOI responses show that heritage crime 
officers are largely ranked at PC and above. 
 
The victims in this study discussed the importance of the surrounding community in the 
prevention and reporting of heritage crime locally, as the local community often felt a 
strong sense of ownership over ‘their’ heritage sites and assets. They also expressed that 
the positive and accessible relationship they had with PCSOs was a product of their local 
PCSOs broader engagement and embedment within the community. Victims were 
impressed with the PCSOs willingness to listen and act upon the issues the victims raised. 
Raising awareness of heritage crime amongst the local community and community 
engagement can be achieved far more readily by PCSOs than police officers (Cosgrave 
and Ramshaw, 2015). PCSOs generally have more time to spend building up community 
relations and developing a detailed knowledge of their local beat, whereas police officers 
are often too preoccupied with other tasks (such as case building) to be able to achieve the 
aforementioned (O’Neill, 2014). As Victim 7 described, the accessibility of his local 
PCSO meant that he had been able to forge a good relationship with this PCSO, at a 
regular ‘surgery’ which the PCSO held within the local area. This strong relationship 
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alleviated some of Victim 7’s fears of further heritage crime occurring. Indeed, findings 
from the Nighthawking Report (Oxford Archaeology, 2009a: 98) also reflected positively 
upon PCSOs, finding that their ability to walk the local beat regularly permitted them to 
informally monitor heritage sites or assets, thus helping to prevent heritage crime. 
Walking the beat may also help PCSOs recognise heritage sites and assets more easily, 
which they may then develop a sense of ownership over themselves. 
 
PCSOs are also equipped with the powers to gather witness statements for certain crimes, 
to view CCTV footage (helpful for some heritage sites and assets) and to address low- 
level crimes and ASB (O’Neill, 2019). The latter is particularly important, as it was found 
that numerous low-level crimes which occurred on heritage sites and assets, were often a 
by-product of their open and unattended nature. These types of low-level crimes are 
unlikely to be perceived as warranting an urgent response by police officers, particularly 
as there is no direct human victim. However, in knowing their ‘patch’ comprehensively, 
PCSOs are arguably better positioned to assess risk, vulnerability and the contextual 
aspects of low-level crimes than a police officer can (Sutherland, 2014). This is 
advantageous when low-level crimes occur on heritage sites and assets, as a PCSO may be 
better placed to understand the significant impacts of these crimes upon the site or asset 
itself and the local community, more readily than police officers. Therefore, accounting 
for the existing literature, victim’s comments in this study, and the capabilities of the 
PCSO; it could be suggested that PCSOs are better placed to tackle heritage crime than 
police officers. 
 
The disadvantage of this approach is that an interested and motivated police officer would 
still have to take upon the role of force heritage crime SPOC; for PCSOs are unable to 
investigate and prosecute crime (Paskell, 2007). This individual would take upon an 
advisory role to PCSOs, acting as an interim between the police and heritage bodies, and 
picking up cases which require further investigation (beyond PCSO powers), for example. 
Despite the drawback of still having to have a force SPOC, one of the aims of the NPCC 
Cultural Heritage and Property Crime National Strategic Assessment (2017:17) is to 
develop a training programme for Heritage Crime Officers and PCSOs, alongside 
volunteers within the police. Therefore, this suggestion already has a basis for a potential 
new approach in tackling heritage crime. 
 
There may also be financial benefits to this approach, as in-depth heritage crime training is 
unlikely to be necessary. This thesis therefore proposes that a combination of regular 
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patrol by PCSOs of their local area, alongside regular engagement with the local 
community (victims in this study often made PCSOs aware of heritage in their patrol 
area), would result in PCSOs knowing heritage sites and assets, and the potential victims 
and impacts of heritage crime comprehensively; without requiring in-depth training. This 
was the case for one victim from a small-scale study of heritage crime in Nottinghamshire 
(Poyser and Poyser, 2017), who felt like the response from police officers to heritage 
crime was far less sympathetic and empathetic than the local PCSO, who knew the asset 
which was subject to heritage crime very well. Indeed, because PCSOs are already likely 
to know and understand the value and importance of heritage sites and assets to their local 
community, the default response is likely to be sympathetic and positive. 
 
The importance of the PCSO in tackling heritage crime is further heightened when 
examining the policing of heritage crime through the lens of policing models. As explored 
in 2.5.2, few policing models are effective in the policing of heritage crime. Of 
neighbourhood policing (NP), problem-orientated policing (POP) and intelligence-led 
policing (ILP), NP appears to be the only effective method of policing heritage crime; and 
findings relating to PCSOs reinforced this assertion. Findings also reinforced that neither 
POP nor ILP are currently effective methods of policing heritage crime, primarily because 
they require police recorded data to work (Tilley, 2009); of which there is currently none 
on heritage crime. This means that neither model is particularly suitable. By process of 
elimination, this leaves neighbourhood policing. Heritage crime aligns well with NP, 
which is orientated around preventative approaches, engaging the public, and longer-term 
outcomes (O’Neill, 2019), which all apply to heritage crime. As the interviewees in this 
research outlined, the current approach to heritage crime centres around crime prevention, 
longer term outcomes (the response to heritage crime is rarely reactive) and the impact is 
primarily centred around the local community (unless heritage crime occurs against a 
nationally recognised site or asset). Ultimately, PCSOs are integral to neighbourhood 
policing (Cosgrove and Ramshaw, 2015) and so, it appears that PCSOs are indeed one of 
the best placed members of the police organisation to tackle heritage crime. 
 
In short, the existing literature and findings of this thesis place PCSOs squarely within the 
remit of policing heritage crime, and the neighbourhood policing model as the best 
approach for delivering a PCSO-centric approach to the latter. Of course, delegating 
responsibility for heritage crime to PCSOs is an approach which would only work well in 
certain forces, and would clearly be redundant in those which have already abolished their 
PCSOs (Dodd, 2019b). A neighbourhood policing led approach to heritage crime would 
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also arguably be far easier to conduct in communities which are more cohesive and 
possess high levels of social capital. However, the feeling of shared, cognitive ownership 
of heritage sites and assets (Boyd et al, 2005), and the abilities of PCSOs to build social 
capital (Rogers, 2017), could mitigate any potential issues a PCSO led approach to the 
policing of heritage crime might incur. 
 
7.3 : Partnership factors 
 
This section addresses Research Questions 3, 4 and 5. RQ3 concerns the obstacles which 
exist in the effective policing of heritage crime in England and Wales. RQ4 addresses who 
the victims of heritage crime are, and how they understand and respond to heritage crime. 
Lastly, RQ5 examines whether victim-focussed mechanisms can be developed to 
overcome the obstacles outlined above. 
 
Chapter 4 established that partnership working between the police and the heritage sector 
is already difficult to facilitate, due to differences in organisational languages and 
priorities. Despite these issues, heritage crime clearly requires the involvement of multiple 
parties to facilitate the efficient prevention, policing and prosecution of heritage crime. 
Neither police officers nor heritage practitioners can tackle heritage crime alone. Any 
discussion surrounding partnership working must therefore take into consideration the 
working cultures of the parties involved; alongside extraneous factors such as limited 
funding. All of these issues are taken into consideration below, where the existing 
problems and solutions to these problems are explored. 
 
7.3.1 : CPS related issues 
 
 
Both the officers and heritage practitioners interviewed for this research explained how 
there were numerous issues to contend with when attempting to guide heritage crime 
through the CJS. These issues centred around the CPS’ lack of knowledge on heritage 
crime, miscommunication between parties, and subsequent misunderstandings between 
the CPS and heritage practitioners. Issues such as miscommunication should have been 
prevented through the Heritage Crime Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (Historic 
England, 2019f), an agreement signed between the CPS, Historic England, and various 
other parties (e.g, local authorities). At a policy level, as mentioned in 4.7.2, the signing of 
this MOU appeared to ensure that heritage crime would be adequately addressed by the 
CPS. However, the findings of this research found that in practice, the keys facets of this 
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MOU have not been implemented thoroughly enough in every CPS Area. In HP3’s 
experience, this had led to a case with a heritage crime element being ‘thrown out’ of 
court before the relevant heritage body could be contacted; as they should have been. In 
fact, the MOU appeared to have largely been forgotten by its signatories, as Victim 4 
highlighted: ‘There’s a lot of intentions…the signing of something was very simple.’ In 
this victim’s opinion, consistent action and recognition of this MOU had failed to 
accompany the signing of it. 
 
CPS has appointed fourteen Crown Prosecutors across England and Wales to act as Rural, 
Wildlife and Heritage Crime Coordinators, introduced in 2.3.3. These provide the 
specialist knowledge necessary to prosecute the aforementioned crimes (CPS, 2019). A 
chief issue however, which the officers in this study experienced, was that there was no 
guarantee that these specialist prosecutors would always be available to provide the degree 
of knowledge necessary for prosecuting heritage crime. Research recognises that even 
with a specialist prosecutor in place, prosecutor continuity is not always guaranteed 
(Bowcott, 2016), and this can be especially challenging when attempting to ensure that 
marginalised areas of crime are understood by, and receive appropriate attention from, a 
judge or magistrate (Flynn, 2017). For example, Officer 7 described how the specialist 
prosecutor for Rural, Wildlife and Heritage Crime in his force area was close to 
retirement, and gradually phasing out of his role. A replacement had not yet been found, 
meaning that when a wildlife crime case had been sent to court, instead of the specialist, 
an unknowledgeable lawyer had attended, who failed entirely to understand the case at 
hand: “The lawyer that turned up on Monday in magistrates court for this job hadn’t got a 
clue” (Officer 7). 
 
As such, the lawyer had to be guided through the process of prosecuting a wildlife crime, 
being told what to say and do by an outside expert who had luckily attended on the day of 
the case. Such findings reflect Nurse’s (2008) interviews with representatives from NGOs, 
where it was found that regardless of the resources NGOs put into educating a specific 
prosecutor about the importance of wildlife crime, their work could easily be undermined 
if the case was suddenly passed to another prosecutor. This prosecutor was unlikely to 
have had to read the case file, and often failed to grasp the importance of the case (Ibid). 
Without knowledgeable prosecutors who are confident in prosecuting heritage crime, the 
severity and the gravity of heritage crime will not be understood by a magistrate or judge. 
Indeed, magistrates and judges already struggle to understand and reflect the severity and 
gravity of heritage crime in their sentencing; through lacking experience in prosecuting the 
162  
area and being accustomed to judging the severity of a crime based (in part) on its 
financial value. This practice cannot account for the symbolic and emotional value of 
heritage sites and assets affected by heritage crime (Shelbourn, 2008). 
 
Therefore, whilst the implementation of fourteen Crown Prosecutors across England and 
Wales who specialise in rural, wildlife and heritage crime is, undoubtedly, a positive start 
in tackling these areas; there is clearly still much to be done. Improvements must be made 
in terms of adherence to the Heritage Crime MOU. It is argued therefore that one of the 
following options occurs: i) the MOU is signed on a yearly basis by its current signatories, 
and the relevant information regarding the MOU is disseminated to these signatories after 
they have signed the MOU, or ii) an online workspace is created specifically for these 
fourteen Crown Prosecutors, containing all of the relevant information needed to help 
them take Rural, Wildlife and Heritage Crime through the CJS, including clear reference 
to the MOU. It might also be beneficial for these prosecutors to receive some form of 
training session, workshop, or conference, led by Historic England or Cadw. Such an 
event would be specifically for the purposes of examining the impacts of heritage crime, 
providing contextual advice about Heritage Crime Impact Statements, and highlighting 
individuals to contact for advice. 
 
Magistrates and judges should also arguably receive some form of guidance concerning 
heritage crime, due to the irregularity of heritage crime cases reaching court, the 
unfamiliarity of the crime, and the fact that specific niche legislation may need to be 
employed (Shelbourn, 2014b). Indeed, providing training for prosecutors and guidance for 
magistrates and judges is particularly timely, considering the recent changes to sentencing 
guidelines for heritage crime which apply to both Magistrate and Crown Courts (Historic 
England, 2019c). These changes have resulted in the ‘full impact’ of arson, criminal 
damage, and vandalism being considered in heritage crime cases; specifically highlighting 
that damage to heritage sites and assets can destroy unique parts of English and Welsh 
history, and should be taken into account during the sentencing process (Ibid: np). 
 
Despite continued austerity measures which are affecting all areas of the CJS (Bowcott, 
2018), it is vital that these fourteen Prosecutors (and possibly magistrates and judges) 
receive some form of training and sustained guidance from Historic England and Cadw; 
which enables the associated parties to exchange best practice. One theme which stood out 
from the findings of this research was the glaring lack of support officers and heritage 
practitioners alike received in their attempts to tackle heritage crimes. Heritage crime will 
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continue to be extremely vulnerable within the CJS if essential guidance is not provided, 
for the small number of practitioners who are currently responsible for the criminal justice 
response. 
 
7.3.2 : Raiders of the Lost ARCH 
 
 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, ARCH is a voluntary, cross-collaborative network, 
created in 2011, with the intention of reducing the amount of heritage crime in England 
(Wales in not included in ARCH’s remit) (Historic England, 2019e). Despite the 
continued presence of the ARCH group on Historic England’s webpages, according to all 
interviewees in this study, it appears that the project has stagnated. No tangible results 
appeared to be forthcoming from the group, and officers explained how ARCH was often 
only adhered to in name by the many police forces which had initially signed up in 2011. 
Fourteen of the 16 victims had no knowledge of ARCH, appearing to suggest that ARCH 
had limited outreach; corroborating the officer’s assertions that the scheme had stagnated. 
The two victims who were aware of ARCH felt that many of those who had signed up to 
the initiative had felt pressured to do so, despite the ARCH webpage stating that the group 
consists of entirely voluntary participation. In Victim 16’s words, the initiative was 
somewhat imposed upon the signatories. To these victims, the goals and long-term modus 
operandi of the group, were unclear. 
 
ARCH appears to be another example of the difficulties of translating policy into practice 
which plagues heritage crime initiatives. ARCH’s webpage states that conferences and 
training will be held, to network and share best practice (Historic England, 2019e). 
Chapters 4 and 6 revealed that in practice, these events have either not occurred, or that 
members were not aware of them. Indeed, none of the two victims who had heard of 
ARCH, nor the heritage practitioners or the police officers, had been involved in 
conferences, training events, or information sharing about heritage crime from the group. 
Shelbourn (2014b: 197) writes that one of the contributing factors to poor enforcement of 
heritage crime has been the failure of teamwork between the police and external parties; 
which is exacerbated by the lack of clarity and confusion about the roles of the various 
agencies involved in its enforcement. Whilst ARCH may have had the potential to 
diminish these stumbling blocks, it seems to have been unsuccessful in doing so. 
 
ARCH is a multi-agency group, and the problems of multi-agency approaches are well 
documented. These include issues such as problems with information sharing, uncertain 
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aims and objectives, and differing expectations between parties (Edwards and Benyon, 
2000). On the part of the police specifically, partnership working incurs a scepticism that 
tangible results will manifest (Pearson et al, 1992). However, literature has demonstrated 
that partnership working can be extremely effective in the policing of other niche areas of 
crime (Wellsmith, 2011). The infrastructure for such a multi-agency network to aid in the 
policing of heritage crime, is already in existence through ARCH, even if ARCH has 
stagnated. Therefore, this thesis recommends that, firstly, the current ARCH network and 
its members should be reviewed, in order to establish if the current members of ARCH 
still wish to participate in the initiative. Secondly, the members of ARCH should be 
consulted as to how they wish the initiative to progress, possibly through a questionnaire 
or conference to draw up a series of goals and clear objectives, which are mutually 
beneficial for all parties. Lastly and most importantly, a core component of partnership- 
based initiatives such as ARCH is strong leadership (Edwards et al, 2000). If initiatives 
like ARCH at to stand any chance of success, such robust leadership is essential. 
 
7.4 The victims of heritage crime 
 
This section addresses RQ2 (how far do police officers understand, become aware of, and 
perceive heritage crime and how this affects their response to victims), RQ4 (who are the 
victims of heritage crime, and how do they understand, perceive and respond to heritage 
crime), and RQ5 (whether victim-focussed mechanisms can be developed to overcome the 
obstacles in the policing of heritage crime). Perhaps surprisingly, this research revealed 
how every interviewee recognised that the victims of heritage crime were vast and 
remarkably varied. These findings inform the development of a new victim typology, 
which helps to significantly develop and clarify our understanding of the nature and extent 
of heritage crime. It also considers the phenomenon of victims ‘de-victimising’ 
themselves, which illustrates how victims situate the poor police response they received 
against the backdrop of continued austerity measures. 
 
7.4.1 : Typology of heritage crime victims 
 
 
One of the purposes of this research was to generate theoretical concepts which are 
specific to heritage crime, as there is a dearth of theory within current literature. A clear 
strand of similar responses emerged from all the interviewees pertaining to the victims of 
heritage crime. Every participant in this research unanimously agreed that the victims of 
heritage crime were wide reaching, varied, and included what can be distilled into the 
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following categories: the individual, the local community, wider society, and future 
generations. The study of heritage crime as an academic discipline lacks adequate 
examination of the victims of the phenomenon and has failed to categorise the various 
victims which emerge from heritage crime itself. Typologies are recognised as a useful 
method of breaking down otherwise complex concepts within law and criminology, into 
more easily understandable segments, allowing for a deepening of analysis (Siegel, 2016; 
Walklate, 2005). Although a typology concerning types of heritage crime does exist 
(Grove, 2013), a typology of heritage crime victims has yet to be created. The findings of 
this research have been used to inform the development of such a typology. This approach 
was thought to be the best method of examining the types of victims, which emerged from 
the findings in greater detail, whilst remaining reasonably simple. 
 
Although the development of this victim typology has primarily been informed by the 
semi-structured interviews conducted for this thesis, other areas of academic literature 
have been drawn upon to help inform its development. These include green victimological 
literature, namely Skinnider’s (2011) typology on the victims of green crime, and 
Shichor’s (1989) model of white-collar crime victims. As mentioned in Chapter 2, victims 
of both green and white collar crime share many similarities with the victims of heritage 
crime, primarily due to the broad nature of victimisation which emerges from all three 
crimes (Skinnider, 2013; Becker, Jipson and Bruce, 2000). Drawing on Shichor’s victim 
model and Skinnider’s (2011) typology, it is proposed that the victims of heritage crime 
can be separated into the following categories: 
 
1) Immediate personal victim 
2) Professional or practising victim 
3) Community/ communal victim 
4) Remote victim 
5) Future victim 
 
 
Firstly, the immediate personal victim concerns the individual/s who directly look after the 
heritage site or asset in question, in a paid or unpaid role. The immediate personal victim 
can concern small groups of individuals, for example ‘Friends’ groups, who voluntarily 
involve themselves in the management and conservation of a heritage site or asset (Rugg 
and Parsons, 2018). These victims are emotionally and actively (in terms of caring for it) 
closest to the site or asset, and because the site or asset cannot be a victim itself in the way 
the police might understand (it is not a non-human animal or alive); such persons are the 
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first or immediate victim/s of the offence. Moreover, as the victims from this study 
reported, the individuals who look after heritage sites and assets almost always possess a 
strong personal connection to said site or asset, meaning that heritage crime often felt like 
a personal attack upon these individuals; hence the category ‘immediate personal victim.’ 
The immediate personal victim is similar to the direct victim of crime, but heritage crime 
victims cannot be considered direct victims in the traditional victimological sense, as 
addressed in 2.7.1. The term ‘immediate personal’ encompasses the personal connection to 
heritage, and the immediate impact heritage crime has upon what would be traditionally 
viewed as indirect victims. 
 
The second victim of heritage crime is referred to as the ‘practicing victim’. These victims 
include heritage practitioners, such as Inspectors of Ancient Monuments working for 
Historic England and Cadw. These victims not only possess a strong understanding of the 
value of heritage sites and assets more widely, but they are also immersed in the 
conservation and preservation of heritage, and the discovery and analysis of heritage finds. 
For example, for an archaeologist, ‘…heritage is data’ (Smith and Waterton, 2012: 53). 
Heritage crime jeopardises or completely negates the ability for these practitioners to 
interpret and learn from heritage sites and assets. The practicing victim is differentiated 
from the other types of victim in this typology, because whilst the feeling of loss 
associated with heritage crime may not be as personal, these individuals arguably possess 
the greatest understanding of the wider impact of heritage crime. The loss of knowledge 
and potential to learn from these sites and assets may also be felt most acutely by these 
individuals. 
 
Thirdly, the communal victim consists of every member of the local community. As this 
research has found, the impact of heritage crime upon the local community is often 
profound, as members of the community generally feel a strong sense of ownership over 
their local heritage assets and sites. Some of these sites and assets formed centres of the 
local community or were incorporated into the community’s everyday routine. Members 
of the local community might walk through an open site daily, for example. These victims 
are likely to not only just be affected emotionally by heritage crime, but they may also 
alter their behaviour in response to the crime. For example, victims may no longer feel 
safe enough to incorporate walking through a heritage site into their daily lives. 
Communal victims are on the tertiary level of victimisation, as the harm caused by the 
heritage crime diffuses outwards and impacts numerous individuals. 
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The remote victim is an individual who is familiar with the heritage site or asset, but they 
are distinguished from the communal victim as the site or asset is not part of their daily 
lives, nor is it local to them. These victims may only visit the site or asset occasionally, or 
even only once before, but it remains an important feature in these victim’s lives. This 
victim may not be aware that heritage crime has occurred until, for example, they observe 
within the media that the site or asset has been subject to heritage crime (as recalled by 
Victim 5), or visit the site or asset after heritage crime has occurred. The distance the 
victim is from the site or asset does not appear to lessen their emotional response to 
heritage crime. 
 
Finally, future victims are a victim who will have no knowledge of their victimisation. 
All interviewees agreed that future generations would be victims of heritage crime that 
had occurred in the present day. Future victims will lose the opportunity to understand, 
appreciate and visit certain heritage sites and assets if these sites and assets are 
permanently damaged or destroyed through heritage crime. Moreover, future victims will 
not be able to understand the contextual nature (provenance) of these sites and assets if 
they continue to be subject to issues such as illegal metal detecting, theft and trafficking. 
The victims in this research also illustrated how the loss of heritage disadvantages future 
generations, as it removes both tangible and intangible connections to the past. 
 
7.4.1A: ‘Heritage’ as a potential victim 
There is not space in this thesis to explore the concept of ‘heritage’ as a victim in depth, 
but in light of the creation of the above typology, it is important to mention the idea that 
‘heritage’ may be a victim itself.  
 
Victims of heritage crime are rarely immediate, particularly to police officers. Indeed, 
according to the typology of heritage crime victims mentioned above, the victims of 
heritage crime are largely broad, reflecting the breadth of victimisation which occurs as a 
result of heritage crime. Perhaps one of the greatest losses with regards to heritage crime 
is that future generations will not know what they have lost. This draws parallels to green 
criminologists’ recognition that environmental losses have a similarly significant impact 
upon future generations, in terms of their quality of life and the ability to learn from the 
environment (Nurse, 2017). It could be argued that future generations are the greatest 
victims of heritage crime. Current victims of heritage crime may be able to reconcile 
their victimisation, but future generations are deprived of the latter, and more so, the 
ability to even conceptualise the breadth of their victimisation. They are arguably most 
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vulnerable to victimisation, because of the abstract nature of their victimisation to current 
generations. 
 
It is important to consider the idea that heritage may also be a victim in and of itself. This 
radical conception has been broached by green criminologists who consider the 
environment itself as a victim (Skinnider, 2013). Parts of the environment which are 
considered victims include flora, fauna, ecosystems and landscape features (such as hills 
and rivers) and are grouped under the name non-human environmental entities (White, 
2020: 81). If non-human environmental entities can be considered victims, then there is 
room for heritage sites and assets to also be considered victims. Heritage sites and assets, 
much like non-human environmental entities, have no voice, and therefore require 
protection from those with a voice, such as researchers and the government (Lynch, 
2020: 51). The loss of heritage has similarly adverse impacts to the loss of the 
environment, many of which are intangible (such as the loss of knowledge, the loss to 
future generations) and irreplaceable. For these reasons, heritage sites and assets might 




7.4.2 : Victims ‘de-victimising’ themselves 
 
 
An interesting theme which emerged from this study is that of ‘de-victimisation.’ This was 
a process whereby the victims all readily accepted that they were victims, but they 
downplayed their validity as a victim. In turn, this led to victims accepting sub-standard 
treatment from the police, contextualising this treatment within their awareness of the 
austerity measures affecting policing. This awareness meant that many of the victim’s 
expectations for a positive police response and understanding of heritage crime were 
already incredibly low. This led them to excuse poor police responses which may have 
otherwise not been accepted by victims of similar crimes. 
 
It should be noted that the concept of de-victimisation in this thesis shares similarities with 
Taylor et al’s (1983) study on how victims use selective evaluation as a response to 
victimisation; subsequently de-victimising themselves. However, Taylor et al (1983) 
focuses upon five key reasons which victims use to minimise victimisation, in response to 
serious events specifically relating to health (Taylor et al, 1983: 35). The application of 
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de-victimisation within this study focusses upon crime specifically, centring upon the 
concept of Just World Theory (Lerner, 1980) as the primary reason for victims de- 
victimising themselves. 
 
The process of de-victimisation is differentiated from that of acquiring victim status and 
rejecting victim status, as every victim still accepted their status as victims of heritage 
crime (as was the case in Taylor et al’s study). To gain greater clarity on the reasoning 
behind these victim’s actions, we can look to psychological theories, namely Lerner’s 
(1980) ‘Just World Theory’ (JWT from herein). Indeed, JWT has helped inform the 
development of victimology (Pemberton, 2012) and therefore is a fitting theory to use in 
the context of this research. JWT posits that people get what they deserve, and that what a 
person deserves is based on the outcome that they are entitled to receive, an outcome 
which is decided by this person’s behaviour and attributes (Lerner, 1980: 11-12). In very 
simple terms, people like to believe that good people deserve good things, and bad people 
deserve bad things: they believe in a just world. People strive to maintain their belief in a 
just world, and therefore, as Hagedoorn et al (2002:128) write ‘…people will get upset and 
will try to protect their belief when they are confronted with information which 
disconfirms their notion that the world is a just place.’ 
 
It could be suggested therefore that some victims of heritage crime attempt to convince 
themselves that the reasons for a poor police response are due to factors outside of police 
control, such as austerity measures, as opposed to the police not caring about heritage 
crime. Indeed, if victims can find one aspect of a situation that is fair, in the case of this 
research, austerity measures which inhibited police function, JWT argues that they will 
use this fair aspect to subsequently justify the situation (Hafer and Begue, 2005). 
Comments from the victims relating to police officer’s poor responses being out of police 
control, included, for example, Victim 2’s comments regarding their own existing low 
expectations of the police response to heritage crime, as they recognised that the police 
were lacking resources. Similarly, Victim 12 was also conscious that police forces were 
coping with a variety of ‘unseen’ crimes, which drew resources away from what police 
forces perceived as less important crimes, such as heritage crime. 
 
Studies have demonstrated that people will attempt to assimilate an injustice to their belief 
in a just world, through downplaying the unfairness of the incident (Lipkus and Siegler, 
1993), and by being forgiving (Strelan, 2007); both of which the victims in this study did. 
For example, the fact that victims were also aware (often from past engagement with the 
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police over heritage crime) that due to the inability to utilise crime prevention measures 
such as CCTV, and the sometimes isolated nature of the heritage sites and assets they 
cared for (resulting in no witnesses), there was very rarely a ‘starting-point’ from which 
the police could begin the investigative process. There was often no catalyst for the police 
to start investigating, and police officers were, effectively, stuck. Therefore, the victims 
justified the police response. Although the current literature on JWT has not closely 
examined the relationship between poor police response to crime, and victims wanting to 
maintain a just view of the police, Hagedoorn et al’s (2002) study focussed upon JWT in 
the context of authoritative decisions, finding that people are likely to perceive an 
authoritative decision as just, even when they receive an unfavourable outcome. As the 
police are an authoritative figure to most individuals, the existing literature indicates that 
victims of heritage crime would indeed use JWT in order to rationalise and accept 
substandard police responses to the crime. Furthermore, the assertion of 15 of 16 victims 
that heritage crime occurred out of ignorance instead of deliberate malice, arguably 
reinforces the victim’s desire to believe in a just world. Indeed, one might suggest that the 
just world response from victims is pre-determined due to their belief that few people 
would actively want to damage or destroy heritage. 
 
As Chapter 2 discussed, the victim label is crucial for positive outcomes to emerge from 
the criminal incident (Cross, 2018). In heritage crime cases, it is arguably crucial that 
victims do not diminish their validity as victims, despite acknowledging the context within 
which they were receiving a largely negative response. As this thesis has discovered, 
many police officers do not view heritage crime as ‘real’ police work. If heritage crime 
victims continue to ‘de-victimise’ themselves, this may engender a level of scepticism 
amongst officers, that heritage crime, like other forms of marginalised crime, does not 
require a robust police response. 
 
7.5 : Practical factors 
 
Research has found that the views of frontline officers are routinely ignored in the 
construction of policing, despite the fact that street level policing practice has the most 
impact on the day-to-day operations of the police and therefore, the outcome of any 
programme or policy (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 2005: 298). In order to answer RQ3 (which 
concerns the obstacles that exist in the prevention and policing of heritage crime in 
England and Wales and how to remedy them) and RQ5 (which examines whether victim 
focussed mechanisms can be developed to overcome obstacles in the policing of heritage 
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crime); it was crucial for this thesis to place the lived experiences of frontline officers at 
the centre of the methods. Section 7.5 explores how training might be developed and 
delivered, and how recording and reporting processes could also be developed, and 
improved. Lastly, steps to ensure that dedicated and motivated officers become heritage 
crime officers are considered. 
 
7.5.1 : Training and support for heritage crime officers 
 
 
A clear need for training and sustained support for heritage crime officers emerged from 
the findings of this thesis. The officers described how support was non-existent and 
training was outdated or minimal: one officer had attended a conference and was then 
considered a qualified heritage crime officer. Existing documentation designed to help 
officers learn about heritage crime was thought to be dull and ultimately unhelpful, and 
was therefore not utilised. In turn, officers felt ill-equipped to deal with certain aspects of 
their role. This research has demonstrated how these officers are restricted in what they 
can achieve by limited resources, guidance, and internal support for their role. A lack of 
training both stemmed from and exacerbated these issues. 
 
Officers believed that heritage crime training was a good idea but couched their responses 
regarding its implementation within their knowledge of austerity measures, alongside the 
fact that not enough regular officers have the personal interest and motivation required for 
policing heritage crime, to warrant large scale training. In addition, unlike other 
marginalised areas of crime, such as rural and wildlife crime, it is arguable that heritage 
crime has not been embedded in the policing psyche for long enough to support the 
development and implementation of effective training. Poor police cultural attitudes 
towards rural and wildlife crime have been reasonably assuaged through the continued 
external efforts of NGOs and outside bodies, who have been imploring the importance of 
policing these areas from the late 20th century onwards (Nurse, 2008). These efforts have 
led to permanent events which were developed to both help the policing of rural and 
wildlife crime and ensure that it maintains a permanent position on the policing agenda, 
such as the Wildlife Crime Enforcers Conference (RSPB, 2018) and wildlife crime 
training courses (NWCU, 2019a). Therefore, it seems that heritage crime training cannot 
be delivered on the same scale as its marginalised counterparts, because of budgetary 
constraints, and the fact that heritage crime has not received enough external or internal 
attention to justify police forces dedicating the necessary time and resources required. 
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There is, this thesis argues, scope for training to be delivered to heritage crime officers. 
However, without heritage crime being embedded in the policing psyche as a problem, 
and limited external pressure leading to limited internal action, convincing police 
leadership to provide the resources required to implement training may be difficult. 
Nevertheless, these difficulties are not insurmountable. All interviewees bar one felt that 
heritage crime training would be useful, meaning that there is currently an existing (albeit 
small) audience for heritage crime training. Furthermore, the interviews with heritage 
practitioners revealed that there were means of circumventing the internal and external 
obstacles to delivering heritage crime training (such as limited budgets). Clearly, good 
quality, succinct heritage crime training can be delivered to small numbers of officers, 
despite the variety of internal and external issues currently facing policing. How this could 
be actioned is explored below. 
 
7.5.2 : Delivering the training 
 
 
All interviewees (except one) agreed that it was important for police forces to receive 
some form of heritage crime training. The delivery of training to the small existing cohort 
of heritage crime officers would maximise efficiency and value for money, but would 
require forces to allocate their heritage crime officers the time to complete this training, 
and to disseminate the learned information internally. Traditionally, police officers are 
trained in-house, with training commonly being delivered by formerly operational officers 
(Howlett-Bolton et al, 2005). However, in being a relatively new area of crime, police 
forces are ill-equipped to provide heritage crime training themselves. 
 
There appear to be two methods of delivering heritage crime training to police officers. 
Firstly, the heritage practitioners in this study were happy to deliver heritage crime 
training sessions, at no cost, to their local police forces (this may of course, not be the case 
in all areas). Although getting to the point of delivery could be laborious due to police 
bureaucracy, it was apparent that training sessions were mutually beneficial for police 
officers and heritage practitioners. Sessions held by heritage practitioners in this research 
greatly increased a small number of officer’s awareness and understanding of heritage 
crime (sessions were usually delivered to small teams of RWCOs) and provided officers 
with a direct local contact for when heritage crime occurred in their force area. For 
heritage practitioners, the training session strengthened links between the heritage body 
and the police. Indeed, Officer 8 recalled how he had asked his local Inspector of Ancient 
Monuments from Cadw to deliver a day’s training to the RWCOs he oversaw, which the 
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Inspector did voluntarily. Taking this into consideration, it may be possible therefore to 
facilitate a more widespread informal arrangement between Inspectors of Ancient 
Monuments, for example, and local police forces, where Inspectors of Ancient 
Monuments deliver training sessions to small cohorts of officers concerned with the 
policing of heritage crime; such as teams of RWCOs. 
 
Of course, one disadvantage of this arrangement is that training would be on an informal 
and non-standardised basis, unless a formal agreement could be reached between 
participating police forces in England and Wales and Historic England and Cadw. This 
training could, however, be categorised under Continuous Professional Development 
(CPD), which consists of any police training which is not mandatory (Simmill-Binning 
and Towers, 2017). This type of training is rarely formally recorded or accredited (Ibid), 
but a lack of ‘quality control’ does not necessarily decrease the efficacy or usefulness of 
training delivered by bodies outside of policing, particularly when it is almost impossible 
to ascertain the current quality of in-house police training (Stanko and Hohl, 2018). 
 
Another potential option is external training courses, which would be designed and 
delivered by bodies external to policing. Wildlife crime training, for example, is generally 
delivered by a wildlife training consultancy to police forces, in the form of a week-long 
residential training course (NWCU, 2019a). The training itself is delivered by two retired 
police officers, which is particularly advantageous in terms of navigating police culture. 
These officers are also likely to be equipped with the skills to translate niche areas of 
legislation (i.e: very specific wildlife crime laws) into terms that attending officers would 
understand. It is possible that Historic England or Cadw could replicate such an approach 
by designing and delivering an external training course. However, the cultural clash 
between police forces and heritage bodies, which manifests itself through communicative 
issues, rooted in terminological differences and linguistic approaches, may hinder this. 
Nevertheless, heritage practitioners are conscious of these barriers, and are perfectly 
willing to streamline information on heritage crime for police officers, as evidenced by the 
actions of HP2: 
 
“I mean, one of the things we’re going to do as part of this year’s plan 
is, we’ve produced some factsheets, a really short one. And we’re going 
to produce one that basically just explains, on the one side for the 
police, so that when we’ve reported a crime we can just send them, 
along with our report of what the damage is, it’s just like a one page 
note that we’re producing, that’ll basically say this is the Act, this is 
why it’s a crime, this is what you do…”(HP2) 
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As argued by the officers in this research, the act of committing a heritage crime is not as 
complex as rural and wildlife crimes: heritage crime is simply a crime which officers are 
already accustomed to, with a heritage element added onto it. Indeed, officers suggested 
bringing all of the parties relevant to the policing of heritage crime together for a just one 
day’s worth of training: 
 
“You could bring everybody together for a day, and that would be a 
mixture of updates from, say, CPS, if the law had changed they could 
give you an input on the update, perhaps everybody brings a best 
practice story to the party and shares that, and then the networking.” 
(Officer 11). 
 
Indeed, with Officer 11’s experience in mind, it is argued that training should be 
reasonably short. One or two days may be sufficient to cover the important aspects of 
heritage crime, including: i) different types of heritage site and asset and methods of 
identifying them, ii) dealing with individuals to contact when more in-depth advice is 
required (from heritage bodies and CPS), iii) analysing existing legislation and application 
of this legislation (particularly in a court setting) and finally, iv) exploring the impact of 
heritage crime upon victims, including use of the Heritage Crime Impact Statement. 
 
In fact, very similar approaches were already being undertaken by some heritage 
practitioners, who were, as mentioned above, happily delivering training for free: 
 
“…we’ve run training events for X Police, which is just like a day, or 
half a day, of giving them presentations and making sure we know who 
each other is so we know who to ring…the last one…I gave them some 
local examples, and talked about how we need to know who the local 
contacts are in particular areas, getting them to know me…kind of 
talking through case studies and to find out how the best way to pursue 
things” (HP3). 
 
Heritage crime training can, therefore, clearly be facilitated (with certain caveats), and is 
currently being facilitated in certain areas in England and Wales, as this practitioner 
describes. Indeed, the experiences of this practitioner can be used as blueprint for 
implementing more widespread training across England and Wales. 
 
Another possible option would be the delivery of online training. NCALT, the system 
currently used to deliver such training, was viewed negatively amongst officers. It was felt 
to be dull, difficult to learn from, and ultimately unengaging (Honess, 2016). Every officer 
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in this research agreed that heritage crime training should not be delivered online. Indeed, 
because online training was thought to be dull, the ability to rapidly ‘click through’ online 
training resulted in the interviewed officers anticipating that other officers would not fully 
engage with the materials. E-learning has been criticised by officers for possessing limited 
interactive capabilities (unlike attending a training course) and providing no opportunity 
for officers to clarify any areas they do not understand (Betts and Farmer, 2019:140-141). 
Indeed, officers in this research highlighted how their workload pressures meant that they 
struggled to get mandatory online training completed, let alone any extraneous training, 
such as online heritage crime training: “We’ve got a lot of those mandatory trainings that 
don’t get done” (Officer 9). As such, online training may be the least effective method of 
improving standards. 
 
7.5.3 : From policy to practice 
 
 
This research has identified a clash between what is available in policing literature, what is 
stated by police leaders on heritage crime, and the reality of policing heritage crime at the 
front-line. The NPCC Cultural Property and Heritage Crime National Strategic 
Assessment (NPCC, 2017) for example, states that all forces in England and Wales have a 
heritage crime officer, which both the officers and FOIs refuted. The same document also 
states that there is a POLKA (Police Online Knowledge Area) webpage on heritage crime, 
which the officers in this research said was blank and therefore useless. Indeed, such 
statements within this NPCC document do not correlate with the officer’s experiences on 
the ground. 
 
Waddington (1999: 119) argues that police officers are capable of recognising ‘bullshit’ 
when they see it and can therefore recognise if reform within policing is soundly based or 
otherwise. The police officers in this study argued that the policing of heritage crime had 
been ushered in suddenly, with little explanation. The latter, combined with the lack of 
overall support they received, resulted in the officers concluding that the introduction of 
heritage crime to policing had been ill-thought-out. This is unsurprising, considering that 
the police documentation and discussion surrounding heritage crime largely fails to reflect 
the front-line reality. For example, Historic England’s Policing and Crime Advisor has 
stated that over the course of four years, heritage crime outreach programmes have been 
conducted for as many as 10,000 practitioners, including many police officers, and that all 
of these trainees should now have a basic awareness and understanding of heritage crime 
(Kerr, 2018: 9). None of these comments corroborated with those of the heritage crime 
176  
officers in this research. Indeed, these types of comments only serve to exacerbate the gulf 
between police officers and police management (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983). For 
heritage crime training to be effective the goals of police leadership must align with front- 
line realities. 
 
7.5.3A: Circumventing cop culture? 
 
As this thesis has established, police cultural attitudes towards heritage crime are largely 
negative. Heritage crime is classified through police culture as being not ‘real’ police 
work. Overcoming cop culture as a whole is a difficult task, as although it is not a 
monolith (Reiner, 2000), and the attitudes towards non-traditional crimes such as heritage 
crime are arguably universal, unless the officer has a particular interest in heritage. 
Nevertheless, there are ways to circumvent cop culture. The officers in this thesis 
emphasised that heritage crime should be delegated to officers who have expressed a 
particular interest in the area. This may not overcome the broader underlying issues police 
culture presents in classifying any crime which is remotely unusual or exciting as not 
‘real’ police work, but it would circumvent these issues (issues pertaining to disinterest in, 
marginalisation of and lack of enthusiasm for policing these crimes). The label of 
‘heritage crime’ may also overcomplicate what is often a straightforward crime for which 
officers can apply legislation with which they are accustomed and with which they are 
comfortable. However, whilst the label of ‘heritage crime’ may heighten negative police 
cultural attitudes towards the crime-the label itself ‘others’ heritage crime and highlights 
that it is not ‘normal’-if this label was to be removed, it would arguably be 
counterproductive. The heritage crime label helps to differentiate heritage crime from 
other crimes and most importantly, highlight the significance of it. Without the label, this 
significance would be diminished. 
 
Focussing upon the criminal law in relation to heritage crime may also be another way of 
circumventing the negative police cultural attitudes towards heritage crime. As Officer 12 
stated in Chapter 4, officers are interested in law, and solid definitions of crime which 
they can easily work with and apply in real life scenarios. According to the officers in this 
research, when regular officers could grasp onto an area they already understand legally, 
they approached heritage crime with greater vigour. This is an important finding, and 
further research would help to ascertain the best ways of proliferating this message 
amongst officers. Indeed, current literature designed for police officers, such as Historic 
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England’s Guide for Law Enforcement Officers (Historic England, 2016) and previously 
mentioned NPCC documentation (NPCC, 2018) puts emphasis upon viewing heritage 




7.5.4 : Reporting and recording 
 
 
Currently, there are no police reporting or recording processes in place for heritage crime. 
Without any form of standardised recording or reporting system in place, our statistical 
knowledge of the crime is limited. We cannot establish the scale of the heritage crime 
problem, nor can we identify potential heritage crime hotspots. In short, without any 
official, standardised methods of reporting and recording, this research found that the 
reporting and recording of heritage crime was fraught with issues. 
 
The issues raised in this section concerning reporting and recording are reasonably 
straightforward, but rather difficult to resolve. For example, call handlers, who are at the 
frontline of the reporting and recording process, have no official guidance on how to 
record a reported heritage crime as accurately as possible. Even with guidance, as 
suggested in 7.2.2, call handler’s options are limited unless internal police crime recording 
systems have a heritage crime category, which they currently do not. Therefore, heritage 
crime is likely to not be recorded when reported, to be recorded under a different crime 
category, or for victims to be given a crime number for insurance purposes and the crime 
to be recorded upon review (meaning it may never be recorded) (Home Office, 2020). 
Recording heritage crime accurately would have necessitated heritage crime being 
included within police recording systems, and there is limited chance of this happening. 
Police internal databases are provided by third parties, specifically external companies 
which make and host the software for police databases, such as NicheRMS or Athena 
(Roycroft, 2016). Officers in this study explained that because this recording software is 
designed, developed and hosted by third party companies, adding another category for 
heritage crime would not be a simple task. Indeed, to do so would be prohibitively 
expensive, and was therefore unlikely to occur. 
 
The NPCC Heritage and Cultural Property Crime Assessment 2017 (NPCC, 2017) has 
suggested exploring the creation of ‘National Stolen Cultural Property’ database (Ibid), 
specifically for recording heritage crime across the UK. The details as to how such a 
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database would be developed and financed is not explained in the document, and chances 
of financing such a resource intensive project are slim; particularly when the Home Office 
does not recognise heritage crime as a crime. It is concerning however, that the NPCC has 
failed to recognise that past efforts at creating a database to record art, antiques and 
cultural property crimes were unsuccessful. This database was deemed financially inviable 
and a poor use of public money (Morris and Flint, 2004: 1). Without any recorded data on 
arts, antiques and cultural property crime, it was also difficult to prove that a database 
would be impactful in reducing these crimes (Thomas and Pentland, 2004). If this 
database could not be facilitated in the early 2000s, prior to significantly reduced police 
budgets across England and Wales, it is likely that attempts to create another database 
would be impossible today. Indeed, external factors beyond the police organisation’s 
control (such as outsourced police reporting and recording infrastructure) have contributed 
to inconsistent and inefficient reporting and recording processes for heritage crime. 
However, as this chapter has stressed, internal factors which the police organisation can 
control, such as allocating heritage crime to officers who are motivated, passionate, and 
dedicated to policing the area, cannot be forgone in the face of those external and 
uncontrollable factors, which hinder positive change. 
 
For example, whilst police forces cannot add a heritage crime category onto existing third- 
party recording systems, they can develop guidance for call handlers. The existing 
problems with recording and reporting heritage crime will continue unheeded if guidance 
is not readily available for call handlers (as discussed in 7.2.2), or if standardised methods 
of reporting and recording are not introduced. This thesis has shown that victims will not 
be dissuaded from reporting heritage crime, regardless of police force responses. Despite 
there being very little in place to guarantee heritage crime is recorded accurately and that 
victims will receive a police response as a result of this; victims did not cease reporting 
heritage crime. In fact, the opposite occurred. Victims continued to report heritage crime 
regardless of the call handler and police response, or lack thereof. In some cases, the lack 
of recording and reporting mechanisms only made victims more determined for heritage 
crime to be recorded and reported. One victim, as mentioned previously, even created a 
system to ensure that heritage crime was reported and recorded as accurately as it could 
be, and that they received a follow-up. 
 
Indeed, the problems with recording and reporting heritage crime will continue to 
exacerbate if police leaders do not put measures in place to improve the current situation. 
Already, the numbers of heritage crime cases are distorted, not just due to the lack of 
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standardised police recording and reporting. Heritage practitioners explained how internal 
reporting systems within heritage bodies resulted in heritage crime never reaching the 
police (thus never becoming a police problem). Compounded these issues, findings also 
revealed that members of the public often report heritage crime to heritage organisations, 
as opposed to the police. Ideally, data on heritage crime would be shared between both 
public and private parties, in order to facilitate the effective and efficient tackling of 
heritage crime. Currently, the chances of this occurring are very low, although some form 
of arrangement would go very far towards challenging the narrative that heritage crime is 
a marginalised area of crime. 
 
7.5.5 : Seen but not heard: heritage crime as the ‘grey figure’ of crime 
 
 
A true picture of heritage crime is impossible to create, and it is anticipated that much of 
the reported heritage crime falls into the phenomenon known as the ‘grey figure’ of crime. 
Criminologists describe the phenomenon of crime that occurs, but goes unreported, as the 
‘dark figure of crime’ (Coleman and Moyniham, 1996). A cousin of the dark figure of 
crime, the ‘grey figure’ of crime refers to the disjuncture between crime that is reported by 
the public, and crime which the police actually record (Bottomley and Pease, 1986). In 
this scenario, crime is most definitely reported to the police, but when reported, the crime 
is not recorded by the police, or is recorded inaccurately (Payne and Hutton, 2017). 
Heritage crime is likely to fall into the ‘grey figure’ of crime, for the results of this study 
have demonstrated that heritage crime is very rarely recorded accurately on police 
databases. This is due to a combination of no available call handler training and guidance, 
an inability to record heritage crime accurately on police systems, and in certain cases, 
individual practice (see 4.2.2, 4.6.1, and 4.6.2). 
 
 
It is not just inaccurate recording that leads heritage crime to fall into the ‘grey figure.’ 
Heritage crime is an un-notifiable crime (recording is not mandatory). Police forces are 
not obliged to tell the Home Office of the level of un-notifiable crimes in their force area 
(Aplin, 2019). To complicate recording practices further, offences against certain heritage 
sites and assets under current heritage legislation are considered notifiable offences 
(Historic England, 2018). However, it is proposed that the latter heavily contributes to the 
grey figure of heritage crime, in two ways. Firstly, although damage to an Ancient 
Monument is considered a notifiable offence which can be collected in crime statistics 
under Home Office guidance (Historic England, 2012), the lack of tangible evidence (such 
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as no CCTV) usually associated with heritage crime, means that this notifiable offence is 
likely to be ‘no-crimed’ (Joyce, 2017). 
No-criming is a process whereby an officer decides that the crime is not worth pursuing, 
citing reasons such as insufficient evidence or an inability to identify the suspect (Gregory 
and Lees, 1999). When a crime is ‘no-crimed’ it disappears from police records, meaning 
that a crime has been reported but has been, for example, deemed impossible to investigate 
successfully, and is therefore not added to the crime statistics despite being a legitimate 
crime (Edwards, 1991); thus falling into the grey figure of crime. Secondly, the official 
guidance provided by Historic England for police forces to follow in relation to heritage 
crime, states that any offence which is not notifiable, is instead recorded as an ‘incident’ 
(otherwise known as a crime related incident) (Historic England, 2018). This exact 
scenario happened to HP4, who had a call handler say to them: “I’ll give you an incident 
number, but no I can’t record that as a crime”…[HP4 replies] “But I’ve just told you 
exactly why it’s a crime under this [law].” Indeed, if expert guidance by Historic England 
is suggesting recording heritage crime as incidents, then this provides forces with a pre- 
made excuse for either ‘no-criming’ heritage crimes or criming them as an incident only. 
Expert guidance is telling forces that classifying heritage crime as an incident is both 
acceptable and expected. From a policing perspective, it is arguable that there is little 
incentive to record heritage crime accurately, or to record the phenomenon at all. 
 
It is also important to mention how third-party pressures can influence the recording 
practices of the police (Hope, 2014) and also contribute to the grey figure of heritage 
crime. Victims in this research who had suffered from lead theft, from various types of 
historic sites and assets, reported how they often had to report the crime (despite knowing 
that the police response would be poor) in order to receive a crime reference number to 
make a claim to their insurance company. As victims need a crime reference number, this 
means that police forces must record lead theft when it occurs. Furthermore, lead, as a 
metal, can be recorded under a variety of crime categories (Home Office, 2013; Home 
Office, 2016), thus increasing the overall number of crimes in the category which the 
officer chooses to place lead theft within. In short, this recording of lead theft means that 
forces are increasing the numbers of crimes within other recordable crime categories, for a 
crime which they would ordinarily no crime, due to the lack of evidence many lead thefts 
present (Price et al, 2014). As such, police forces hands are, effectively, tied when 
recording lead theft from historic sites and assets. 
 
Without police recorded statistics on heritage crime, heritage crime cannot currently be 
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proved to be a policing problem. This is despite the fact that the victims in this study 
suffered from repeat victimisation, and the heritage practitioners encountered heritage 
crime regularly enough to prove that there was a clear problem on the ground. The 
paradoxical reliance upon statistical police data to prove that there is a crime problem 
means that crimes where data cannot and is not required to be collected, such as heritage 
crime, do not exist as problems; and mean that the lived experiences of heritage 
practitioners and victims are currently redundant. 
 
7.5.6 : Due Diligence Officers: avoid the same mistakes 
 
 
Chapter 4 revealed that the heritage crime officers had little to no heritage crime training, 
limited internal support, and almost no resources with which to undertake the heritage 
crime role. The experiences of the police officers interviewed for this research, mirror the 
issues associated with the implementation of due diligence officers, officers appointed in 
the early 2000s across England and Wales to liaise with the arts and antiques trade and 
tackle arts and antiques crime (Bennett, 2000). However, the due diligence officer role 
was beset by numerous challenges. This thesis has explored these challenges in Chapter 2, 
however in short, they included: budgetary constraints and the role being seen as a low 
policing priority (Antiques Gazette, 2000: n.p), inadequate time being given to the officers 
to conduct their role, and forces not possessing the funds to send their officers to relevant 
training sessions (Oxford Archaeology, 2009a). Indeed, without adequate resources, 
training, and internal police understanding of the importance of the crime; it appears that 
these officers were largely redundant. These are the same issues heritage crime officers are 
currently facing, and the risk of the heritage crime officer role becoming redundant is, 
arguably, a real possibility. However, the mistakes made in the implementation of due 
diligence officers can be learnt from by the police, and lessons can be applied in practice 
to the current heritage crime officers. 
 
Ideally, each police force today would have a heritage crime officer, similar to the network 
of due diligence officers. However, due diligence officers were imposed upon every force 
in the early 2000s, as examined in Chapter 2, and an officer per force failed to work. One 
heritage crime officer per force is also failing to work, with Chapter 5 revealing that each 
force in England does not have a heritage crime officer, despite NPCC documentation 
stating otherwise (NPCC, 2017). 
 
ACPO was equally as enthusiastic and involved in introducing the policing of arts and 
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antiques crime (Steele, 2000) as the NPCC appears to have been in the policing of heritage 
crime (NPCC, 2017); but after the initial enthusiasm and commitment to policing heritage 
crime there appears to have been little thought dedicated to the practicalities of policing 
the area. This research found that the current method of distributing responsibility for 
heritage crime, where heritage crime is largely imposed upon officers without choice who 
are not necessarily interested in the area, exacerbates the existing problems with resources 
and cultural disinterest. A key point which emerged from this research was that crimes 
which are culturally perceived within policing as ‘rubbish’ (Reiner, 2010), should not be 
imposed upon police forces or police officers, as this does little for the policing of the 
crime in question. By making officers who show no interest, passion or motivation for 
policing heritage crime responsible for the area, the policing of heritage crime will 
continue to be perceived poorly, understanding will be limited, and awareness will be low. 
 
On this basis, this thesis has extrapolated these issues into the seven step model below. 
This model has been developed using the direct experiences of the victims, police officers 
and heritage practitioners in this research, in order to produce an empirically informed 
model which should (similarly to Kirkwood’s (1994) models of wildlife crime officers) 
produce the most suitable method of allocating the policing of heritage crime for forces 
across England and Wales. This model aims to prevent the current method of allocating 
heritage crime to officers who are uninterested and unenthusiastic about policing the area 
from continuing. It allows police forces to consider the suitability of officers by referring 
to the list of questions and considerations below. Ultimately, this model aims to prevent 
police forces from allocating heritage crime to officers who are ill-suited for the heritage 
crime role. It also adds accountability to the process of allocating heritage crime, which is 
currently lacking (section 7.2.3). 
 
The Heritage Crime Officer: A Proposed 7 Step Model: 
 
 
Step 1: Is there an officer in the force interested in heritage crime? 
 
 
Step 2: Is the role open to officers at all levels? 
 
 
Step 3: Do they have any qualifications pertaining to heritage/ are they active in the 
heritage sector in some way? (e.g; amateur archaeologist) 
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Step 4: Have they expressed an explicit willingness to learn about heritage 
crime/willingness to engage in the inevitable partnership working necessary to police 
heritage crime? 
 
Step 5: Is there support in place to help the officer: has the force reached out to Historic 
England/Cadw, local heritage groups, PAS? 
 
Step 6: Who would be responsible for the policing of heritage crime if this officer was to 
fall ill/retire/no longer be able to adopt responsibility? (to maintain seamless transition of 
the role, and ensure that the role is not forced upon an disinterested officer) 
 
Step 7: Can the addition of a heritage crime officer be justified operationally? (This 
question must be answered honestly: will the force allow the officer time to integrate with 
the community in regards to heritage and spread awareness of his/her role, will the 
heritage aspect of the officer’s job be marginalised, is there enthusiasm for management 
with regards to taking this role on?) 
 
The policing of heritage crime must not be forced upon police forces. If the policing of 
heritage crime is indeed imposed upon forces, as described by the interviewees in this 
research, it will simply be pushed to the very bottom of the policing agenda by both the 
force itself and the overworked officer who did not express interest in the area, and 
ultimately continue to be perceived as a burden. 
 
7.6 : Implications for theory 
 
There are two areas of criminological theory which emerged over the course of the 
interviews for this thesis, namely Broken Windows Theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) 
and more generally, the theme of fear of crime. Below, these are developed upon, in the 
context of heritage crime. These developments are anticipated to help improve our 
understanding of the policing of heritage crime from a theoretical viewpoint. 
 
7.6.1 : Criminological theories: problematizing Broken Windows and fear of crime 
 
 
Following analysis of the interview data, it became clear that there were two particular 
threads of criminological thought interwoven into the interviewees’ responses, without the 
interviewees realising they were describing criminological phenomena. The first 
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criminological theory explored was Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) Broken Windows 
Theory. As mentioned in Chapters 4 and 6, this theory posits that low-level crimes and 
physical dilapidation which go unpunished, and are unremedied, will subsequently attract 
an incremental number of crimes, increasing in severity (Skogan, 1990). A central 
component of Broken Windows Theory is that these low-level crimes are deliberate and 
the resulting environmental degradation is a product of said deliberate criminality 
(Pollard, 1998). The findings of this thesis however, suggest that Wilson and Kelling’s 
work can be viewed through a heritage specific lens. On heritage sites and assets 
specifically, this thesis found that there was no precursor to site or asset deterioration 
through acts of criminal behaviour. As two victims described, the heritage sites and assets 
they looked after came to be perceived as places to commit crime not because an initial 
crime had occurred. Instead, the existing appearance of the asset or site, many of which 
were in a permanently ruinous state and deteriorating beyond repair, or lacked the funds to 
keep tidy and look cared for (such as regular grass cutting), inversely, resulted in the site 
or asset becoming the cause of criminal behaviour itself. 
 
Disorder is believed to be a necessary component for decay to occur (Sampson and 
Raudenbush, 2004), but in the case of heritage crime, the existing decay or dilapidated 
appearance due to the age of heritage sites and assets, or the inability to pay for their 
upkeep, indicates to the public that they are being uncared for; thus inviting crime and 
acting as a catalyst for disorder. Therefore, this thesis has termed this phenomenon 
‘Ruined Windows theory’, as the site or asset is already in a state of decay through the 
natural deterioration process of heritage, rather than a result of deliberate human action. In 
addition, the financial limitations facing interviewees, which meant that they were unable 
to maintain the appearance of the site or asset in question, was neither criminal nor 
deliberate, once again suggesting that Ruined Windows is a step removed from Broken 
Windows. However, many of the basic premises of Wilson and Kelling’s theory remain 
applicable to heritage crime. Much like Broken Windows Theory, all interviewees were 
conscious that after an offence had occurred, it often went unnoticed or was not 
discovered for some time after the crime had initially happened. This meant that those 
who committed heritage crime generally went unpunished, and, as mentioned above, 
indicated to other individuals that further criminal behaviour would be tolerated and could 
snowball thereafter. 
 
Whilst there are clearly some similarities between Broken Windows and Ruined 
Windows, the latter does present a challenge to the traditional solutions utilised to prevent 
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the downward spiral of crime and deterioration that incurs from Broken Windows Theory 
(Kelling and Coles, 1997), such as ‘…cleaning up graffiti and other signs of vandalism, 
cleaning the streets and avoiding property falling into decay’ (Hopkins-Burke, 2017: 289). 
With heritage crime, rapidly remedying damage resulting from vandalism, for example, is 
often impossible. The historical nature of heritage sites and assets means that any attempts 
to restore or repair them requires particular care and time, involving multiple parties and 
specially trained individuals (Norton, 2017). Indeed, Victim 7 described how specialist 
masons were required to undertake some intricate repairs to the heritage asset he cared for, 
but this process had been delayed by unpredictable weather, as specific conditions were 
necessary to carry out the work. Sections of the asset in question therefore, had been 
partially boarded up for some time. To the untrained eye, it appeared that the asset had 
been damaged and that nobody cared enough to have it repaired or restored. However, the 
opposite was true. Clearly, there are a variety of complex factors which inhibit the swift 
remedying of damage caused by heritage crime, and distance it from Broken Windows 
Theory. 
 
The second criminological concept explored was fear of crime, in this case, the link 
between heritage crime and fear of crime. Despite one officer in Chapter 4 explaining 
how, in his experience, he had found that fear of crime increased as a result of heritage 
crime amongst the local community, the findings in Chapter 6 refuted this officer’s 
experience. From the perspective of the victims, fear of crime was only isolated to the 
immediate area surrounding the heritage site or asset itself (such as the grounds of an open 
access heritage site). Fear of crime appeared to be localised to the site or asset in question. 
In response to heritage crime, victims described how members of the public altered their 
routine, no longer incorporating sites or assets into their daily lives, avoiding them in the 
fear that they may be at an increased risk of crime and victimisation; on those sites or 
assets specifically. Indeed, Victim 11 described how the local community were reluctant to 
visit a heritage site which had been repeatedly subject to crime because they feared crime 
on the site in question; but not in any other aspect of their daily lives. There was no 
suggestion from the victims in this study, or the public the victims engaged with and 
referred to, that crime which occurred on the heritage sites or assets made them or the 
public fear crime and increased victimisation in their daily lives more widely. Fear of 
crime was restricted to the heritage site or asset itself. 
 
There were a combination of reasons for this localised fear of crime. The crimes described 
by victims were generally low-level and restricted to heritage sites and assets, and as 
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mentioned previously, heritage sites and assets were thought to be attractive places to 
commit crime without recourse. For example, they were open access, did not have a 
permanent guardian, were not overlooked, or were isolated. Research has recognised that 
these factors can contribute to an increased risk of crime on heritage sites and assets 
(Bradley et al, 2012), but because these factors could not be changed, crime was often met 
with a sense of accepted inevitability (to an extent) from the victims. Indeed, whilst fear of 
crime literature posits that signs of disorder symbolise a loss of informal social control, 
which causes individuals to fear that they have an increased risk in becoming a victim of 
crime (LaGrange et al, 1992), there was conversely no indication from the victims that the 
disorder they experienced in the form of heritage crime, was a sign of crime occurring 
elsewhere. This could be attributable to the aforementioned factors, alongside the victim’s 
general consensus that heritage crime primarily occurred out of ignorance. 
 
Importantly, victims were aware of the general levels of disorder and crime in their local 
areas and were conscious that the disorder which occurred on the heritage site or asset was 
not representative of crime in their local area as a whole. Whilst victims did not ascribe to 
many of the norms within existing fear of crime literature, interviews tended to 
corroborate with existing research which suggests that the lived environment can either 
increase or decrease fears of victimisation (Box et al, 1988). Lastly, there was also no 
indication from the victims, and the community which they liaised with on a regular basis, 
that the local community felt at an increased risk of victimisation as a result of heritage 
crime, refuting the link, in this instance, between indirect victimisation and a fear of crime 
(Hale, 1996). Clearly, the type of crimes committed (low-level), and the nature of heritage 
sites and assets, in almost being cradles for crime which did not disperse into the local 
area, meant that the victims, and local community more broadly, only felt a fear of crime 
and a risk of increased victimisation on heritage sites and assets specifically. This fear of 
crime was not illustrative of a fear of crime and victimisation more broadly. This is an 
important area to explore in further research in the field as it calls into question some of 









7.6.1A: Criminological theories and: the Risk society and Labelling theory  
 
The Risk Society 
Two theoretical constructs may also provide useful frameworks for improving the praxis 
response to heritage crime: Beck’s (1992) ‘risk society’ and labelling theory.  The risk 
society is a product of late modernity, the period in which we currently live. Late 
modernity (otherwise known as high/liquid/reflexive modernity) is a fraught period of 
change, characterised by rapid technological advancement, detraditionalisation, 
disembedding of social life, and reflexivity (Giddens, 1991). Constant reflexivity leads to 
ontological insecurity, and the risk society is a response to the pervasiveness of 
ontological insecurity. The significant changes of the world around us, the shift from 
modernity to late modernity, has increased our awareness of risk, as Beck (1992: 21) 
illustrates, risk is ‘…a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities of induced 
and introduced by modernisation.’ The police response to the risk society is through a 
constant process of risk management and risk assessment, which is reliant upon 
knowledge, in the form of data (Maguire, 2000).  
 
In the risk society, with the police as the thin blue line between chaos and order, crime 
and victims are rationalised through the measurement and management of risk. 
Hierarchies of victims are created; with victims deemed most ‘at risk’ receiving the most 
immediate police attention. Although the police are the knowledge brokers of the risk 
society, organisations and communities are also expected to participate in measuring risk, 
as the police ‘…help them to look after their own risk management’ (Ericson and 
Haggerty, 1997: 67). This is usually in the form of crime prevention, which, as this thesis 
has shown, rarely works in the case of heritage crime, for cultural and historical reasons, 
alongside the nature of aged heritage sites and assets. Moreover, knowledge in the risk 
society manifests itself through the use of collated data held on police databases (ibid), 
and there is currently no clear police data on heritage crime.  
  
It could be argued that there is an absence of risk with heritage crime. Therefore, officers 
may be seen as being tolerant of risk when policing the crime. Officers in this study made 
frequent reference to risk. Risk was constantly considered in their work, and the officers 
were conscious that the measurement of risk ensured that heritage crime would be at the 
bottom of the ‘risk agenda’ of policing; with no immediate victim, no immediate harm, no 
risk of a high risk situation. From the policing perspective, heritage crime is ‘low risk’, 
with no data to merit the policing of it. From a heritage practitioner and victim 
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perspective, heritage crime is high risk. Once again, a clear clash between the police, and 
heritage practitioners and victims, emerges, who both view risk in relation to heritage on 
the opposite ends of the risk spectrum. Risk, in a policing context, simply does not apply 
to heritage crime and, in fact, acts as a detriment to the protection of heritage.  
 
Labelling Theory  
As Chapter 2 explored, heritage is socially constructed. This may lead to an uneven 
approach in labelling: some heritage is considered more worthy of preservation and 
conservation that other types of heritage, some forms of heritage are labelled elite, others, 
industrial, each with socially constructed connotations (Smith, 2006).  
 
To contextualise the impact of not labelling heritage crime as a crime, we can turn to 
labelling theory. Labelling theory has been developed and advanced by a variety of 
sociological and criminological theorists across the 20th century, such as Becker (1963) 
and Lemert (1972). These theorists interpret labelling theory in differing ways, but their 
interpretations are all underpinned by the idea that crime and deviance are socially 
constructed, and that nothing is deviant or criminal until it has been labelled as such. 
Collating and considering the experiences of all the interviewees across this thesis, 
through the lens of labelling theory, it appears that those who commit heritage crime out 
of ignorance are arguably more likely to be labelled deviant or criminal, for a crime they 
do not understand the severity of nor perhaps realise they are committing; than those who 
consciously commit heritage crime, understand its severity, and know the harm and 
damage they are causing. The latter individual is more likely to evade the criminal label.  
 
It is suggested that those who commit more minor heritage crimes, stemming from 
ignorance (or not), cross-over with ‘regular crimes’ and have facets which allow officers 
to label these crimes, and the perpetrators of these crimes, with relative ease. For example, 
graffiti, vandalism, or ASB on a heritage site or asset are more likely to leave evidence, to 
be recognisable by officers, to allow officers to apply legislation they are accustomed to 
(such as criminal damage). On the other hand, heritage crimes which are more serious and 
deliberate such as nighthawking, lead theft from churches, and heritage marine crimes 
rarely leave evidence (Bradley et al, 2012) and therefore, evade police involvement, thus 
avoiding the labelling process. Indeed, as labelling theorists stress, and in the case of 
heritage crime in particular, ‘…deviance is not the quality of the act the person commits, 
but rather a consequence of the application by others…’ (Becker, 1963: 8). Smaller, less 
significant crimes are dealt with by the powerful (the police), but the crimes committed by 
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those who have knowledge and awareness of the heritage crime they are committing 
(power) are difficult to police, and therefore, largely ignored.  
 
 
7.6.2: A Zemiological Approach?  
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis explored how both heritage and crime share the fundamental 
similarity of being socially constructed by those with power. In addition to both heritage, 
and crime, victims are also socially constructed by the powerful (Miers, 1990). As 
heritage crime is not legally defined as a crime, there are no legally defined victims of 
heritage crime. Of course, this thesis has proved that there are indeed victims of heritage 
crime. Working within the official definitions of crime has been said to be a disservice to 
victims (Elias, 1985: 6). To address these shortcomings, it is worth considering a 
zemiological approach to the study of heritage crime. Adopting this approach would allow 
heritage crime scholars to examine the plethora of unrecognised harms and variety of 
victims which emerge from the crime. Considering that there is no heritage crime law, and 
the harms resulting from heritage crime are not captured legally (for example, loss of 
heritage to future generations), then the argument for a zemiological approach to the study 
of heritage crime is particularly pertinent.  
 
Zemiologists argue that the criminal law is said to be unable to capture the more 
damaging and pervasive forms of harm which exist (Hillyard and Tombs, 2003: 12). 
Thus, zemiology looks beyond legally defined harms to consider harms which are not 
outlined in criminal law, or harms which are, but are either ignored or handled without 
resort to it (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004: 13). Zemiologists consider the following social 
harms: economic/financial, physical, and psychological harm, and harms relating to 
cultural safety (ibid). Every victim in this study experienced such harms, bar physical 
harm. Adopting a zemiological approach to the study of heritage crime and victims of 
heritage crime would mirror the zemiological considerations in similarly marginalised 
areas of crime.  
 
For example, green victimologists examine green victimisation through a zemiological 
lens (McKie et al, 2016), allowing these scholars to address the more ‘legally ambiguous 
activities which foster victimisation’ Hall (2013: 14). Moreover, adopting a zemiological 
approach allows scholars to consider crimes where the victim may not be immediately 
apparent, is widespread, or perceived as victimless, such as climate change (Brisman and 
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South, 2013) and wildlife crime (Nurse, 2017). All of these benefits to using a 
zemiological approach can equally be applied to heritage crime.  
 
Therefore, it is argued that discussions around heritage crime should adopt, in part, a 
zemiological approach. Physical harms are unlikely to be a result of heritage crime, but 
financial, social, and psychological harm, are all harms which can occur as a result of 
heritage crime.  The psychological harms which emerge from heritage crime are 
substantial. Chapter 6 demonstrated the extensive psychological impacts of heritage crime 
upon victims, ranging from anger, to feelings of despair over the destruction of heritage, 
and extreme stress and worry over how to afford specialist repairs to the heritage sites and 
assets they looked after. Indeed, these specialist repairs form part of the financial harm 
associated with heritage crime, repairs which, if severe enough, can threaten the survival 
of heritage sites and assets. This also relates to the notion of cultural safety, which 
concerns notions of autonomy, development and growth, but also and crucially in the 
context of heritage crime, access to cultural, intellectual and informational resources 
which are generally available in any given society (Hillyard and Tombs, 2004: 20). The 
destruction of whole heritage sites and assets, the illegal trafficking of heritage assets, the 
removal of heritage assets from where their original resting place and the defacing of 
heritage sites and assets, all clearly contribute towards a loss of cultural, intellectual and 
informational resources.  
 
From a policy and practice perspective, situating heritage crime within a zemiological 
framework could also be beneficial for improving understanding of its impact among 
police officers. Expressing the various harms which heritage crime causes may help 
officers to understand the severity and impact of the crime, as well as the broad range of 
victims emerging from it. Indeed, the small number of heritage crime officers across 
England and Wales who are aware and knowledgeable of the impacts of heritage crime 
may already be considering heritage crime from a harms perspective, albeit without 












7.7 : Conclusion 
 
This chapter examined the factors which contributed to the generally limited police 
understandings and perceptions and, poor awareness of heritage crime. Firstly, it examined 
how factors relating specifically to police culture contributed to poor police 
understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime. Issues with partnership 
working were then explored. The problems of general underfunding across the CJS, and 
how this was likely to impact upon the efficacy of Wildlife, Rural and Heritage Crime 
Prosecutors was discussed. The chapter further highlighted the importance of focussing 
efforts upon improving the overall understanding and awareness of heritage crime across 
the CPS. Whilst acknowledging the budgetary constraints currently assailing policing, this 
chapter demonstrated how heritage crime training might be accomplished, which meets 
the needs of officers, heritage practitioners and victims, but remains cognisant of the 
financial restrictions facing police forces across England and Wales. 
 
This chapter also made suggestions relating to theory and practice. A key aspect of this 
thesis, pertaining to victims, was the development of the victim typology in Section 7.4. 
Defining and distilling the breadth and depth of the victims of heritage crime was key to 
not only this thesis, but central to furthering academic understandings of how the victims 
of heritage crime perceive themselves, and others, as victims of the phenomenon. In 
practice, this is anticipated to help officers understand, and be more aware of, who the 
victims of heritage crime are, and why heritage crime can be devastating to such a broad 
range of individuals. The discovery of victims ‘de-victimising’ themselves revealed how 
the awareness of austerity measures amongst victims has a significant impact upon how 
they view their right to a police response to heritage crime. In presenting an original model 
to avoid heritage crime being allocated to officers who are uninterested in the area, this 
chapter demonstrated how the policing of heritage crime has been ill-thought-out, and that 
this has negatively impacted upon the officers responsible for policing it. Lastly, the 
creation of Ruined Windows Theory was a key development in the field of heritage crime, 
which has, until now, been a theoretical desert. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
‘Victimhood is a contested space’ (Cross, 2018: 243) 
 
 
This quote is particularly relevant to heritage crime, for it summarises the crux of the 
heritage crime ‘problem’ which emerged from this thesis. This was that there will always 
be differing perspectives between police officers, victims of heritage crime and heritage 
practitioners regarding the severity and importance of the phenomenon. Whilst victims 
and concepts of victimisation naturally change over time, and are subject to social, 
political, cultural and economic influences (Green and Pemberton, 2018), these influences 
are even more nuanced in the case of heritage crime. However, no research thus far had 
addressed the large gap in the existing heritage crime literature, namely the qualitative 
investigation of heritage crime from victims, police officers, and heritage practitioners’ 
perspectives (RQs 2, 3 and 4). This research aimed to fill this gap. In order to answer this 
overarching aim, this study sought to answer the following five research questions: 
 
1. How has the heritage sector in England and Wales influenced attitudes towards 
heritage and heritage crime in each country? 
 
2. How do police officers understand, became aware of and perceive heritage crime, 
and how does this affect their response to victims? 
 
3. What obstacles exist to impede the effective policing of heritage crime in England 
and Wales? 
 
4. Who are the victims of heritage crime, and how do they understand, perceive and 
respond to it? 
 
5. Can victim-focussed mechanisms be developed to overcome the obstacles to the 
effective policing of heritage crime? 
 
Many of the findings which emerged from this research rarely affected one group of 
participants singularly. For example, the role of police culture in heritage crime not only 
impacted upon police understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime, but it 
also affected the victims of heritage crime. Indeed, the vast majority of the issues raised in 
Chapters 4 and 5, and the participants affected by them, were closely intertwined. 
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Therefore, this chapter will illustrate how this thesis answered the first four research 
questions through a series of suggested changes below, each pertaining to a particular 
theme which emerged throughout this thesis. The fifth research question is answered in the 
‘Recommendations’ section towards the end of this chapter. 
 
8.1 : Heritage and crime 
 
Heritage crime itself ties into a wider debate about what heritage is, how it is defined, who 
is responsible for its preservation and conservation, and ‘whose’ heritage is most 
important to maintain. An examination of these aforementioned factors (RQ1) revealed 
that conceptions of heritage in England and Wales have been and continue to be narrow in 
perspective. A review of the limited existing literature found a lack of experience in 
dealing with heritage crime across the CJS, from the police to the CPS, and revealed that 
attitudes towards heritage crime and its’ victims appeared to be poor. In particular, an 
examination of the victims of heritage crime suggested that police officers were unlikely 
to understand the severity and impact of this form of crime. Chapters 5 and 6 confirmed 
these assumptions (RQ2, RQ4), and are discussed further below. The protection, 
preservation, and conservation of heritage is undoubtedly important to many people. 
Heritage crime is, as this thesis has discovered, a definite policing issue. However, in 
examining police culture alongside the current policing approach to heritage crime, it was 
confirmed that there were multiple barriers to police understanding, awareness and 
perceptions of the phenomenon. 
 
8.1.1 : Police culture 
 
 
As a relatively new area of crime within policing (Historic England, 2019d) it was 
important to establish police understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime, 
and how these might impact upon police responses to victims of heritage crime (RQ2). 
This research revealed that the overall understandings, awareness, and perceptions of 
heritage crime were mostly poor amongst officers in both England and Wales. Three 
themes directly relating to police culture, emerged in Chapter 4 (RQ4), including fear of 
engaging with an unknown area of crime, the lack of an immediate human victim (which 
led to officers downgrading the importance of the crime), and little to no training 
(resulting in a lack of overall knowledge of heritage crime). Combined, these all 
contributed to a poor response to heritage crime from police officers in general. 
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Individually, these factors illustrated how police culture is interwoven into police officers’ 
understandings, awareness and perceptions of heritage crime. 
 
Chapter 4 also revealed that the poor responses by regular police officers were also clearly 
influenced by police culture (RQ2). Firstly, it became apparent from the interviewed 
officer’s responses that the ‘lay low’ and ‘cover your ass’ mantra amongst regular officers, 
appeared to prevent them from engaging in the policing of heritage crime. Officers were 
reluctant to risk making mistakes in an area of crime which was unfamiliar to them (Van 
Maanen, 1974). This reluctance to engage in unfamiliar crimes is arguably heightened in 
heritage crime cases, where the crime can affect swathes of people, and the consequences 
of an inadequate police responses may incur the outrage of whole communities (RQ4). 
Heritage crime is also very rarely action packed or exciting, therefore failing to provide 
officers with a sense of mission when responding to it (Reiner, 2010). Without this sense 
of mission, officers (heritage crime officers excluded) were found to perceive heritage 
crime as ‘rubbish’ (Waddington, 2014) and unworthy of police attention. Regular officers 
were found to be disinterested in investigating heritage crime cases, and downgraded the 
importance of the crime (RQ2, RQ3). In addition, crimes which lack an immediate human 
victim, such as heritage crime, were (understandably) not considered important, in 
comparison to other crimes with an immediate human victim. Subsequently, the policing 
of heritage crime was (and continues to be) insufficiently resourced, resulting in heritage 
crime SPOCs receiving limited to no training, poor guidance, and no support. They were 
also not provided with the time to advertise their role internally, making it in some ways, 
redundant (RQ3). 
 
Lastly, two facets of police culture which emerged strongly in this research are the 
unquestioning deference to one’s superiors, and the lack of recognition of the lived 
realities of frontline officers from superiors themselves (Reiner, 1992a; Rowe, 2006). The 
superiors in this case, the NPCC, have unfortunately contributed to the marginalisation 
and continued misperceptions of heritage crime within policing. For example, the idea that 
heritage crime is closely linked to rural and wildlife crime, has been supported by NPCC 
documentation (NPCC, 2017; NPCC, 2018b). This internal discourse has marginalised 
heritage crime further within policing. Moreover, the consequences of affixing heritage 
crime to rural and wildlife crime were felt acutely by the RWCOs, who held responsibility 
for heritage crime, as they failed to understand how their existing skillset would aid them 
in their policing of the crime (RQ4). Overall, and as the officers themselves alluded to in 
this study, any police officer recognises ‘…that to make something into a crime requires 
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work’ (Sumner, 1994: 218). This research revealed that heritage crime is highly likely to 
incur time consuming work with unfamiliar partners outside of policing, such as engaging 
with heritage practitioners. Officers also might have to employ heritage specific laws 
which they have little knowledge of and experience using. It is unsurprising therefore, that 
the SPOCs described regular officers as having little incentive to engage in heritage crime 
cases, despite being told of their importance by the heritage crime SPOC in question 
(RQ2, RQ4). Heritage crime was simply another pressure that these officers, and the 
policing organisation itself, did not need. 
 
8.1.2 : Austerity measures 
 
 
Although the overall police response to heritage crime was poor, there were pockets of 
good practice, and a steadily improving response in all four forces in Wales. It transpired 
that the key driver behind a positive, consistent police response to heritage crime (RQ2) 
and its victims (RQ5) was a dedicated and enthusiastic officer who is passionate about 
policing the area; mirroring findings in the similarly marginalised areas of rural and 
wildlife crime (Kirkwood, 1994; Nurse, 2008). However, regardless of whether a heritage 
crime officer was enthusiastic and motivated to police heritage crime, an officer’s ability 
to undertake the successful policing of the crime was often greatly inhibited by factors 
beyond their control. In exploring the obstacles that exist in relation to the prevention and 
policing of heritage crime (RQ3), it was found that austerity measures were a sizeable 
contributor to numerous issues associated with policing the area. With inadequate 
resources available at their disposal, and very limited justification to prioritise heritage 
crime, even the most passionate officer was forced to relegate this crime to the very 
bottom of their workload. In addition, the passing on of the heritage crime officer role 
between officers, and the total absence of the role in numerous English forces, left existing 
heritage crime officers without a strong support network. For all intents and purposes, the 
heritage crime officers in this research were largely operating alone in their pursuit of 
heritage crime. 
 
8.2 : Structural obstacles 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 highlighted numerous structural obstacles which hindered the policing 
of heritage crime and impeded the positive treatment of victims of the crime across 
England and Wales unanimously (RQ2, RQ3). A key structural obstacle which affected all 
participants related to issues with reporting and recording heritage crime. Heritage crime 
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is not required to be recorded by the Home Office (and if heritage crime is recorded on 
police systems, there is no means of delineating it as a ‘heritage crime’). Without any 
police recorded data on heritage crime, it was exceptionally hard for victims and heritage 
practitioners to prove that heritage crime was a policing problem (RQ3, RQ4). Indeed, the 
assertions of both victims and heritage practitioners that heritage crime was a growing 
issue, could not be supported without statistical evidence from the police (RQ3). From a 
policing perspective, whilst a lack of police recorded data meant that heritage crime was 
not a policing problem, it also meant that police officers could not efficiently and 
effectively police it (RQ3). 
 
Reporting heritage crime presented victims with numerous difficulties (RQ4). Call 
handlers were revealed to be gatekeepers to a police response (Garner and Johnson, 2006), 
arguably more so with heritage crimes than other forms of crime, as call handlers were 
unfamiliar with the area. Victims would diligently report heritage crime, but would rarely 
see results from their actions, as they found it difficult to convey the importance and 
impact (RQ4) of a crime which, to call handlers, did not exist. Further issues were 
incurred when call handlers judged the severity and urgency of a heritage crime call 
against narrow existing criteria for ‘normal’ crimes, which could not account for the 
specifics of heritage crime cases. Chapter 6 also revealed how call handlers closed down 
valid heritage crime cases, arguing that it was not a crime, despite victims and heritage 
practitioners stressing that heritage crime was a crime, and did require a police response 
(RQ3). This left both parties feeling exasperated (RQ3). 
 
Although existing research indicated that negative experiences with call handlers may 
prevent victims from reporting further crime (Rossetti et al, 2017; Stafford, 2018) victims 
continued to report heritage crime (RQ4). Chapter 6 revealed that whilst victims may have 
been left feeling exasperated by the poor treatment of them from call handlers (RQ3), they 
felt that they had a responsibility, a moral obligation, to report heritage crime for the 
benefit of current and future generations (RQ4). Bad experiences with the police will 
clearly not dissuade victims of heritage crime from reporting the crime, and heritage crime 
is clearly a policing problem which cannot be ignored. 
 
8.2.1 : Beyond the Police: heritage crime and CPS 
 
 
More broadly, this thesis revealed that other parts of the CJS, outside of policing, were the 
source of various obstacles which impeded both police officers and heritage practitioners 
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(RQ3). Findings from Chapter 4 emphasised how police officers focus upon the legal 
definition of crimes, of which there is none for heritage crime. Prosecution of heritage 
crime cases were, therefore, not seen as straightforward, amongst regular officers (RQ3). 
Indeed, this research revealed that the average officer was unlikely to be aware of 
legislation pertaining to heritage crime, nor the fact that heritage crime is an aggravating 
factor in court, meaning that officers would prosecute heritage crime under legislation 
with which they were familiar (RQ2, RQ3).This serves to negate sentencing guidelines 
which have endeavoured to ensure that heritage crime cases receive a proportionate 
sentence in court (Historic England, 2018; 2019c). Chapter 4 also revealed how the extra 
work necessary to prosecute a heritage crime case (such as finding and contacting heritage 
experts) could be a burden, even for the heritage crime officers (RQ2). 
 
In turn, a general lack of understanding and knowledge from the CPS concerning heritage 
crime emerged as a considerable obstacle facing both heritage practitioners and the police 
(RQ3). Heritage practitioners experienced difficulties in getting the CPS to understand the 
importance of heritage crime. Officers meanwhile, explained how the efforts spent 
building a case file, including contacting specialists and drawing together a HCIS, could 
all be thwarted by unknowledgeable magistrates or judges, who failed to understand the 
impact and importance of heritage crime (RQ3, RQ4). Specialist CPS prosecutors for 
rural, wildlife and heritage crime are in place across England and Wales (CPS, 2019), but 
with one per CPS Area, the officers recalled from personal experience how their 
involvement in cases was not always guaranteed (RQ4). Recognition of these pitfalls is 
crucial, as is raising awareness and increasing knowledge of heritage crime across the 
CPS. Introducing changes to the policing of heritage crime will all be redundant if the 
CPS cannot be relied upon, to appreciate the devasting impact and importance of heritage 
crime. 
 
8.2.3: Victims and heritage crime 
 
 
This research found that the victims and impacts of heritage crime are vast and varied, 
which the officers in this study all understood (RQ2, RQ4). The experience of the victims 
however suggested that this knowledge was not widespread across police forces, 
considering the generally negative police responses the victims received (RQ2, RQ4). 
When police officers responded to heritage crime, issues raised in Chapter 6 by victims 
included: having to inform attending officers that heritage crime was a crime, a lack of 
follow-up, and officers failing to take heritage crime seriously or consider it a police 
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problem (RQ2, RQ4). Whilst police officers provided a generally poor response, this 
research found that PCSOs provided a response that was unanimously considered to be 
positive, understanding, and compassionate (RQ2). Unlike police officers, PCSOs also did 
not appear to need an existing personal interest in heritage or heritage crime to provide 
good practice, as their immersion in local communities gave them an understanding of the 
severity and impact of the crime. 
 
The victims themselves highlighted a key obstacle in the policing of heritage crime (RQ3) 
which is important to address but difficult to navigate. Specifically, this obstacle 
concerned the fact that many crimes which are a crime on a heritage site or asset are not a 
crime in other places. Unknowledgeable attending officers, therefore, could not 
understand why victims were so distraught over events, and impacts, which appeared 
innocuous to them, such as a hole in the ground from illegal metal detecting. Upon being 
told that what had occurred was indeed a crime by victims, officers were reported as being 
dismissive, and at times, openly resistant to recognising what was a legitimate crime 
(RQ2). Despite this, the general consensus amongst the victims was that most police 
officers were not intentionally careless, but that their often blasé attitudes towards heritage 
crime were influenced by a lack of understanding, training, and familiarity with the crime; 
alongside the pressures of austerity measures upon officers (RQ2, RQ4). 
 
The next section of this chapter will focus upon the recommendations that this thesis has 
suggested in order to improve the policing of heritage crime across England and Wales. 
 
8.3 : Recommendations 
 
There are a variety of recommendations which are suggested to improve the policing of 
heritage crime and the treatment of victims (RQ5). However, these recommendations must 
be contextualised in the current policing environment and the prevailing organisational 
attitudes towards ‘victimless’ crimes. These suggestions are separated into different 
categories, including cultural and policy changes, practical changes, theoretical changes, 
and structural changes. Each change is highlighted alongside a respective recommendation 
below. 
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8.3.1 : Policy changes 
 
 
The influence of police culture upon the police organisation’s approach to the policing of 
heritage crime has led to internal marginalisation, ill-thought-out affixation of the crime to 
officers, and general inconsistencies in policing the area across forces in England and 
Wales. These inconsistencies were highlighted in the FOI results, which revealed that not 
all forces in England have a heritage crime officer, contradicting official NPCC 
documentation concerning heritage crime (NPCC, 2017). The FOI results highlighted the 
disjuncture between the realities and complications of policing heritage crime from the 
frontline, and the messages from police leaders. Cultural change is extremely difficult 
within policing (Chan, 1996), but efforts can certainly be made to soften certain aspects of 
police culture. Police leaders must seek the input of frontline officers in relation to 
heritage crime, as frontline officers currently have the greatest experience in the area. 
Therefore, this experience must be drawn upon. 
 
 
Narratives from police leaders must align more closely with the operational realities of 
policing heritage crime. Continued oversight from police leaders has left heritage crime 
officers without training, adequate support networks, and guidance. Indeed, frontline 
officers have been acknowledged for their ability to translate, adapt and resist policy 
which does not reflect the realities of frontline policing (Davis, 2019:79). To ignore 
frontline officers in the policing of heritage crime not only does a huge disservice to these 
officers, many of whom did not pursue the policing of heritage crime, but also, arguably, 
jeopardises heritage sites and assets. More broadly, officers have recently reported in the 
Home Office Front Line Review as feeling that the NPCC could be stronger at supporting 
the rank and file (Betts and Farmer, 2019: 177). Moving forwards, the current realities of 
rank and file policing must be acknowledged by the current NPCC Heritage and Cultural 
Property Crime Lead. 
 
8.3.1A: Policy changes: the possibility of training  
 
The difficulties associated with introducing heritage crime training and providing police 
officers with some level of general knowledge surrounding heritage crime are significant, 
as this thesis has explored, for heritage crime is neither a policing priority nor considered 
an important enough area to dedicate limited resources to. Officers in this thesis 
highlighted the fact that implementing police training for heritage crime would be almost 
impossible. However, recent changes to police education, in the form of the Police 
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Education Qualification Framework (PEQF herein), may provide opportunities to 
integrate a foundational level of heritage crime training, or at least knowledge acquisition 
in relation to the area. Consisting of three entry routes, (Police Constable Degree 
Apprenticeship, undergraduate degree in professional policing, or a 2 year conversion 
course for those with a degree that is not professional policing) the PEQF is a 
standardised national framework which sets out the minimum educational requirements 
by rank or level of practice for all police officers and staff (Ramshaw and Soppitt, 2018: 
244).  
 
The PEQF was created in response to the changing nature of crime and role of the police 
in the 21st century and seeks to introduce new forms of knowledge into police forces 
(Williams et al, 2019). In particular, the PEQF aims to address ‘new’ crimes which 
undermine traditional police learning and training (Ramshaw and Soppitt, 2018). Age old 
mantras of ‘common-sense’ and ‘learning on the job’ clash against a spectrum of ‘new’ 
crimes, which require entirely different policing approaches to which officers are 
accustomed. Indeed, the College of Policing acknowledges that there ‘…is increasing 
demand on the police to do more than just solve crime and ‘catch the bad guy.’’ (College 
of Policing, 2021: n.d).  It is suggested that the PEQF is an ideal platform for the 
inclusion of marginalised crimes, such as heritage crime. Of course, to justify the 
inclusion of heritage crime within the PEQF’s remit, heritage crime would have to be 
grouped with similarly marginalised crimes: the trio of heritage, rural and wildlife crime 
would be the most feasible.  
 
Of the 3 PEQF entry routes, introducing rural, wildlife and heritage crime into the 
undergraduate curriculum would arguably be the most effective and receptive method of 
teaching potential officers about heritage crime. Undergraduates on professional policing 
courses appear to have the least contact with the police out of these 3 entry methods and 
are therefore less likely to have police culture influence their opinions of marginalised 
crimes. If marginalised areas of crime can be introduced to potential  police officers 
before they enter the police force, they may be able to circumvent (or be less receptive to) 
the cultural influence in formulating their opinions of, and policing, these crimes; all 3 of 
which are traditionally perceived as ‘rubbish work’ (Reiner, 2000). Introducing 
marginalised areas of crime into the undergraduate curriculum would be markedly easier 




 Indeed, Brown (2018: 15) notes that the Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship, 
although not completely dominated by police forces, is likely to be too ‘…police 
controlled, and may be particularly susceptible to the potential adverse socialising effects 
of the police occupational culture.’ The PEQF is certainly not the solution to 
comprehensive police understanding of heritage crime, but introducing marginalised 
crimes through the PEQF may have a small, but significant, impact upon overall 
knowledge and police perception of heritage crime. 
 
 
8.3.2 : Structural changes: 
 
 
An important structural factor which currently impedes the policing of heritage crime is a 
lack of accurate recording and reporting in the area. As raised in Chapters 4 and 7, there 
are currently no reporting and recording standards for heritage crime in England and 
Wales. Introducing reporting and recording standards for heritage crime would be greatly 
beneficial, not only for improving the treatment of victims and heritage practitioners who 
report offences, but also for our overall knowledge regarding the nature and extent of 
heritage crime. These reporting and recording standards would, understandably, not be 
flawless, but would go some way to plugging a huge data knowledge gap in relation to 
heritage crime. Implementing standards might help inform policy makers and police 
leaders where heritage crime is most concentrated, thereby enabling a more targeted police 
response. Heritage crime training could then be focussed upon forces where recorded 
levels of heritage crime are the highest. Moreover, recorded data may allow policing 
approaches such as POP and ILP to be used, as both approaches require data. Whilst 
changing internal police recording systems seems highly unlikely in the short term, 
relatively simply actions such as providing call handlers with guidance on heritage crime 
would help to provide a clearer picture. Call handlers may not be able to record certain 
heritage crimes even if they do recognise them, but the sheer acknowledgement of these 
crimes could help to validate victims, as well as enable a more effective police response. 
 
A further structural factor to consider concerns alternative models of enforcement in 
relation to heritage crime. These might include a National Heritage Crime Unit, similarly 
to the National Wildlife Crime Unit, and/or a multi-agency approach to policing heritage 




As this thesis has illustrated, austerity measures continue to assail both the heritage sector 
and police forces across the UK (Dodd, 2019a). Nevertheless, it is suggested that a 
Heritage Crime Unit would be a useful structural addition to the existing methods of 
policing heritage crime in England and Wales; akin to the NWCU (as mentioned in 
Chapter 7). With a limited budget, a Heritage Crime Unit would most likely remain small. 
Nevertheless, there would be scope for such a unit to grow, as the NWCU did with 
continued lobbying, changes in crime trends, and increasing attention being paid to 
wildlife crime (NWCU, 2019). As the importance of wildlife crime has risen in policing 
agendas, despite still being marginalised, funding for the NWCU has been relatively 
sustained. The Unit remains small, but its’ size has not reduced its’ impact or efficacy, and 
it is recognised and well regarded by RWCOs across the UK. However, when such 
specialised units are formalised, there are a variety of consequences.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, police officers often perceive specialised units as containing 
the only individuals capable of policing crimes within the Unit’s remit and may be 
tempted to simply ‘pass on’ crimes under the Unit’s remit which they do not want to 
police. These units are also commonly a target for policing budget cuts. The NWCU itself 
was threatened with budget cuts in 2016 (Carrington, 2016) which could have led to its 
total closure, whilst the current unit which polices cultural and heritage crime in London, 
the Arts and Antiques Unit, was temporarily disbanded, (a disbandment which the arts and 
antiques community was convinced might have been permanent) and its officers deployed 
to help with the Grenfell Tower disaster in 2017 (Reyburn, 2017).  
However, the attention a crime receives once it is formalised into an official national unit, 
alongside the benefit of centralised information and guidance in one place; largely 
outweighs these concerns. Moreover, the success of the AAU and the NWCU despite their 
size, suggests that niche areas of policing do not necessarily require the training of 
multiple officers to be effective; rather officers who are passionate, interested, and 
motivated, necessary traits echoed by the interviewed officers in this thesis.  
 
A National Heritage Crime Unit may work alongside a multi-agency approach. This thesis 
has identified the problems of the multi-agency approach in policing, and the reticence of 
police forces to engage in multi-agency working more generally. Nevertheless, in 
marginalised areas of crime like heritage crime, where a myriad of skill-sets are required 
(knowledge and practical experience of applying obscure legislation, an understanding of 
specific forms of heritage, regular engagement with other actors in the CJS, amongst 
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others), then a multi-agency policing approach to the problem appears to be the most 
useful way of combining the various skill-sets required to prevent, police and prosecute 
heritage crime. Indeed, a multi-agency approach to the policing of heritage crime is, 
arguably, unavoidable. Considering the willingness of heritage professionals to aid police 
officers in the policing of heritage crime, it is suggested that a multi-agency policing 
approach to heritage crime might be situated within one of the 6 regional offices in 
Historic England. Historic England’s headquarters are in London, but to place a multi-
agency policing group in London would be redundant, with the AAU also in London. It 
may also be perceived as centric to the South of England. Centring this unit outside of 
London would offer opportunities for multi-agency working with smaller heritage 
agencies which may not have easy access to London, heritage agencies which focus upon 
less elite forms of heritage and voluntary groups; alongside more established partners.  
 
In addition, the collection of heritage crime data ought to be considered. One of the most 
important issues which has assailed the policing of heritage crime is the inability for 
police forces to quantify the crime. Quantification of a crime is not only important for 
ascertaining where, when, and how frequently a crime is occurring, but is also crucial for 
obtaining support to tackle the crime and can clearly identify that the crime in question is 
a policing problem. Of course the paradox with quantifying heritage crime, by recording it 
on police systems, means that it becomes a policing problem. As explored in Chapter 4, 
police forces will not eagerly shoulder another area of crime. Yet, the fact that heritage 
crime is currently not recorded, is one of the contributory factors to the lack of police 
understanding, awareness, and knowledge of the phenomenon amongst police officers. 
Moreover, as the heritage practitioners all acknowledged, without statistics, they could not 
make a case for policing the swathes of heritage crime they knew was occurring, but 
which was absent from force databases. Quantifying heritage crime is unlikely, but the 
case must be made for quantifying the crime. Without quantifying heritage crime, the 
problem will continue to plague policing. Victims of heritage crime will not stop reporting 
the phenomenon: as Chapter 6 explored, victims see reporting heritage crime as a ‘moral 
duty’ to the protection of heritage. The last barrier, arguably, to the comprehensive 
policing of heritage crime (but not necessarily the improved treatment of victims) is the 







8.3.2A: Structural changes: a less punitive approach? 
 
It is arguable that considering a less punitive approach to tackling heritage crime would be 
a step forward in recognising the unique nature and impact of the crime. The current 
punitive punishments for heritage crime do not sufficiently reflect the damage and harm 
caused to victims and communities (Shelbourne, 2014b), nor is there any evidence of a 
deterrent effect. Indeed, the CPS’ focus upon monetary value in relation to sentencing 
detracts from the wealth of other, arguably more important, issues which emerge from a 
heritage crime. From the wealth of issues associated with taking heritage crime through 
the CJS, made by the officers and the heritage practitioners in Chapter 4, it seems that the 
prevailing punitive approach is inadequate. Therefore, it is contended that restorative 
approaches may hold potential in raising awareness of the impact of such offences among 
offenders. 
 
Conventional justice places little concern on the relationship between victim and offender 
(Calhoun and Pelech, 2010: 293). In heritage crime, the relationship between the victim 
and the offender is complex, with heritage crime often occurring out of ignorance, and the 
offender simultaneously being the victim (by damaging shared heritage). This complicated 
relationship indicates that a restorative approach may prove beneficial in heritage crime 
cases. Restorative approaches, although without a universal definition, are underpinned by 
‘values’ which are particular to it and in contrast to conventional justice such as respect, 
truth-telling, trust, fairness, empathy, participation, and voice (Pranis, 2007: 60-64; 
O’Mahony and Doak, 2017: 14).  Such values may instil a sense of agency and 
empowerment, which are strikingly absent in the conventional criminal justice system 
(O’Mahony and Doak, 2017). Empowering the victim in heritage crime cases has a host of 
benefits, not least due to the complicated relationship between victim/offender but, as 
explored in further detail below, it would offer the victim a chance to educate, inform and 
even perhaps empower the offender themselves (through a new knowledge and 
understanding of heritage). 
 
Current restorative approaches in police forces centre upon a restorative community 
resolution (a community resolution can be non-restorative), which is ‘instant’ restorative 
justice, or community/restorative conferencing (Shewan, 2010). A community resolution 
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is typically used for low level offences, where the offender admits responsibility, has no 
relevant offending history, and the victim does not want to undertake more formal action 
(Glen, 2017). Community/restorative conferencing are used for more persistent, serious 
crimes, or post-offence (Shewan, 2010), conditions which rarely apply for heritage crimes. 
Therefore, community resolutions appear to be the best non-punitive approach to dealing 
with heritage crime.  
 
Community resolutions help promote the perspective of the victim. They would be 
particularly useful for recognising the harms created by heritage crime which may not be 
recognised by the CJS, or which are not immediately apparent; such as the loss of 
provenance, loss of heritage to future generations, and psychological impacts. Indeed, a 
community resolution is the ideal arena within which to communicate the abstract sense of 
loss associated with heritage crime, to an offender. Chapter 2 illustrated that community 
resolutions were already being used by four police forces in relation to illegal metal 
detecting, suggesting that this restorative approach is feasible in cases of heritage crime. 
 
Community resolutions would offer the chance for the individual in charge of the site or 
asset to communicate to the offender the severity of heritage crime, no matter how 
seemingly insignificant the crime itself is. They could be used as an educational tool in 
heritage crime cases, in particular, benefitting offenders who commit heritage crime out of 
ignorance, and victims of heritage crime who do not want formal action taken because of 
the latter. An offender might be able to observe some portion of a heritage site or asset 
being repaired, to understand the protracted, costly, and difficult nature of fixing even the 
most minimal damage. This would act as a learning experience for the offender: even if 
the crime against the heritage site or asset seems insignificant, the harm caused has 
complex and lengthy consequences.  
 
 
8.3.3 : Theoretical developments: 
 
 
These potential developments in praxis should also be reflected in the further development 
of theory. Theoretical developments emerged from the use of Grounded Theory, for one of 
the products of utilising Grounded Theory as a method of analysis, is the generation of 
theory (Glaser, 1992). 
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This thesis set out to contribute theoretically to the field of heritage crime, an academic 
area which has remained a theoretical desert for numerous years. Theoretically, two 
empirical advancements were made pertaining to heritage crime. Heritage crime was 
found to empirically link into broader criminological concepts, including fear of crime and 
Broken Windows Theory (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). In particular, Broken Windows 
Theory was expanded upon from a heritage crime centric perspective, termed ‘Ruined 
Windows Theory.’ Crucially, in ‘Ruined Windows Theory’, initial instances of criminal 
behaviour did not have to occur for there to be subsequent crime attracted to the site or 
asset. This was because the appearance of the heritage site or asset, which is either 
decayed or dilapidated due to its age, attracted crime, as its appearance indicated that it 
was uncared for. Furthermore, it was also found that because much heritage crime occurs 
out of ignorance, unlike the deliberate acts which form the foundations of Broken 
Windows Theory, this meant that ‘Ruined Windows Theory’ was one step removed from 
(but has its roots in) Broken Windows Theory. 
 
The results of this thesis also demonstrated that fear of crime emerging from heritage 
crime was largely restricted to the heritage site or asset itself. Victims, and the local 
community who utilised the heritage sites and assets, did not experience a more general 
fear of crime because they were aware of the contextual aspects of heritage crime. 
Specifically, these contextual aspects were that heritage sites and assets were often 
perceived as a place to commit crime without recourse, and that much of the crime which 
occurred on them occurred out of ignorance. Therefore, the victims and local community 
the victims liaised with, felt that heritage crime was not an indication of wider disorder 
outside of heritage sites and assets. 
 
Existing perspectives on heritage crime cites crime prevention as a method of tackling 
heritage crime (Grove and Thomas, 2014; Grove and Pease, 2014), but no empirical basis 
supports this. This thesis revealed that whilst crime prevention measures could work well 
on heritage sites and assets in theory, in practice, these measures were largely ineffective. 
Reasons for their ineffectiveness included, for example, the permanently open nature of 
many sites and assets, and the cost implications of some crime prevention measures, such 
as paying for the presence of a permanent guardian on the site or asset. The victims 
explained how the latter was the most effective crime prevention measure, but, in these 
particular cases, the individuals concerned had had their posts rescinded due to budgetary 
constraints. Another flaw which emerged in crime prevention usage was the inability for 
police officers to understand that certain straightforward crime prevention measures could 
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not be applied on heritage sites and assets. The clearest example of this was officers who 
suggested that churches lock their doors to prevent crime, most likely unaware of the fact 
that heritage assets such as churches are traditionally kept open for long standing cultural 
reasons (Baker, 1999). Similarly, many heritage sites and assets are open access by design, 
and are therefore impossible to close (Humphries, 2006). 
 
Moreover, the victims were emphatic that heritage assets should be kept open for the 
enjoyment of others, despite the risk of crime. When police officers attempted to shoehorn 
traditional crime prevention practices onto heritage sites and assets, despite the victims 
repeatedly telling the officers they would not work, the police mantra was perceived as 
defeatist: “If crime prevention fails, there’s nothing else we can do.” This inflexibility on 
the part of officers and the wider police response to heritage crime reflects the focus upon 
crime prevention measures in police documentation (NPCC, 2016; NPCC, 2017), and is 
indicative of the limited thought that has been put into the policing of heritage crime. The 
NPCC and its partners must think more creatively about their approaches to tackling 
heritage crime as a whole, but crime prevention measures formulate a large part of their 
current approach. Whilst crime prevention has its merits, as Chapter 6 demonstrated, in the 
case of heritage crime it is fundamentally flawed, and will not take precedence over 
cultural traditions, nor prevent crime that occurs out of ignorance. 
 
Lastly, it is also worth considering the application of zemiology to the study of heritage 
crime. Heritage crime easily fits within the conceptual framework of zemiology. In 
particular, zemiology permits heritage crime scholars to capture the harms caused by 
heritage crime and allows these same scholars to consider broader forms of victimisation; 
meaning it is useful for exploring abstract victims of heritage crime such as future 
generations. Viewing heritage crime through a zemiological lens, and framing heritage 
crime in terms of the harms it causes, might also help police officers to comprehend the 
less immediate consequences of heritage crime and consider it in the light of its immediate 
impact upon victims and communities.  
 
 
8.4 : Concluding thoughts 
 
 
Clearly, there are numerous changes which can be made to the policing of heritage crime 
and the treatment of victims of the phenomenon. Heritage crime is gaining traction in 
policing and police forces across England and Wales are gradually becoming more aware 
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of the problem. Despite the challenges the officers in this research faced, they were all 
determined to police heritage crime to the best of their ability. However, amongst officers 
more generally, the perception of heritage crime is poor, and the treatment of victims, 
substandard. Police perceptions of victims remain unyieldingly based in the tangible, 
immediate human victim, whilst officers still struggle to recognise crimes without an 
immediate human victim as being important (Flynn and Hall, 2017); juxtaposing directly 
against the varied victims and broad impact of heritage crime. Indeed, although the 
impacts of heritage crime may not always be immediately obvious to officers, they are 
acutely felt by the victims of heritage crime. Problematically however, heritage crime 
demands a police response which contrasts against traditional police methods, including 
responding to crimes which are not immediately obvious or leave no evidence (such as 
illegal metal detecting appearing to only leave holes in the ground), engaging heavily with 
partners, and utilising proactive instead of reactive policing. 
 
Indeed, the effective policing of heritage crime does not appear to be achievable without 
collaboration. More academic research is greatly needed to help forces police heritage 
crime more effectively. Linguistic and cultural barriers must be overcome between 
heritage practitioners and police officers, and police leaders must engage more with 
heritage crime officers. As this research only centred upon England and Wales, further 
research, with a greater budget and more time, could include Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, in order to gain a more rounded view of heritage crime policing across the UK. 
Studies on a smaller scale, which would improve our understandings of the realities of 
policing heritage crime from a cultural perspective, might involve ethnographic work with 
the police. Building on the findings of this research, it would be beneficial to explore the 
victims of heritage crime further, conducting qualitative research with communities and 
individuals who feel victimised by heritage crime, but are not geographically close to the 
heritage site or asset in question. Overall, whilst the policing of heritage crime does incur 
extra work on the part of police, the seriousness of the crime merits police attention 
despite the latter. Indeed, as all the participants in this thesis stressed, once heritage crime 
has damaged or destroyed a site or asset: 
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Appendix 1: Interview schedules 
Appendix 2: Freedom of Information Request email 
Appendix 3: Freedom of Information Request responses 
 
Appendix 1: Police officers and heritage practitioners interview schedule 
As part of my PhD, I am investigating the understandings and responses to ‘heritage 
crime’ across England and Wales. Your views are considered to be very important to this 
research, and therefore I wondered whether you may be prepared to answer the following 
questions. This interview is anticipated to take no more than one hour and all interview 
responses are anonymised. 
 
1. In your opinion, what are the impacts of heritage crime? 
 
 
2. Who are the victims of heritage crime? 
 
 
3. What are the impacts of heritage crime on its victims? 
 
 
4. In your experience, when they report such instances, are victims aware that it is a 
heritage crime specifically? 
 
 
5. What are your opinions on the legislation concerning heritage crime? 
 
 
6. Do you believe that there are strong enough penalties in place to prevent heritage 
crime? 
 
7. In your opinion, what obstacles exist in responding to heritage crime? 
 
 
8. Do you think that there is sufficient training available for police officers relating to 
heritage crime? 
 
9. Based on your personal experiences, how far do you feel that police officers 
understand heritage crime? 
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10. How far do you feel that collaborative partnership working (such as ARCH, the MOU) 
is the best method with which to tackle heritage crime? 
 
11. Do you think that the focus on metal theft has had an impact upon heritage crime 
awareness and understanding? 
 
12. How would you improve awareness and understanding of heritage crime within your 
police force? (/the police force across England and Wales more broadly-to use when 
interviewing heritage professionals) 
 
13. Could the recording of heritage crime be improved and if so how? 
 
 




Thank you for participating in this interview. If you would like a copy of this interview 
once it has been transcribed, please contact me on: bethan.poyser@ntu.ac.uk and I will 
gladly supply one. 
 
 
Appendix 1A: Victims interview schedule 
As part of my PhD, I am investigating the understandings and responses to ‘heritage 
crime’ across England and Wales. I am particularly interested in the discrepancies 
between victims and police practitioners’ understandings and experiences of heritage 
crime, with a view as to recommending improvements for policing policy. Your views are 
considered to be very important to this research, and therefore I wondered whether or not 
you may be prepared to answer the following questions. This interview is anticipated to 
take no more than one hour and all interview responses are anonymised. 
 
1. In your own words, please define heritage crime. 
 
 
2. What is your role in relation to this heritage site? 
 
 
3. Have you experienced any instances of heritage crime on this heritage site? 
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4. When reporting an incident of heritage crime to your local police force, can you 
describe the police response? (time, how they acted, if they used a Heritage Crime 
Impact Statement) 
 
5. To what extent do you feel that your local police force understands heritage crime? 
 
 
6. Have you ever been consulted by your local police force about preventing instances of 
criminal behaviour on this site? 
 
7. In your opinion, does your local police force do enough to tackle heritage crime? 
 
 
8. Has your role as a place manager required you to respond to heritage crime yourself? 
 
 
9. In your opinion, what are the impacts of heritage crime? 
 
 
10. Who are the victims of heritage crime in your opinion? 
 
 
11. Are you aware of the resources provided by Historic England concerning heritage 
crime? 
 
12. What, if any, recommendations would you give to improve your local police force’s 
understanding of heritage crime? 
 
Thank you for participating in this interview. If you would like a copy of this interview 
once it has been transcribed, please contact me on: bethan.poyser@ntu.ac.uk and I will 
gladly supply one. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Freedom of Information request email 
 
To whom it may concern, 
 
 
I am requesting this information under the Freedom of Information Act (2000). 
Currently, I am conducting a PhD on heritage crime. As part of this research, I am hoping 
to find out if every police force in England is in possession of a heritage 
crime liaison officer. 
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The role of heritage crime liaison officer is often (almost exclusively) ‘bolted on’ to a 
serving police officer’s existing role. For example, in some forces Rural and Wildlife 
Crime Officers have had the role of heritage crime liaison officer bolted onto their existing 
position, becoming Rural, Wildlife and Heritage Crime Officers. In other forces, the role 
of heritage crime liaison officer is taken on alongside the officer’s existing position; with 
the officer in question being referred to as, for example, ‘Inspector and Heritage Crime 
Liaison Officer.’ 
 
With this mind, my 2 questions are as follows: 
 
 
1). Does your force have a heritage crime liaison officer/heritage crime officer? 
 
 
2). If your force does have a heritage crime liaison officer, could you please tell me what 
rank the officer in question is and if that officer is one of the following: a Rural and 
Wildlife Crime Officer; Rural, Wildlife and Environmental Crime Officer; Rural 
Crime Officer; Wildlife Crime Officer; or Wildlife and Environmental Crime Officer, or 






Appendix 3: Freedom of Information Request results from police forces in England 
 
 
Force Does this force have a heritage crime officer? Rank and Role of Officer 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary No: ‘Avon and Somerset Police does not currently have a heritage 
crime officer or heritage crime liaison officer.’ 
N/A 
Bedfordshire Police No: ‘Bedfordshire Police does not have a dedicated heritage crime 
officer. We have a Rural Crime Team which incorporates wildlife crime 
within their role. The Rural Crime Team consists of 1 Inspector, 1 
Sergeant and 4 Constable’ 
N/A 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary No: ‘We do not have a specific heritage crime officer as a named 
individual. We have a team of Rural Crime officers for whom heritage 
crime is part of their overall remit.’ 
N/A 
Cheshire Constabulary No: ‘Cheshire Constabulary does have a Heritage watch volunteer, in 
addition the responsibility is sometimes bolted onto the role of Rural 
Crime Officers responsibilities depending on the location in Cheshire. 
We do not have anything on Force systems to highlight this, however 




City of London Police No N/A 
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Cleveland Police No: “Having made enquiries within the Force we do not have a heritage 
crime liaison officer.’ 
N/A 
Cumbria Constabulary No: ‘I can confirm that Cumbria Constabulary do not have a Crime 
Liaison/Heritage Crime Officer.’ 
N/A 
Derbyshire Constabulary Yes PC: Wildlife, CITES & Heritage 
Crime Officer 
Devon & Cornwall Police No: ‘No, we do not have specified roles of this nature. This activity is 
normally aligned to Neighbourhood and Local Investigation Police 
Officer roles…this covers all Police Officer Ranks’ 
N/A 
Dorset Police Yes: ‘A thematic held by a Patrol Inspector who does not have 
responsibility for rural crime. However, the thematic of heritage crime 
does sit under the Territorial Policing Command as does rural crime.’ 
Inspector 
Durham Constabulary Yes Detective Sergeant 
Essex Police Yes Rural and Wildlife Crime Officer 
 
Essex Police has an officer who 
specializes in wildlife and heritage 
matters supported by other officers 
covering all three local policing 
areas. 
 
Essex Police also has a crime 
prevention tactical adviser who also 
has a heritage crime portfolio. 
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  Essex Police also has a Heritage 
watch portfolio. All three work 
closely together in regard to 
heritage crime matters 
. 
Gloucestershire Constabulary  N/A 
Greater Manchester Police No: ‘There is no post title within the force of heritage crime liaison 
officer/heritage crime officer. GMP does have some officers who are 
wildlife liaison officers as a bolt-on to their normal role.’ 
N/A 
Hampshire Constabulary Yes: ‘Our force has a team of Rural and Wildlife Crime Officers who 
all deal with heritage crime’ 
1 Inspector, 1 Sergeant, 6 police 
staff, 3 police staff investigators 
. 
Hertfordshire Constabulary Yes: ‘Hertfordshire Constabulary has 3 X full time Heritage Crime 
Officers. (1 x Sgt & 2 x PC) they, in turn, link in with Safer 
Neighbourhood teams throughout the Constabulary to ensure crimes 
reported against wildlife are fully investigated. 
They form the Rural Operational Support Team and also lead on Rural, 
Wildlife, Environmental and Equine Crime.’ 
1 Sergeant, 2 PCs 
All 3 are Rural Crime Officers, part 




Humberside Police Yes PC: Rural and Wildlife Crime 
Officer (not responded yet but 
available online0 
Kent Police Yes Sergeant: Rural, Wildlife and 
Heritage Crime (this isn’t an FOI 
response-can find out online) 
Lancashire Constabulary Yes Police staff: Rural, Wildlife and 
Heritage Crime Co-ordinator. 
Leicestershire Police Yes: ‘Sgt Redacted is the tactical lead for heritage crime in 
Leicestershire Police.’ 
‘He has this as part of his portfolio of heritage, wildlife and rural crime. 
The role involves liaising with a team of our officers who will also have 
wildlife and rural crime within their portfolio's (as well as their normal 
neighbourhood responsibilities). [Sgt’s own words] ‘I also liaise / 
supervise a team of heritage watch volunteers who are people who have 
academic knowledge of heritage and a passion to deliver crime 
prevention advice and guidance for some of our locations.’’ 
Sergeant: Rural, Wildlife and 
Heritage Crime Lead. 
Lincolnshire Police Yes: ‘Lincolnshire Police has a force lead on Rural Crime, which 
includes responsibility for Heritage Crime…[the officer] has 
responsibility for Rural Crime and the force Wildlife Officers.’ 
Chief Inspector: Rural, Wildlife and 
Heritage Crime Lead. 
Merseyside Police No N/A 
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Metropolitan Police Service Arts and Antiques Unit (contains 3 officers which are dedicated to the 
policing of art and antiques crime. Heritage crime would be delegated to 
these officers) 
N/A 
Norfolk Constabulary No: ‘Neither Norfolk nor Suffolk Constabulary has a dedicated heritage 
crime liaison officer/heritage crime officer. The Rural Crime Teams 
also cover reports of heritage crime. In Norfolk, the dedicated rural 
officer is a Wildlife Crime Officer. There are a further 36 Wildlife 
Crime Officers across the organisation in a variety of roles.’ 
N/A 
North Yorkshire Police Yes Inspector (not actual response-can 
find out online) 
Northamptonshire Police No: Northamptonshire Police has 2 Rural Crime Officers who oversee 
the investigation of Heritage Crimes.’ 
N/A 
Northumbria Police No: ‘Northumbria Police do not have heritage crime liaison 
officers/heritage crime officers.’ 
N/A 
Nottinghamshire Police Yes Chief Inspector: Rural and Wildlife 
Crime Lead for the Force. 
South Yorkshire Police No: ‘I approached a number of departments and our districts for 
assistance with this request. Firstly Workforce Planning firstly advised 
that there is no listing of Heritage Crime Liaison Officer but they 
checked with each of our four districts (Sheffield, Rotherham, Barnsley, 
Doncaster) Each returned with a Nil response. Our Operational Support 
Unit & Specialist Crime Services also gave a Nil response. Therefore 
our response is one of “No Information Held” 
Incidents or Crimes of this type would be part of the daily duties of all 




Staffordshire Police Yes: ‘They do act as part of the Rural and Wildlife Crime Unit; 
however, this is ancillary to their regular duties.’ 
Inspector: Part of the Rural and 
Wildlife Crime Unit. 
Suffolk Constabulary No: ‘Neither Norfolk nor Suffolk Constabulary has a dedicated heritage 
crime liaison officer/heritage crime officer. The Rural Crime Teams 
also cover reports of heritage crime. In Suffolk, Nick Stonehouse is the 
Head of a Rural Policing Team.’ 
N/A 
Surrey Police Yes PC: Rural, Wildlife and Heritage 
Crime Co-ordinator 
Sussex Police Yes Sergeant: Rural Wildlife & Heritage 
Lead 
PCSO-Voluntary Heritage Crime 
Officer 
Thames Valley Police No: ‘Whilst Thames Valley Police have a designated officer who will 
deal with wildlife and rural crime, there is not a specific job role of 
‘Heritage Crime Liaison Officer.’ 
N/A 
Warwickshire Police No N/A 
West Mercia Police No N/A 
West Midlands Police No: ‘West Midlands Police have a subject matter expert for Wildlife 
Crime, Rural Affairs and Heritage Crime. The subject matter expert is a 




West Yorkshire Police No: ‘West Yorkshire Police do not hold any information in relation to 
your request, as heritage crime is covered within a Police Officer’s 
role.’ 
N/A 
Wiltshire Police  N/A 
   
Dyfed-Powys Police Yes Inspector and Heritage Crime 
Liaison Officer 
Gwent Police Yes PC-Rural, Wildlife and Heritage 
Crime Officer 
North Wales Police Yes PC-Rural and Wildlife Crime 
Officer 
South Wales Police Yes PC-Wildlife and Environmental 
Crime Officer 
 
